Student or educator? Sign up with your school email and get 6 months of Pro free.
CoChat
Sign Up
Cited by 441

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India

Open access
Cole, Shawn·2009·American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
DOI 10.1257/app.1.1.219
Open this paper in CoChat — free account

Abstract

This paper integrates theories of political budget cycles with theories of tactical electoral redistribution to test for political capture in a novel way. Studying banks in India, I find that government-owned bank lending tracks the electoral cycle, with agricultural credit increasing by 5–10 percentage points in an election year. There is significant cross-sectional targeting, with large increases in districts in which the election is particularly close. This targeting does not occur in nonelection years or in private bank lending. I show capture is costly: elections affect loan repayment, and election-year credit booms do not measurably affect agricultural output. (JEL D72, O13, O17, Q14, Q18)

Overview

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1257/app.1.1.219

Cites

28 of 28 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Verification

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Citations

Cites

Show all 28 references

Cited by

See all 441

Metadata

Authors
Cole, S.
Venue
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics
Publisher
American Economic Association
Published
2009-01-01
Volume
1
Issue
1
Pages
219-250
ISSN
  • 1945-7782 (ISSN-L)
  • 1945-7790
DOI
10.1257/app.1.1.219
OpenAlex
W2096027253
Cited by
441
References
28
FWCI
45.86
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/app.1.1.219
The paper
Cole, S. (2009). Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. https://doi.org/10.1257/app.1.1.219

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.