The DOI matches its Crossref record; 93 of the 97 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 28 of the 81 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
The brain's conversation with itself: neural substrates of dialogic inner speech
Open accessAbstract
Inner speech has been implicated in important aspects of normal and atypical cognition, including the development of auditory hallucinations. Studies to date have focused on covert speech elicited by simple word or sentence repetition, while ignoring richer and arguably more psychologically significant varieties of inner speech. This study compared neural activation for inner speech involving conversations ('dialogic inner speech') with single-speaker scenarios ('monologic inner speech'). Inner speech-related activation differences were then compared with activations relating to Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning and visual perspective-taking in a conjunction design. Generation of dialogic (compared with monologic) scenarios was associated with a widespread bilateral network including left and right superior temporal gyri, precuneus, posterior cingulate and left inferior and medial frontal gyri. Activation associated with dialogic scenarios and ToM reasoning overlapped in areas of right posterior temporal cortex previously linked to mental state representation. Implications for understanding verbal cognition in typical and atypical populations are discussed.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
This fMRI study compared dialogic versus monologic inner speech in 19 participants and found that dialogic inner speech engaged a broader bilateral network than monologic inner speech, including superior temporal and medial/posterior midline regions. The dialogic condition also overlapped with Theory-of-Mind reasoning in right posterior temporal cortex, suggesting a link between internal dialogue and social-cognitive processing.
## Key findings
- In the scanner, dialogic compared with monologic inner speech showed significantly greater activation in bilateral superior temporal gyri, left inferior and medial frontal gyri, left precuneus, and right posterior cingulate; the reverse contrast found no significant activations.
- Conjunction analysis of dialogic > monologic inner speech with Theory-of-Mind > physical reasoning identified one significant overlapping cluster in right posterior STG (48, −41, 20; t = 4.59; cluster size = 15; P < 0.05, corrected). At a more liberal threshold, overlaps also appeared in right anterior STG, precuneus, right MTG, left paracentral lobule, and right fusiform gyrus.
- Individual differences analyses found that vividness ratings correlated with right posterior MTG (36, −58, 15; t = 5.47; cluster size = 37) and right cingulate gyrus (6, −23, 35; t = 4.93; cluster size = 9), while the Dialogic Inner Speech subscale of the VISQ correlated with right MTG (39, −58, 15; t = 6.57) and two right precuneus clusters.
- In the mock-scanner behavioral study (n = 20), dialogic scenarios had more vivid other voices (t = 7.47, df = 19, P < 0.001) and more switches in perspective/voice/role (t = 5.35, df = 19, P < 0.001) than monologic scenarios; in both scenario types, inner speech ratings exceeded visual imagery ratings.
## Methods
- The main study used fMRI in 21 recruited right-handed native English speakers; 2 were excluded for movement, leaving 19 participants in the imaging analyses.
- Participants completed three scanner tasks: an inner-speech task with five dialogic and five monologic scenarios, a cartoon-based Theory-of-Mind task (10 ToM stories and 10 physical reasoning stories), and a visual perspective-switching task; after scanning they provided vividness/imagery ratings and VISQ self-reports.
- Analyses used SPM8 general linear models, with within-subject contrasts for dialogic vs monologic inner speech, ToM vs physical reasoning, and Switch vs Stick, followed by conjunction analyses to identify shared activation.
- A separate mock-scanner behavioral study used 20 additional participants to rate phenomenology of the inner-speech task, including vividness, inner speech, visual imagery, voice vividness, and switches in perspective/voice/role; an articulatory suppression version was also tested.
## Limitations
- The paper states that a key limitation is whether the inner-speech task truly elicited inner speech, since participants may have varied in their ability to generate it or may have relied on visual imagery instead.
- The paper also states that the perspective-switching task did not produce consistent activation maps for conjunction analysis, limiting assessment of whether dialogicity depended only on imagery-related demands.
- The text makes evident that the sample for the imaging study was small (19 analyzed participants), and the authors explicitly note that the individual-difference correlates require replication in a much larger sample.
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Claims the paper makes
23 Valid · 4 Not valid · 26 Not checked · 68 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Reading of direct speech was specifically associated with activation in middle and posterior right STS compared with indirect speech.”
§ The brain’s conversation with itself: neural substrates of dialogic inner speech > Introduction
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Yao et al. (2011) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The paper title in our copy states that silent reading of direct versus indirect speech activates voice-selective areas in the auditory cortex. The available passages do not identify those areas as the middle and posterior right STS, so they do not verify that specific localization. (LLM, conf=0.75)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“Taken together, these findings suggest that dialogic forms of inner speech are likely to draw on a range of regions beyond a typical left-sided perisylvian language network, including the right IFG, right middle temporal gyrus (MTG) and the right STG/STS.”
§ The brain’s conversation with itself: neural substrates of dialogic inner speech > Introduction
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Shergill et al. (2001) source
- Could not verifycites Yao et al. (2011) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Our indexed copy provides the paper’s title and bibliographic information (unpaged), but no findings identifying the right IFG, right MTG, or right STG/STS as regions involved in dialogic inner speech. Searches for those regions, dialogic inner speech, and direct-speech reading returned no substantive passage that settles the claim. (LLM, conf=0.70)
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The same areas were also active in a second study (Yao et al., 2012) when participants listened to examples of direct speech read in a monotonous voice, but that was not the case during listening to indirect speech.”
§ The brain’s conversation with itself: neural substrates of dialogic inner speech > Introduction
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Yao et al. (2012) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Discussion and The main contrast report greater activity in right temporal voice areas for monotonous direct speech than for monotonous indirect speech, in areas similar to those found in the earlier reading study. But The main contrast explicitly says both listening conditions were active against baseline, so the claim overstates the result if “not the case” means those areas were inactive during indirect speech. (LLM, conf=0.91)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Similarly, in an AVH study by Linden et al. (2011), auditory imagery for familiar voices, such as conversations with family members, was associated with bilateral activation in IFG, superior temporal sulcus (STS), SMA and anterior cingulate cortex in healthy participants.”
§ The brain’s conversation with itself: neural substrates of dialogic inner speech > Introduction
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Linden et al. (2011) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The AI Participants section says healthy participants commonly imagined familiar people, including family members in conversation. Table 2 reports auditory-imagery activation in both hemispheres for IFG and STS, but lists SMA/pre-SMA only under the left hemisphere and anterior cingulate cortex across the midline. The claim is supported except insofar as it describes SMA and anterior cingulate activation as bilateral. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“The involvement of a left-hemisphere network including IFG, STG and the cerebellum during generation of dialogic scenarios is consistent with prior inner speech studies (Shergill et al., 2001; Simons et al., 2010; Geva et al., 2011) and implies a greater demand on these areas when a dialogue must be produced (in contrast to a monologue).”
§ The brain’s conversation with itself: neural substrates of dialogic inner speech > Discussion
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Shergill et al., 2001 source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Simons et al., 2010 source
- Supportedcites Geva et al., 2011 source
The Discussion (page unavailable) reports prior inner-speech findings involving the left inferior frontal gyrus, left superior temporal gyrus and bilateral cerebellum. This supports the citation’s role as background for the regions involved; the dialogue-versus-monologue inference is the citing authors’ own interpretation, not a finding attributed to Geva et al. (LLM, conf=0.87)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Neuroscientific techniques such as brain imaging and neurostimulation have added detail to the picture of how IS arises functionally in the brain [17,18].”
From Inner speech as language process and cognitive tool (2023) · cites this paper as [18]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“The contrast between dialogal and monologal inner speech revealed increased activation in STG bilaterally, left IFG and MFG, left precuneus, and right posterior cingulate.”
From The ConDialInt Model: Condensation, Dialogality, and Intentionality Dimensions of Inner Speech Within a Hierarchical Predictive Control Framework (2019) · cites this paper as Alderson-Day et al. (2016)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“The study by Alderson-Day et al. (2016) addressed dialogality in a more ecological way, using scenarios designed to elicit either monologal (soliloquial) or dialogal (imagining a dialog with another person) inner speech.”
From The ConDialInt Model: Condensation, Dialogality, and Intentionality Dimensions of Inner Speech Within a Hierarchical Predictive Control Framework (2019) · cites this paper as Alderson-Day et al. (2016)
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Contrary to our own results, however, there was no increase in right IFG and MTG in dialogal inner speech compared with monologal inner speech in their study.”
From The ConDialInt Model: Condensation, Dialogality, and Intentionality Dimensions of Inner Speech Within a Hierarchical Predictive Control Framework (2019) · cites this paper as Alderson-Day et al. (2016)
Citations
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The Brain's Default Network: Anatomy, Function, and Relevance to Disease
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Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8 · Cited by 8,599 · cited 1×
“As a second example, atypical ToM has for a long time been considered a core feature of autism spectrum disorder (Baron-Cohen et al ., 1985), but differences in inner speech in autism have only been studied relatively recently (Whitehouse et al ., 2006; Wallace et al ., 2009; Holland and Low, 2010).”
Frith, C., & Frith, U. (2005) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/j.cub.2005.08.041 · Cited by 3,481
Automated Talairach Atlas labels for functional brain mapping
Lancaster, J. L., Woldorff, M. G., Parsons, L. M., Liotti, M., Freitas, C. S., Rainey, L., Kochunov, P. V., Nickerson, D., Mikiten, S. A., & Fox, P. T. (2000) · Human Brain Mapping · doi:10.1002/1097-0193(200007)10:3<120::aid-hbm30>3.0.co;2-8 · Cited by 3,387
(1987) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 2,399
People thinking about thinking peopleThe role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind”
Saxe, R., & Kanwisher, N. (2003) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/s1053-8119(03)00230-1 · Cited by 2,316 · cited 2×
“While sentence repetition was associated with activation of left IFG, superior temporal gyrus (STG), insula and the SMA, imagined speech in another person’s voice recruited a bilateral frontotemporal network, including right IFG, left pre-central gyrus and right STG. Similarly, in an AVH study by…”
Spreng, R. N., Mar, R. A., & Kim, A. S. N. (2009) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn.2008.21029 · Cited by 2,143 · cited 12×
“Recent research on structural connectivity suggests that TPJ splits into three separate subregions: a dorsal component connecting to lateral anterior PFC, an anterior region connecting to the ventral attentional network and a posterior region connecting to social cognitive areas such as the precuneus and posterior cin…”
BackgroundInfluentialThe cognitive neuropsychology of schizophrenia
(1993) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.31-0601 · Cited by 1,901
Other minds in the brain: a functional imaging study of “theory of mind” in story comprehension.
Fletcher, P. (1995) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(95)00692-r · Cited by 1,522 · cited 1×
“Activity in posterior right STG was evident during both dialogic scenarios and ToM reasoning, in a region previously linked to both ToM (Fletcher et al., 1995) and imagery for personal perspectives (Ruby and Decety, 2001).”
Improving Lesion-Symptom Mapping
Rorden, C., Karnath, H.-O., & Bonilha, L. (2007) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn.2007.19.7.1081 · Cited by 1,346 · cited 1×
“Brain images were generated using SPM and MRICron (Rorden et al., 2007).”
Method
Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Morin, 2009, Inner speech, 380
- Schneider, 2002, E-Prime Reference Guide
- WHO, 1993, The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders: Diagnostic Criteria for Research
Cited by
Inner Speech: Development, Cognitive Functions, Phenomenology, and Neurobiology
Alderson-Day, B., & Fernyhough, C. (2015) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/bul0000021 · Cited by 864
Self-citationSchizophrenia, dopamine and the striatum: From biology to symptoms
McCutcheon, R. A., Abi-Dargham, A., & Howes, O. D. (2019) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2018.12.004 · Cited by 763
“The neurobiological correlate of inner speech includes neural activation in cortical areas involved in the perception of external speech, such as the secondary auditory cortex [93], and these cortical areas project to the dorsal striatum [18].”
BackgroundDecoding Covert Speech From EEG-A Comprehensive Review
Panachakel, J. T., & Ramakrishnan, A. G. (2021) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2021.642251 · Cited by 156
Hurlburt, R. T., Alderson-Day, B., Kühn, S., & Fernyhough, C. (2016) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0147932 · Cited by 131
“, rhyming judgments [46] or dialogues [47]) could demonstrate what difference the form and length of inner speech might make.”
BackgroundSelf-citationAlderson-Day, B., Mitrenga, K., Wilkinson, S., McCarthy-Jones, S., & Fernyhough, C. (2018) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2018.07.001 · Cited by 116
“…of mind about how and why we experience our thoughts as our own (Roessler, 2016) – questions that are important to consider when probing the distinction between inner speech, auditory verbal hallucination, and other atypical experiences such as thought insertion (Wilkinson & Alderson-Day, 2016).”
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Alderson-Day, B., Weis, S., McCarthy-Jones, S., Moseley, P., Smailes, D., & Fernyhough, C.
- Affiliations
- Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham, UK,
- Durham University (GB)
- Department of Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, Australia,
- University of Lancashire (GB)
- Venue
- Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2015-07-20
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 110-120
- ISSN
- 1749-5016 (ISSN-L)
- 1749-5024
- PMC
- PMC4692319
- OpenAlex
- W2114910605
- Semantic Scholar
- 2f11819eb4c5d14b5f8b00ceff3da5c2e14108fc
- Cited by
- 94
- References
- 97
- Citations by year
- 2026: 10 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 2
- FWCI
- 11.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Durham Research Online (Durham University) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
- Northumbria Research Link (Northumbria University) (acceptedVersion)
- CLOK (University of Central Lancashire) (acceptedVersion)
- Durham Research Online (Durham University) (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
- Durham Research Online (Durham University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- Wellcome Trust (098455, WT098455, 108720/Z/15/Z)
- Australian Research Council (DE140101077)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Representations and Identity
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neurobiology of Language and Bilingualism
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Hallucinations in medical conditions
- Keywords
- inner speech, theory of mind, perspective taking, auditory hallucinations, neural correlates, superior temporal gyrus, precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex, frontal cortex, mental state representation, verbal cognition
- MeSH terms
- Brain, Brain Mapping, Dominance, Cerebral, Female, Humans, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Male, Nerve Net, Speech, Thinking, Theory of Mind
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- Alderson-Day, B., Weis, S., McCarthy-Jones, S., Moseley, P., Smailes, D., & Fernyhough, C. (2016). The brain's conversation with itself: neural substrates of dialogic inner speech. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsv094
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