The DOI matches its Crossref record; 44 of the 44 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Evolutionary dynamics of collective action in N -person stag hunt dilemmas
Open accessAbstract
In the animal world, collective action to shelter, protect and nourish requires the cooperation of group members. Among humans, many situations require the cooperation of more than two individuals simultaneously. Most of the relevant literature has focused on an extreme case, the N -person Prisoner's Dilemma. Here we introduce a model in which a threshold less than the total group is required to produce benefits, with increasing participation leading to increasing productivity. This model constitutes a generalization of the two-person stag hunt game to an N -person game. Both finite and infinite population models are studied. In infinite populations this leads to a rich dynamics that admits multiple equilibria. Scenarios of defector dominance, pure coordination or coexistence may arise simultaneously. On the other hand, whenever one takes into account that populations are finite and when their size is of the same order of magnitude as the group size, the evolutionary dynamics is profoundly affected: it may ultimately invert the direction of natural selection, compared with the infinite population limit.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Smith, J. M. (1988) · Did Darwin Get It Right? · doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-7862-4_22 · Cited by 7,906
Culture and the Evolutionary Process
Griesemer, J. R., Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1986) · The Condor · doi:10.2307/1367778 · Cited by 7,034
Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation
Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1133755 · Cited by 5,894
Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173179 · Cited by 5,502
A First Course in Stochastic Processes
(1975) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/c2009-1-28569-8 · Cited by 3,890
THE MAJOR TRANSITIONS OF EVOLUTION
Leigh, E. G. (1995) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.1995.tb04464.x · Cited by 3,410
The Major Transitions in Evolution
Maynard Smith, J., & Szathmary, E. (1997) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198502944.001.0001 · Cited by 2,551
Young, H. P. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951778 · Cited by 2,399
Cooperation under the security dilemma
Jervis, R. (1978) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2009958 · Cited by 2,305 · cited 2×
“In human affairs, we also find collective action problems that can be viewed as generalized SHs, not only in literal hunts such as the whale hunts discussed in Beding (2008), but also in international relations ( Jervis 1978) and macroeconomics (Bryant 1994).”
BackgroundA simple rule for the evolution of cooperation on graphs and social networks
Ohtsuki, H., Hauert, C., Lieberman, E., & Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature04605 · Cited by 2,208
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
Kandori, M., Mailath, G. J., & Rob, R. (1993) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951777 · Cited by 2,044
Scale-Free Networks Provide a Unifying Framework for the Emergence of Cooperation
Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2005) · Physical Review Letters · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.95.098104 · Cited by 1,804
Self-citationSocial dilemmas: the anatomy of cooperation
Kollock, P. (1998) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.183 · Cited by 1,746
Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma
(2015) · Conflict After the Cold War · doi:10.4324/9781315664484-51 · Cited by 1,555
The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure
Skyrms, B. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139165228 · Cited by 1,524
Self-citationSocial diversity promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods games
Santos, F. C., Santos, M. D., & Pacheco, J. M. (2008) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature06940 · Cited by 1,442
Self-citationEmergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations
Nowak, M. A., Sasaki, A., Taylor, C., & Fudenberg, D. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature02414 · Cited by 1,399
Population Games and Evolutionary DynamicsPreprint
Sandholm, W. H. (2005) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 1,369
Evolutionary Dynamics of Biological Games
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2004) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1093411 · Cited by 1,184
Volunteering as Red Queen Mechanism for Cooperation in Public Goods Games
Hauert, C., De Monte, S., Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (2002) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1070582 · Cited by 1,114
Evolutionary dynamics of social dilemmas in structured heterogeneous populations
Santos, F. C., Pacheco, J. M., & Lenaerts, T. (2006) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0508201103 · Cited by 1,011
Self-citationThe Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare
Sugden, R. (2005) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9780230536791 · Cited by 878
Selfish and Spiteful Behaviour in an Evolutionary Model
HAMILTON, W. D. (1970) · Nature · doi:10.1038/2281218a0 · Cited by 873
Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation
(2003) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/3232.001.0001 · Cited by 743
Via Freedom to Coercion: The Emergence of Costly Punishment
Hauert, C., Traulsen, A., Brandt, H., Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (2007) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1141588 · Cited by 725
Communal hunting and pack size in African wild dogs, Lycaon pictus
Creel, S., & Creel, N. M. (1995) · Animal Behaviour · doi:10.1016/0003-3472(95)80048-4 · Cited by 712
Learning dynamics in social dilemmas
Macy, M. W., & Flache, A. (2002) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.092080099 · Cited by 625
The collective-risk social dilemma and the prevention of simulated dangerous climate change
Milinski, M., Sommerfeld, R. D., Krambeck, H.-J., Reed, F. A., & Marotzke, J. (2008) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0709546105 · Cited by 610
Stochastic dynamics of invasion and fixation
Traulsen, A., Nowak, M. A., & Pacheco, J. M. (2006) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.74.011909 · Cited by 604
Self-citationCooperative hunting in lions: the role of the individual
Stander, P. E. (1992) · Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1007/bf00170175 · Cited by 499
The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment
Rockenbach, B., & Milinski, M. (2006) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature05229 · Cited by 498
ELEMENTS OF STOCHASTIC PROCESSES
KARLIN, S., & TAYLOR, H. M. (1975) · A First Course in Stochastic Processes · doi:10.1016/b978-0-08-057041-9.50005-2 · Cited by 470
Cooperative hunting roles among taï chimpanzees
Boesch, C. (2002) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-002-1013-6 · Cited by 407
Milinski, M., Semmann, D., Krambeck, H.-J., & Marotzke, J. (2006) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0504902103 · Cited by 379
Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamics
Traulsen, A., Pacheco, J. M., & Nowak, M. A. (2007) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.01.002 · Cited by 378
Self-citationSynergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas
Hauert, C., Michor, F., Nowak, M. A., & Doebeli, M. (2006) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.08.040 · Cited by 335
太郎丸, 博. (1992) · OUKA (Osaka University Knowledge Archive) (Osaka University) · doi:10.18910/9684 · Cited by 218
Skyrms, B. (2001) · Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association · doi:10.2307/3218711 · Cited by 214
Self-citationPunishing and abstaining for public goods
Brandt, H., Hauert, C., & Sigmund, K. (2006) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0507229103 · Cited by 204
Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of Public-Goods Provision
Taylor, M., & Ward, H. (1982) · Political Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9248.1982.tb00545.x · Cited by 186
Stochastic payoff evaluation increases the temperature of selection
Traulsen, A., Nowak, M. A., & Pacheco, J. M. (2006) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.08.008 · Cited by 118
Self-citationUrn Models, Replicator Processes, and Random Genetic Drift
Schreiber, S. J. (2001) · SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics · doi:10.1137/s0036139999352857 · Cited by 110
Foraging costs in social carnivores
Packer, C., & Caro, T. (1997) · Animal Behaviour · doi:10.1006/anbe.1997.0480 · Cited by 53
Cited by
Coevolutionary games—A mini review
Perc, M., & Szolnoki, A. (2010) · Biosystems · doi:10.1016/j.biosystems.2009.10.003 · Cited by 1,971
Networks beyond pairwise interactions: Structure and dynamics
Battiston, F., Cencetti, G., Iacopini, I., Latora, V., Lucas, M., Patania, A., Young, J.-G., & Petri, G. (2020) · Physics Reports · doi:10.1016/j.physrep.2020.05.004 · Cited by 1,602
Cyclic dominance in evolutionary games: a review
Szolnoki, A., Mobilia, M., Jiang, L.-L., Szczesny, B., Rucklidge, A. M., & Perc, M. (2014) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2014.0735 · Cited by 520
Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment
Archetti, M., & Scheuring, I. (2012) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.06.018 · Cited by 296
Resolving social dilemmas on evolving random networks
Szolnoki, A., & Perc, M. (2009) · EPL (Europhysics Letters) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/86/30007 · Cited by 293
Metadata
- Authors
- Pacheco, J. M., Santos, F. C., Souza, M. O., & Skyrms, B.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2008-09-23
- Volume
- 276
- Issue
- 1655
- Pages
- 315-321
- ISSN
- 0080-4649 (ISSN-L)
- 0962-8452
- 1471-2954
- OpenAlex
- W2101333912
- Cited by
- 310
- References
- 44
- FWCI
- 38.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.