The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence
Abstract
Political influence on the central bank is measured here by looking at the probability that a central bank governor will be replaced shortly after a political change of government. The governor changes about half the time within six months of a nonconstitutional or other radical change of government—a military coup or a restoration of democracy. The governor is much less likely to change within six months following a routine change in the head of government—about one-fourth of the time in developing countries and one-tenth in industrial countries. These indicators vary across countries and correlate statistically with inflation and its variability and with real growth and real interest rates. Differences in the vulnerability of the central bank to political instability, in political instability itself, and in central bank turnover in nonpolitical periods seem to be a major part of the explanation for why developing countries have, on average, higher and more variable inflation than industrial countries do.
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Citations
Cites
Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries
Barro, R. (1989) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w3120 · Cited by 8,385
Political instability and economic growth
Alesina, A., �zler, S., Roubini, N., & Swagel, P. (1996) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1007/bf00138862 · Cited by 1,830
The Political Economy of Growth
Yeager, L. B., & Baran, P. A. (1958) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1055713 · Cited by 1,395
(1992) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,366
Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes
Cukierman, A., Web, S. B., & Neyapti, B. (1992) · The World Bank Economic Review · doi:10.1093/wber/6.3.353 · Cited by 950
Self-citationVoting for reform: democracy, political liberalization, and economic adjustment
(1995) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.32-4010 · Cited by 379
Growth, Macroeconomics, and Development
Fischer, S. (1991) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w3702 · Cited by 174
The Pressures on American Monetary Policy
Havrilesky, T. M. (1993) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4757-2228-4 · Cited by 161
Cited by
Fiscal policy and economic growth
Easterly, W., & Rebelo, S. (1993) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3932(93)90025-b · Cited by 1,667
KEEFER, P., & STASAVAGE, D. (2003) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055403000777 · Cited by 636
More evidence on income distribution and growth
Clarke, G. R. G. (1995) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-3878(94)00069-o · Cited by 560
Gilardi, F. (2002) · Journal of European Public Policy · doi:10.1080/1350176022000046409 · Cited by 498
Contract-Intensive Money: Contract Enforcement, Property Rights, and Economic Performance
Clague, C., Keefer, P., Knack, S., & Olson, M. (1999) · Journal of Economic Growth · doi:10.1023/a:1009854405184 · Cited by 483
Metadata
- Authors
- Cukierman, A., & Webb, S. B.
- Venue
- The World Bank Economic Review
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1995
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 397-423
- ISSN
- 0258-6770 (ISSN-L)
- 1564-698X
- OpenAlex
- W2170770541
- Cited by
- 306
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 20.60
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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