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Cited by 234

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Restraining Overconfident CEOs through Improved Governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

Open access
Banerjee, Suman, Humphery-Jenner, Mark, Nanda, Vikram · 2015 · Review of Financial Studies

Abstract

The literature posits that some CEO overconfidence benefits shareholders, though high levels may not. We argue that adequate controls and independent viewpoints provided by an independent board mitigates the costs of CEO overconfidence. We use the concurrent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and changes to the NYSE/NASDAQ listing rules (collectively, SOX) as natural experiments, to examine whether board independence improves decision making by overconfident CEOs. The results are strongly supportive: after SOX, overconfident CEOs reduce investment and risk exposure, increase dividends, improve postacquisition performance, and have better operating performance and market value. Importantly, these changes are absent for overconfident-CEO firms that were compliant prior to SOX.

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Metadata

Authors
Banerjee, S., Humphery-Jenner, M., & Nanda, V.
Venue
Review of Financial Studies
Published
2015-06-01
Volume
28
Issue
10
Pages
2812-2858
ISSN
  • 0893-9454 (ISSN-L)
  • 1465-7368
OpenAlex
W3126000200
Cited by
234
References
3
FWCI
67.79
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Restraining Overconfident CEOs through Improved Governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/rfs/hhv034
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Banerjee, S., Humphery-Jenner, M., & Nanda, V. (2015). Restraining Overconfident CEOs through Improved Governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Review of Financial Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhv034

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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