Pretending and believing: issues in the theory of ToMM
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Commonsense notions of psychological causality emerge early and spontaneously in the child. What implications does this have for our understanding of the mind/brain and its development? In the light of available evidence, the child's "theory of mind" is plausibly the result of the growth and functioning of a specialized mechanism (ToMM) that produces domain-specific learning. The failure of early spontaneous development of "theory of mind" in childhood autism can be understood in terms of an impairment in the growth and functioning of this mechanism. ToMM constructs agent-centered descriptions of situations or "metarepresentations". Agent-centered descriptions place agents in relation to information. By relating behavior to the attitudes agents take to the truth of propositions, ToMM makes possible a commonsense causal interpretation of agents' behavior as the result of circumstances that are imaginary rather than physical. Two early attitude concepts, pretends and believes, are discussed in the light of some current findings.
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In the citing paper
“Studies have shown that theory of mind develops in infancy by the age of 5 years (Barresi and Moore, 1996;Leslie, 1994).”
From Social cognitive development during adolescence (2006) · cites this paper as Leslie, 1994
In the citing paper
“A decoupling mechanism enables the infant to hold in mind a separate representation of the scene that incorporates the agent's false or pretend beliefs but otherwise functions as expected, making it possible to interpret or predict the agent's actions [32,59].”
From False-belief understanding in infants (2010) · cites this paper as [59]
In the citing paper
“SS2 extends SS1 and enables infants to attribute to agents reality-incongruent informational states; these include false beliefs as well as pretense [58,59].”
From False-belief understanding in infants (2010) · cites this paper as [59]
Citations
Cites
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00076512 · Cited by 8,743 · cited 1×
“Premack and Woodruff (1978) coined the term “theory of mind” for the ability, illustrated by this scenario, to predict, explain and interpret the behavior of agents in terms of mental states.”
BackgroundDoes the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8 · Cited by 8,599
Self-citationWimmer, H. (1983) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5 · Cited by 6,305
Pretense and representation: The origins of "theory of mind."
Leslie, A. M. (1987) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.94.4.412 · Cited by 3,379 · cited 19×
“By combining a method of minimal task differences with the SEE control, Surian and Leslie obtained a sensitive measure of 3-year-old competence. We were able to isolate Fodor’s ambiguity of desire factor by comparing the performance on Robinson and Mitchell’s original task with the ambiguity modified version of it, wh…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSelf-citationGrice, H. P. (1957) · The Philosophical Review · doi:10.2307/2182440 · Cited by 2,824
Play and Its Role in the Mental Development of the Child
Vygotsky, L. S. (1967) · Soviet Psychology · doi:10.2753/rpo1061-040505036 · Cited by 2,465
From a Logical Point of View: Nine Logico-Philosophical Essays, Second Revised Edition
Van Orman Quine, W. (1980) · Harvard University Press eBooks · doi:10.2307/j.ctv1c5cx5c · Cited by 2,439
Understanding the Representational Mind
Perner, J. (1993) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/6988.001.0001 · Cited by 2,430
Executive function deficits in high-functioning autistic individuals: Relationship to theory of mind
Ozonoff, S., Pennington, B. F., & Rogers, S. J. (1991) · Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry · doi:10.1111/j.1469-7610.1991.tb00351.x · Cited by 1,766
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-5332 · Cited by 1,750
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Harris, P.L., & Kavanaugh, R. (in press). The comprehension of pretense by young children. Society for Research in Child Development Monographs.
- Reprinted in G.E. Butterworth, P.L. Harris, A.M. Leslie, & H.M. Wellman (Eds.), Perspectives on the child's theory of mind (315–330). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cited by
Mirror neurons and the simulation theory of mind-reading
Gallese, V (1998) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(98)01262-5 · Cited by 3,201
Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing
Frith, U., & Frith, C. D. (2003) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2002.1218 · Cited by 2,306
“To use the terminology of Leslie (1994), these representations are decoupled from the physical world and are no longer subject to normal input–output relations.”
MethodFunctional imaging of ‘theory of mind’
Gallagher, H. L., & Frith, C. D. (2003) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)00025-6 · Cited by 2,092
Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading
Goldman, A. I. (2006) · doi:10.1093/0195138929.001.0001 · Cited by 1,470
Evolutionary origins of stigmatization: The functions of social exclusion.
Kurzban, R., & Leary, M. R. (2001) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.127.2.187 · Cited by 1,424
Metadata
- Authors
- Leslie, A. M.
- Affiliations
- Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey (US)
- Corresponding author
- Leslie, Alan M.
- ORCID
- Leslie, Alan M.
- Venue
- Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1994-04
- Volume
- 50
- Issue
- 1-3
- Pages
- 211-238
- ISSN
- 0010-0277 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2102578376
- Semantic Scholar
- 41d773874b625e8f219da753d9d283eb87bd7e28
- Cited by
- 740
- References
- 40
- Citations by year
- 2026: 18 · 2025: 32 · 2024: 9 · 2023: 12 · 2022: 34 · 2021: 37 · 2020: 48 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 20 · 2017: 16 · 2016: 23 · 2015: 23 · 2014: 25 · 2013: 24 · 2012: 32
- FWCI
- 14.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- Locations
- Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Robot Interaction and HRI
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- theory of mind, TOMM, pretense, belief, metarepresentation, domain-specific learning, autism spectrum disorder, mental causation, child development, mental representation
- MeSH terms
- Child, Preschool, Cognition, Concept Formation, Female, Humans, Imagination, Imitative Behavior, Individuality, Male, Problem Solving, Psychological Theory, Reference Values
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- The paper
- Leslie, A. M. (1994). Pretending and believing: issues in the theory of ToMM. Cognition. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(94)90029-9
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.