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Emergence of cooperation in public goods games

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Kurokawa, Shun, Ihara, Yasuo · 2009 · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Cited by 163

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Evolution of cooperation has been a major issue in evolutionary biology. Cooperation is observed not only in dyadic interactions, but also in social interactions involving more than two individuals. It has been argued that direct reciprocity cannot explain the emergence of cooperation in large groups because the basin of attraction for the ‘cooperative’ equilibrium state shrinks rapidly as the group size increases. However, this argument is based on the analysis of models that consider the deterministic process. More recently, stochastic models of two-player games have been developed and the conditions for natural selection to favour the emergence of cooperation in finite populations have been specified. These conditions have been given as a mathematically simple expression, which is called the one-third law. In this paper, we investigate a stochastic model of n -player games and show that natural selection can favour a reciprocator replacing a population of defectors in the n -player repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. We also derive a generalized version of the one-third law (the {2/[ n ( n +1)]} 1/( n −1) law). Additionally, contrary to previous studies, the model suggests that the evolution of cooperation in public goods game can be facilitated by larger group size under certain conditions.

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Crossref · 10.1098/rspb.2008.1546

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Citations

Cites

  • The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism

    Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010 · cited 2×

    “Animals sometimes behave cooperatively even towards unrelated individuals and direct reciprocity has been a key concept to explain this phenomenon (Trivers 1971; Axelrod & Hamilton 1981; Axelrod 1984).”
    Background
  • Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation

    Nowak, M. A. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1133755 · Cited by 5,894 · cited 4×

    “7) include the corresponding conditions that have been obtained (Nowak et al. 2004) for the case of n= 2. Following Nowak et al. (2004), we call strategy B ESSN (evolutionarily stable strategy) if the following two conditions are met: (i) selection opposes A invading B, which means that a single mutant A in a populati…”
    BackgroundInfluential
  • Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics

    Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173179 · Cited by 5,502 · cited 1×

    “Let us compare the ESSN conditions (2.8) and (2.9) with the traditional ESS condition in the conventional deterministic model (e.g. Maynard Smith 1982; Hofbauer & Sigmund 1998).”
    ResultInfluential
  • Social dilemmas: the anatomy of cooperation

    Kollock, P. (1998) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.183 · Cited by 1,746 · cited 2×

    “Humans often cooperate in public goods games and in situations ranging from family issues to global warming (Kollock 1998; Milinski et al. 2006).”
    Background

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Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Kurokawa, S., & Ihara, Y.
Venue
Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
Published
2009-01-13
Volume
276
Issue
1660
Pages
1379-1384
ISSN
  • 0080-4649 (ISSN-L)
  • 0962-8452
  • 1471-2954
OpenAlex
W2168904520
Cited by
163
References
4
FWCI
19.54
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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