Infants’ reasoning about others’ false perceptions
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 46 of the 46 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Prior research suggests that children younger than age 3 or 4 do not understand that an agent may be deceived by an object's misleading appearance. The authors asked whether 14.5-month-olds would give evidence in a violation-of-expectation task that they understand that agents may form false perceptions. Infants first watched events in which an agent faced a stuffed skunk and a doll with blue pigtails; the agent consistently reached for the doll, suggesting that she preferred it over the skunk. Next, while the agent was absent, the doll was hidden in a plain box, and the skunk was hidden in a box with a tuft of blue hair protruding from under its lid. Infants expected the agent to be misled by the tuft's resemblance to the doll's hair and to falsely perceive it as belonging to the doll. These and other results indicate that 14.5-month-old infants can already reason about agents' false perceptions.
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“To date, spontaneous-response tasks have shown that infants can attribute to an agent a false belief about an object's location [16-19], a false perception of an object [21], and a false belief about an object's identity [4]; these findings are described below.”
From False-belief understanding in infants (2010) · cites this paper as [21]
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states
Apperly, I. A., & Butterfill, S. A. (2009) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0016923 · Cited by 1,261
False-belief understanding in infants
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How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind
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“What do these infants and young children represent that enables them to track others’ perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs in such cases? e most straightforward answer would be to suppose that they represent perceptions, knowledge states and beliefs as such (e.g. Leslie 2005; Song et al. 2008).”
BackgroundInfluentialHow we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition
Carruthers, P. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09000545 · Cited by 610
Early False-Belief Understanding
Scott, R. M., & Baillargeon, R. (2017) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2017.01.012 · Cited by 407
Metadata
- Authors
- Song, H.-J., & Baillargeon, R.
- Affiliations
- Yonsei University (KR)
- Venue
- Developmental Psychology
- Published
- 2008
- Volume
- 44
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1789-1795
- ISSN
- 0012-1649 (ISSN-L)
- 1939-0599
- PMC
- PMC3372913
- OpenAlex
- W2124331449
- Cited by
- 179
- References
- 46
- Citations by year
- 2026: 13 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 9 · 2015: 10 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 19 · 2012: 17
- FWCI
- 23.30
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
- Locations
- Developmental Psychology (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Funders
- Yonsei University (2006-1-0029)
- Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (HD-021104)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Robot Interaction and HRI
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Language Development and Disorders
- Keywords
- false perception, deception, theory of mind, false belief, social cognition
- MeSH terms
- Psychology, Child, Concept Formation, Cues, Discrimination Learning, Female, Humans, Infant, Male, Pattern Recognition, Visual, Perceptual Masking, Problem Solving, Personal Construct Theory
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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