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Cited by 353

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 56 of the 56 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Consumers as Tax Auditors

Open access
Naritomi, Joana·2019·American Economic Review

Abstract

To investigate the enforcement value of third-party information on potentially collusive taxpayers, I study an anti-tax evasion program that rewards consumers for ensuring that firms report sales and establishes a verification system to aid whistle-blowing consumers in São Paulo, Brazil (Nota Fiscal Paulista). Firms reported sales increased by at least 21 percent over 4 years. The results are consistent with fixed costs of concealing collusion, increased detection probability from whistle-blower threats, and with behavioral biases associated with lotteries amplifying the enforcement value of the program. Although firms increased reported expenses, tax revenue net of rewards increased by 9.3 percent. (JEL D22, H25, H26, L25, O14, O17)

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Metadata

Authors
Naritomi, J.
Venue
American Economic Review
Published
2019-09-01
Volume
109
Issue
9
Pages
3031-3072
ISSN
0002-8282 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2745994608
Cited by
353
References
56
FWCI
41.15
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Consumers as Tax Auditors. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1257/aer.20160658
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Naritomi, J. (2019). Consumers as Tax Auditors. American Economic Review. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160658

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