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Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter
Open accessAbstract
Operating performance and stock return results imply that managers who commit fraud anticipate large stock price declines if they were to report truthfully, which would cause greater losses for managerial stockholdings than for options because of differences in convexity. Fraud firms have significantly greater incentives from unrestricted stockholdings than control firms do, and unrestricted stockholdings are their largest incentive source. Our results emphasize the importance of the shape and vesting status of incentive payoffs in providing incentives to commit fraud. Fraud firms also have characteristics that suggest a lower likelihood of fraud detection, which implies lower expected costs of fraud.
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Cites
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Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods
Cohen, D. A., Dey, A., & Lys, T. Z. (2008) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2008.83.3.757 · Cited by 3,078
The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting
Armstrong, C. S., Guay, W. R., & Weber, J. P. (2010) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001 · Cited by 1,494
Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia
EDMANS, A. (2009) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01508.x · Cited by 1,258
Executive overconfidence and the slippery slope to financial misreporting
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Metadata
- Authors
- Johnson, S. A., Ryan, H. E., & Tian, Y. S.
- Venue
- Review of Finance
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2008-05-09
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 115-145
- ISSN
- 1382-6662 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-692X
- 1572-3097
- OpenAlex
- W3125313247
- Cited by
- 560
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 111.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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- Johnson, S. A., Ryan, H. E., & Tian, Y. S. (2009). Managerial Incentives and Corporate Fraud: The Sources of Incentives Matter. Review of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfn014
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.