The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Strategic gaming analysis for electric power systems: an MPEC approach
Abstract
Transmission constraints and market concentration may prevent power markets from being fully competitive, allowing firms to exercise market power and raise prices above marginal cost. We present a strategic gaming model for analyzing such markets; it represents an oligopolistic market economy consisting of several dominant firms in an electric power network. Each generating firm submits bids to an ISO, choosing its bids to maximize profits subject to anticipated reactions by rival firms. The single-firm model is formulated as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) with a parameter-dependent spatial price equilibrium problem as the inner problem. Power flows and pricing strategies are constrained by the ISO's linearized DC optimal power flow (OFF) model. A penalty interior point algorithm is used to compute a local optimal solution of the MPEC. Numerical examples based on a 30 bus network are presented, including multi-firm Nash equilibria in which each player solves an MPEC of the single-firm type.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Power Generation, Operation, and Control
Wood, A. J., & Wollenberg, B. F. (1984) · Cited by 8,303
Schweppe, F. C., Caramanis, M. C., Tabors, R. D., & Bohn, R. E. (1988) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4613-1683-1 · Cited by 2,409
Mathematical Programs with Equilibrium Constraints
Luo, Z.-Q., Pang, J.-S., & Ralph, D. (1996) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511983658 · Cited by 1,963
Self-citationOptimal Load Flow with Steady-State Security
Alsac, O., & Stott, B. (1974) · IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems · doi:10.1109/tpas.1974.293972 · Cited by 1,557
Hill, P. G. (1977) · Cited by 1,394
Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
Klemperer, P. D., & Meyer, M. A. (1989) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913707 · Cited by 1,382
Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market
Green, R. J., & Newbery, D. M. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261846 · Cited by 1,336
Spatial and temporal price and allocation models
Zusman, P. (1971) · Cited by 992
Market power and strategic interaction in electricity networks
Cardell, J. B., Hitt, C. C., & Hogan, W. W. (1997) · Resource and Energy Economics · doi:10.1016/s0928-7655(97)00006-7 · Cited by 471
Spot Market Competition in the UK Electricity Industry
von der Fehr, N.-H. M., & Harbord, D. (1993) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2234530 · Cited by 466
Wolfram, C. D. (1998) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2556090 · Cited by 399
Competition and Choice in Electricity
Hunt, S., & Shuttleworth, G. (1996) · Infoscience (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne) · Cited by 388
The Competitive Effects of Transmission Capacity in a Deregulated Electricity Industry
Borenstein, S., Bushnell, J., & Stoft, S. E. (1997) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w6293 · Cited by 341
Oren, S. S. (1997) · The Energy Journal · doi:10.5547/issn0195-6574-ej-vol18-no1-3 · Cited by 262
Power Markets and Market Power*
Newbery, D. (1995) · The Energy Journal · doi:10.5547/issn0195-6574-ej-vol16-no3-2 · Cited by 248
Hierarchical optimization: An introduction
Anandalingam, G., & Friesz, T. L. (1992) · Annals of Operations Research · doi:10.1007/bf02098169 · Cited by 229
Wolak, F., & Patrick, R. (2001) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w8248 · Cited by 221
Andersson, B., & Bergman, L. (1995) · The Energy Journal · doi:10.5547/issn0195-6574-ej-vol16-no2-5 · Cited by 128
Using game theory to analyze electric transmission pricing policies in the United States
Hobbs, B. F., & Kelly, K. A. (1992) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/0377-2217(92)90219-y · Cited by 63
Self-citationIntelligent agents for negotiations in market games. I. Model
Krishna, V., & Ramesh, V. C. (1998) · IEEE Transactions on Power Systems · doi:10.1109/59.709106 · Cited by 63
Hobbs, B. F., & Schuler, R. E. (1985) · Papers of the Regional Science Association · doi:10.1111/j.1435-5597.1985.tb00859.x · Cited by 35
Self-citation
Cited by
Electricity price forecasting: A review of the state-of-the-art with a look into the future
Weron, R. (2014) · International Journal of Forecasting · doi:10.1016/j.ijforecast.2014.08.008 · Cited by 1,646
Electricity market modeling trends
Ventosa, M., Baı́llo, Á., Ramos, A., & Rivier, M. (2005) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2003.10.013 · Cited by 708
Linear complementarity models of Nash-Cournot competition in bilateral and POOLCO power markets
Hobbs, B. E. (2001) · IEEE Transactions on Power Systems · doi:10.1109/59.918286 · Cited by 522
Self-citationOligopolistic competition in power networks: a conjectured supply function approach
Day, C. J., Hobbs, B. F., & Pang, J.-S. (2002) · IEEE Transactions on Power Systems · doi:10.1109/tpwrs.2002.800900 · Cited by 492
Self-citationLinear Complementarity Models of Nash-Cournot Competition in Bilateral and POOLCO Power Markets
Hobbs, B. F. (2001) · IEEE Power Engineering Review · doi:10.1109/mper.2001.4311384 · Cited by 461
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Hobbs, B. F., Metzler, C. B., & Pang, J.-S.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
- Published
- 2000-05
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 638-645
- ISSN
- 0885-8950 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2166063259
- Cited by
- 821
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 16.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.