The DOI matches its Crossref record; 56 of the 56 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Consumers as Tax Auditors
Open accessAbstract
To investigate the enforcement value of third-party information on potentially collusive taxpayers, I study an anti-tax evasion program that rewards consumers for ensuring that firms report sales and establishes a verification system to aid whistle-blowing consumers in São Paulo, Brazil (Nota Fiscal Paulista). Firms reported sales increased by at least 21 percent over 4 years. The results are consistent with fixed costs of concealing collusion, increased detection probability from whistle-blower threats, and with behavioral biases associated with lotteries amplifying the enforcement value of the program. Although firms increased reported expenses, tax revenue net of rewards increased by 9.3 percent. (JEL D22, H25, H26, L25, O14, O17)
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Becker, G. S. (1968) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259394 · Cited by 13,999
How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E., & Mullainathan, S. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355304772839588 · Cited by 10,641
Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis
Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2 · Cited by 4,970
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1993) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118402 · Cited by 3,778
Thaler, R. H. (1999) · Journal of Behavioral Decision Making · doi:10.1002/(sici)1099-0771(199909)12:3<183::aid-bdm318>3.0.co;2-f · Cited by 3,166
The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk
Friedman, M., & Savage, L. J. (1948) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/256692 · Cited by 3,077
Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semiparametric Approach
DiNardo, J., Fortin, N. M., & Lemieux, T. (1996) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2171954 · Cited by 2,903
Earnings Losses of Displaced Workers
Jacobson, L. S., LaLonde, R. J., & Sullivan, D. G. (1992) · doi:10.17848/wp92-11 · Cited by 2,895
Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence
Chetty, R., Looney, A., & Kroft, K. (2009) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.99.4.1145 · Cited by 2,742
Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?
DYCK, A., MORSE, A., & ZINGALES, L. (2010) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01614.x · Cited by 1,858
Cited by
No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax
Pomeranz, D. (2015) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.20130393 · Cited by 822
Difference-in-Differences Estimators of Intertemporal Treatment Effects
de Chaisemartin, C., & D’Haultfœuille, X. (2026) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_01414 · Cited by 740
Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries
Kleven, H. J., Kreiner, C. T., & Saez, E. (2016) · Economica · doi:10.1111/ecca.12182 · Cited by 340
The effect of a fiscal squeeze on tax enforcement: Evidence from a natural experiment in China
Chen, S. X. (2017) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.01.001 · Cited by 299
Tax Me, but Spend Wisely? Sources of Public Finance and Government Accountability
Gadenne, L. (2017) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.20150509 · Cited by 165
Metadata
- Authors
- Naritomi, J.
- Venue
- American Economic Review
- Publisher
- American Economic Association
- Published
- 2019-09-01
- Volume
- 109
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 3031-3072
- ISSN
- 0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2745994608
- Cited by
- 353
- References
- 56
- FWCI
- 41.15
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Consumers as Tax Auditors. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.20160658
- The paper
- Naritomi, J. (2019). Consumers as Tax Auditors. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160658
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.