The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Early false-belief understanding in traditional non-Western societies
Open accessAbstract
The psychological capacity to recognize that others may hold and act on false beliefs has been proposed to reflect an evolved, species-typical adaptation for social reasoning in humans; however, controversy surrounds the developmental timing and universality of this trait. Cross-cultural studies using elicited-response tasks indicate that the age at which children begin to understand false beliefs ranges from 4 to 7 years across societies, whereas studies using spontaneous-response tasks with Western children indicate that false-belief understanding emerges much earlier, consistent with the hypothesis that false-belief understanding is a psychological adaptation that is universally present in early childhood. To evaluate this hypothesis, we used three spontaneous-response tasks that have revealed early false-belief understanding in the West to test young children in three traditional, non-Western societies: Salar (China), Shuar/Colono (Ecuador) and Yasawan (Fiji). Results were comparable with those from the West, supporting the hypothesis that false-belief understanding reflects an adaptation that is universally present early in development.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The weirdest people in the world?
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x0999152x · Cited by 12,641
Self-citationDoes the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8 · Cited by 8,599 · cited 2×
“For example [9], children listen to a story enacted with props: an agent hides her toy in one of two locations and leaves; in her absence, the toy is moved to the other location.”
BackgroundWimmer, H. (1983) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5 · Cited by 6,305
Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.01.005 · Cited by 1,648
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later
Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.02.010 · Cited by 1,592
Three-year-olds’ difficulty with false belief: The case for a conceptual deficit
Perner, J., Leekam, S. R., & Wimmer, H. (1987) · British Journal of Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.2044-835x.1987.tb01048.x · Cited by 1,550
Action Anticipation Through Attribution of False Belief by 2-Year-Olds
Southgate, V., Senju, A., & Csibra, G. (2007) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.x · Cited by 1,066
False-belief understanding in infants
Baillargeon, R., Scott, R. M., & He, Z. (2010) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.12.006 · Cited by 1,030
Self-citationThe Relation between Children's and Mothers’ Mental State Language and Theory-of-Mind Understanding
Ruffman, T., Slade, L., & Crowe, E. (2002) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00435 · Cited by 885
Attribution of Beliefs by 13-Month-Old Infants
Surian, L., Caldi, S., & Sperber, D. (2007) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01943.x · Cited by 811
Pretending and believing: Issues in the theory of ToMM
Leslie, A. M. (1994) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(94)90029-9 · Cited by 740
Liu, D., Wellman, H. M., Tardif, T., & Sabbagh, M. A. (2008) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/0012-1649.44.2.523 · Cited by 417
Introduction: Cultural and Linguistic Anthropology and the Opacity of Other Minds
Robbins, J., & Rumsey, A. (2008) · Anthropological Quarterly · doi:10.1353/anq.0.0005 · Cited by 397
Which Penguin Is This? Attributing False Beliefs About Object Identity at 18 Months
Scott, R. M., & Baillargeon, R. (2009) · Child Development · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01324.x · Cited by 352
Self-citationSynchrony in the Onset of Mental-State Reasoning: Evidence From Five Cultures
Callaghan, T., Rochat, P., Lillard, A., Claux, M. L., Odden, H., Itakura, S., Tapanya, S., & Singh, S. (2005) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2005.01544.x · Cited by 351 · cited 1×
“Similar tasks with non-Western children have 64 shown substantial cultural variability in development, with false-belief understanding emerging 65 as late as 7 years of age in some societies (13-15).”
BackgroundInfants’ reasoning about others’ false perceptions
Song, H.-J., & Baillargeon, R. (2008) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0013774 · Cited by 179 · cited 1×
“Positive results have been obtained using such tasks with Western children in the third [20–23], second [24–28] and even first [29,30] year of life.”
Method
Cited by
The Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing Moral Judgment by Redefining Harm
Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2018) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868317698288 · Cited by 659
Early False-Belief Understanding
Scott, R. M., & Baillargeon, R. (2017) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2017.01.012 · Cited by 407
Self-citationSmall-scale societies exhibit fundamental variation in the role of intentions in moral judgment
Barrett, H. C., Bolyanatz, A., Crittenden, A. N., Fessler, D. M. T., Fitzpatrick, S., Gurven, M., Henrich, J., Kanovsky, M., Kushnick, G., Pisor, A., et al. (2016) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1522070113 · Cited by 339
Self-citationPsychological reasoning in infancy
Baillargeon, R., Scott, R. M., & Bian, L. (2016) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115033 · Cited by 263
Theory of mind in animals: current and future directions
Krupenye, C., & Call, J. (2019) · WIREs Cognitive Science · doi:10.1002/wcs.1503 · Cited by 180
Metadata
- Authors
- Barrett, H. C., Broesch, T., Scott, R. M., He, Z., Baillargeon, R., Wu, D., Bolz, M., Henrich, J., Setoh, P., Wang, J., & Laurence, S.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Publisher
- The Royal Society
- Published
- 2013-03-22
- Volume
- 280
- Issue
- 1755
- Pages
- 20122654
- ISSN
- 0080-4649 (ISSN-L)
- 0962-8452
- 1471-2954
- OpenAlex
- W2093809889
- Cited by
- 171
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 23.08
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.