The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Cost of Political Connections
Open accessAbstract
Using plant-level data from France, we document a potential cost of political connections for firms that is not offset by other benefits. Politically connected CEOs alter corporate employment decisions to help (regional) politicians in their re-election efforts by having higher job and plant creation rates, and lower rates of destruction in election years, especially in politically contested areas. There is little evidence that connected firms benefit from preferential access to government resources, such as subsidies or tax exemptions. Connected firms are less profitable in the cross-section and also experience a drop in profitability when a connected CEO comes to power.
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Cites
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Self-citationCorporate Lobbying and Fraud Detection
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Rent Seeking in Elite Networks
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Corporate Governance in China: A Survey
Jiang, F., & Kim, K. A. (2020) · Review of Finance · doi:10.1093/rof/rfaa012 · Cited by 815
Senior management's academic experience and corporate green innovation
He, K., Chen, W., & Zhang, L. (2021) · Technological Forecasting and Social Change · doi:10.1016/j.techfore.2021.120664 · Cited by 299
Metadata
- Authors
- Bertrand, M., Kramarz, F., Schoar, A., & Thesmar, D.
- Venue
- Review of Finance
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2018-03-07
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 849-876
- ISSN
- 1382-6662 (ISSN-L)
- 1572-3097
- 1573-692X
- OpenAlex
- W2790630030
- Cited by
- 356
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 40.22
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.