The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Enforcement and Good Corporate Governance in Developing Countries and Transition Economies
Open accessAbstract
More than regulations, laws on the books, or voluntary codes, enforcement is key to creating an effective business environment and good corporate governance, at least in developing countries and transition economies. A framework is presented to help explain enforcement, the impact on corporate governance when rules are not enforced, and what can be done to improve corporate governance in weak enforcement environments. The limited empirical evidence suggests that private enforcement tools are often more effective than public tools. However, some public enforcement is necessary, and private enforcement mechanisms often require public laws to function. Private initiatives are often also taken under the threat of legislation or regulation, although in some countries bottom-up, private-led initiatives preceded and even shaped public laws. Concentrated ownership aligns incentives and encourages monitoring, but it weakens other corporate governance mechanisms and can impose significant costs. Various steps can be taken to reduce these costs and reinforce other corporate governance mechanisms. But political economy constraints, resulting from the intermingling of business and politics, often prevent improvements in the enforcement environment and the adoption and implementation of public laws.
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Cites
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302753399436 · Cited by 3,956
Economic Theories of Legal Liability
Cooter, R. D. (1991) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.5.3.11 · Cited by 104
Metadata
- Authors
- Berglof, E.
- Venue
- The World Bank Research Observer
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2006-01-12
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 123-150
- ISSN
- 0257-3032 (ISSN-L)
- 1564-6971
- OpenAlex
- W2166177033
- Cited by
- 158
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 36.01
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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