Cited by 709Quantum Information and CryptographyQuantum Mechanics and ApplicationsWireless Communication Security Techniques

From Bell’s Theorem to Secure Quantum Key Distribution

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Acín, Antonio, Gisin, Nicolas, Masanes, Lluis·2006·Physical Review Letters

Abstract

The first step in any quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol consists of sequences of measurements that produce correlated classical data. We show that these correlation data must violate some Bell inequality in order to contain distillable secrecy, if not they could be produced by quantum measurements performed on a separable state of larger dimension. We introduce a new QKD protocol and prove its security against any individual attack by an adversary only limited by the no-signaling condition.

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Crossref · 10.1103/physrevlett.97.120405

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  • In QKD, secure keys can be generated even when the experimental devices are not fully trusted or characterised.

    “In QKD, secure keys can be generated even when the experimental devices are not fully trusted or characterised. 51,52”

    From Quantum random number generation (2016) · cites this paper as [52]

    The paper’s conclusion (p. 4) says its CHSH-based QKD protocol is secure without assumptions about Alice’s and Bob’s Hilbert-space dimensions, supporting the claim that full device characterisation is unnecessary. But the proof covers individual nonsignaling attacks and requires Bell-inequality-violating data; it does not establish security for untrusted devices without those conditions. (LLM, conf=0.86)

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Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. [10]C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, New York, 175 (1984).
  2. [13]I. Csisz´ ar and J. K¨ orner, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 24 , 339 (1978).
  3. [14]U. Maurer and S. Wolf, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 45 , 499 (1999).
  4. [15]R. Renner and S. Wolf, in Proc. EUROCRYPT 2003, Lect. Notes in Comp. Science (Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2003).
  5. [16]U. M. Maurer, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 39 , 733 (1993).
  6. [18]N. Gisin and S. Wolf, Proc. CRYPTO 2000, Lect. Notes in Comp. Science 1880 , 482 (2000) .

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Authors
Acín, A., Gisin, N., & Masanes, L.
Affiliations
  • Institute of Photonic Sciences (ES)
  • University of Geneva (CH)
Venue
Physical Review Letters
Published
2006-09-20
Volume
97
Issue
12
Pages
120405-120405
ISSN
  • 0031-9007 (ISSN-L)
  • 1079-7114
OpenAlex
W2000985364
Cited by
709
References
14
Citations by year
2026: 30 · 2025: 29 · 2024: 25 · 2023: 37 · 2022: 38 · 2021: 46 · 2020: 36 · 2019: 61 · 2018: 40 · 2017: 41 · 2016: 57 · 2015: 34 · 2014: 41 · 2013: 28 · 2012: 36
FWCI
26.21
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Physical Review Letters (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • CERN Document Server (European Organization for Nuclear Research) (submittedVersion)
  • UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
  • Archive ouverte UNIGE (University of Geneva) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • Archive ouverte UNIGE (University of Geneva) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Quantum Information and Cryptography
  • Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics › Quantum Mechanics and Applications
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Wireless Communication Security Techniques
Keywords
quantum key distribution, Bell's theorem, Bell inequalities, no-signaling, separable states, individual attacks, security proofs

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