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The brain's conversation with itself: neural substrates of dialogic inner speech

Open access
Alderson-Day, Ben, Weis, Susanne, McCarthy-Jones, Simon, Moseley, Peter, Smailes, David, Fernyhough, Charles · 2016 · Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience

Abstract

Inner speech has been implicated in important aspects of normal and atypical cognition, including the development of auditory hallucinations. Studies to date have focused on covert speech elicited by simple word or sentence repetition, while ignoring richer and arguably more psychologically significant varieties of inner speech. This study compared neural activation for inner speech involving conversations ('dialogic inner speech') with single-speaker scenarios ('monologic inner speech'). Inner speech-related activation differences were then compared with activations relating to Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning and visual perspective-taking in a conjunction design. Generation of dialogic (compared with monologic) scenarios was associated with a widespread bilateral network including left and right superior temporal gyri, precuneus, posterior cingulate and left inferior and medial frontal gyri. Activation associated with dialogic scenarios and ToM reasoning overlapped in areas of right posterior temporal cortex previously linked to mental state representation. Implications for understanding verbal cognition in typical and atypical populations are discussed.

Overview

CoChat Summary

## TL;DR

This fMRI study compared dialogic versus monologic inner speech in 19 participants and found that dialogic inner speech engaged a broader bilateral network than monologic inner speech, including superior temporal and medial/posterior midline regions. The dialogic condition also overlapped with Theory-of-Mind reasoning in right posterior temporal cortex, suggesting a link between internal dialogue and social-cognitive processing.

## Key findings

  • In the scanner, dialogic compared with monologic inner speech showed significantly greater activation in bilateral superior temporal gyri, left inferior and medial frontal gyri, left precuneus, and right posterior cingulate; the reverse contrast found no significant activations.
  • Conjunction analysis of dialogic > monologic inner speech with Theory-of-Mind > physical reasoning identified one significant overlapping cluster in right posterior STG (48, −41, 20; t = 4.59; cluster size = 15; P < 0.05, corrected). At a more liberal threshold, overlaps also appeared in right anterior STG, precuneus, right MTG, left paracentral lobule, and right fusiform gyrus.
  • Individual differences analyses found that vividness ratings correlated with right posterior MTG (36, −58, 15; t = 5.47; cluster size = 37) and right cingulate gyrus (6, −23, 35; t = 4.93; cluster size = 9), while the Dialogic Inner Speech subscale of the VISQ correlated with right MTG (39, −58, 15; t = 6.57) and two right precuneus clusters.
  • In the mock-scanner behavioral study (n = 20), dialogic scenarios had more vivid other voices (t = 7.47, df = 19, P < 0.001) and more switches in perspective/voice/role (t = 5.35, df = 19, P < 0.001) than monologic scenarios; in both scenario types, inner speech ratings exceeded visual imagery ratings.

## Methods

  • The main study used fMRI in 21 recruited right-handed native English speakers; 2 were excluded for movement, leaving 19 participants in the imaging analyses.
  • Participants completed three scanner tasks: an inner-speech task with five dialogic and five monologic scenarios, a cartoon-based Theory-of-Mind task (10 ToM stories and 10 physical reasoning stories), and a visual perspective-switching task; after scanning they provided vividness/imagery ratings and VISQ self-reports.
  • Analyses used SPM8 general linear models, with within-subject contrasts for dialogic vs monologic inner speech, ToM vs physical reasoning, and Switch vs Stick, followed by conjunction analyses to identify shared activation.
  • A separate mock-scanner behavioral study used 20 additional participants to rate phenomenology of the inner-speech task, including vividness, inner speech, visual imagery, voice vividness, and switches in perspective/voice/role; an articulatory suppression version was also tested.

## Limitations

  • The paper states that a key limitation is whether the inner-speech task truly elicited inner speech, since participants may have varied in their ability to generate it or may have relied on visual imagery instead.
  • The paper also states that the perspective-switching task did not produce consistent activation maps for conjunction analysis, limiting assessment of whether dialogicity depended only on imagery-related demands.
  • The text makes evident that the sample for the imaging study was small (19 analyzed participants), and the authors explicitly note that the individual-difference correlates require replication in a much larger sample.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1093/scan/nsv094

Cites

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Figures

Fig. 1. Conjunction of dialogic inner speech and theory-of-mind. A cluster in right STG (Fig.1a) was evident for both dialogic inner speech > monologic inner speech and ToM > physical reasoning, rendered here on the standard MNI brain supplied by SPM. Dialogic inner speech (Fig 1b; blue) was evident in right STG, cingulate and frontal gyrus, while ToM (yellow) was associated with extensive right STG activation running posterior to anterior. Their conjunction (green) was at the posterior end of right STG, in the TPJ area. ToM, Theory-of-mind; STG, superior temporal gyrus, all P < 0.05, corr., clusters > 6 voxels.
Fig. 1. Conjunction of dialogic inner speech and theory-of-mind. A cluster in right STG (Fig.1a) was evident for both dialogic inner speech > monologic inner speech and ToM > physical reasoning, rendered here on the standard MNI brain supplied by SPM. Dialogic inner speech (Fig 1b; blue) was evident in right STG, cingulate and frontal gyrus, while ToM (yellow) was associated with extensive right STG activation running posterior to anterior. Their conjunction (green) was at the posterior end of right STG, in the TPJ area. ToM, Theory-of-mind; STG, superior temporal gyrus, all P < 0.05, corr., clusters > 6 voxels.CC BY · PubMed Central

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Citations

Cites

Show all 97 references

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Morin, 2009, Inner speech, 380
  2. Schneider, 2002, E-Prime Reference Guide
  3. WHO, 1993, The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders: Diagnostic Criteria for Research

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Metadata

Authors
Alderson-Day, B., Weis, S., McCarthy-Jones, S., Moseley, P., Smailes, D., & Fernyhough, C.
Affiliations
  • Department of Psychology, Durham University, Durham, UK,
  • Durham University (GB)
  • Department of Cognitive Science, Macquarie University, Australia,
  • University of Lancashire (GB)
Venue
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience
Published
2015-07-20
Volume
11
Issue
1
Pages
110-120
ISSN
  • 1749-5016 (ISSN-L)
  • 1749-5024
OpenAlex
W2114910605
Cited by
94
References
97
Citations by year
2026: 10 · 2025: 10 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 6 · 2015: 2
FWCI
11.45
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by-nc)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Durham Research Online (Durham University) (publishedVersion, other-oa)
  • Northumbria Research Link (Northumbria University) (acceptedVersion)
  • CLOK (University of Central Lancashire) (acceptedVersion)
  • Durham Research Online (Durham University) (acceptedVersion, other-oa)
  • Durham Research Online (Durham University) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
Funders
  • Wellcome Trust (098455, WT098455, 108720/Z/15/Z)
  • Australian Research Council (DE140101077)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Representations and Identity
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neurobiology of Language and Bilingualism
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Hallucinations in medical conditions
Keywords
inner speech, theory of mind, perspective taking, auditory hallucinations, neural correlates, superior temporal gyrus, precuneus, posterior cingulate cortex, frontal cortex, mental state representation, verbal cognition
MeSH terms
Brain, Brain Mapping, Dominance, Cerebral, Female, Humans, Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Male, Nerve Net, Speech, Thinking, Theory of Mind

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The brain's conversation with itself: neural substrates of dialogic inner speech. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1093/scan/nsv094
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Alderson-Day, B., Weis, S., McCarthy-Jones, S., Moseley, P., Smailes, D., & Fernyhough, C. (2016). The brain's conversation with itself: neural substrates of dialogic inner speech. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsv094

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