Entry Regulation and the Formalization of Microenterprises in Developing Countries
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The majority of microenterprises in most developing countries remain informal despite more than a decade of reforms aimed at making it easier and cheaper for them to formalize. This paper summarizes the evidence on the effects of entry reforms and related policy actions to promote firm formalization. Most of these policies result in only a modest increase in the number of formal firms, if there is any increase at all. Most informal firms appear to not benefit on net from formalizing. As a consequence, ease of formalization along will not induce most of them to become formal. Increased enforcement of rules can increase formality. Although there is a fiscal benefit of doing this with larger informal firms, it is unclear whether there is a public rationale for attempting to formalize subsistence enterprises.
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Citations
Cites
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BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citation
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Teaching personal initiative beats traditional training in boosting small business in West Africa
Campos, F., Frese, M., Goldstein, M., Iacovone, L., Johnson, H. C., McKenzie, D., & Mensmann, M. (2017) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aan5329 · Cited by 399
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Informality: Causes and Consequences for Development
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Export Markets and Labor Allocation in a Low-Income Country
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Bruhn, M., & McKenzie, D.
- Venue
- The World Bank Research Observer
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2014-03-11
- Volume
- 29
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 186-201
- ISSN
- 0257-3032 (ISSN-L)
- 1564-6971
- OpenAlex
- W2134179690
- Cited by
- 211
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 37.70
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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