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Cited by 74Security in Wireless Sensor NetworksIoT Networks and ProtocolsSmart Grid Security and Resilience

Energy Depletion Attacks in Low Power Wireless Networks

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Nguyen, Van-Linh, Lin, Po-Ching, Hwang, Ren-Hung·2019·IEEE Access
DOI 10.1109/access.2019.2911424
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Abstract

Low Power Wireless (LPW) networks have recently been emerging as key candidates to offer affordable connectivity for the constrained devices in the Internet of Things (IoT). However, they also raise major security concerns due to the inherent security vulnerabilities of built-in communication protocols. By exploiting these flaws, an adversary can attack sensors or actuators in an LPW network and force them to execute energy-hungry tasks such as verifying unauthenticated garbage messages repeatedly. This attack, namely energy depletion attack (EDA), can drain the batteries of the devices rapidly and lead to soaring network-wide energy expenditure. Consequently, the offense can leave the victims disabled, and even shut down the whole network due to the battery exhaustion of all the devices. In this paper, we investigate existing studies and provide a systematic review of EDAs and defenses in LPW networks. Through this work, we conclude that most existing LPW technologies are vulnerable to EDAs. This paper also indicates the security challenges in LPW networks related to EDAs along with the potential research directions. While LPW technologies have already hit the market with the promising deployment schedules, our attempt can inspire the research community to enhance the security of underlying protocols that will shape the connectivity of billions of devices in the future IoT ecosystem.

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  • When an attacker has physical access to a LoRa device, the UART or SPI interface between the radio and host microcontroller can be used to eavesdrop on all key exchanges and obtain the encryption key.

    “Chatzoglou et al. [66] proposed that when an attacker can access a device at the physical level, since the LoRa terminal device contains a radio module and a host microcontroller unit, the radio communicates with the host microcontroller through the UART or SPI interface. For example, if both devices use the UART interface, the interface can be used to eavesdrop on all key exchanges, and the AttaC”

    From A Survey of IoT Privacy Security: Architecture, Technology, Challenges, and Trends (2024) · cites this paper as [67]

    The Attack Stages section discusses gathering device information, and the MAC-layer defenses section discusses eavesdropping and secret keys, but neither describes obtaining a LoRa encryption key through a device interface. Searches for UART, SPI, physical access, and key exchanges found no passage supporting the claimed method; page numbers were not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.74)

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  63. REN-HUNG HWANG received the Ph.D. degree in computer science from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA. He joined the Department of Computer Science and Infor- mation Engineering, National Chung Cheng Uni- versity (CCU), in 1993, where he is currently a Distinguished Professor. He has published over 200 international journal and conference papers. He has served as the Dean of the College of Engi- neering (2014-2017). He received the IEEE Best Paper Award from the IEEE Ubi-Media 2018, the IEEE SC2 2017, the IEEE IUCC 2014, and the IEEE Outstanding Paper Award from the IEEE UIC 2012. His current research interests are the Internet of Things, network security, cloud/edge/fog computing, and software-defined networks.

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Authors
Nguyen, V.-L., Lin, P.-C., & Hwang, R.-H.
Affiliations
National Chung Cheng University (TW)
ORCID
Venue
IEEE Access
Publisher
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Published
2019
Volume
7
Pages
51915-51932
ISSN
2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1109/access.2019.2911424
OpenAlex
W2941918278
Cited by
74
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 9 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 7 · 2020: 13 · 2019: 5
FWCI
5.34
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
ieeexplore.ieee.org/Xplorehelp/downloads/license-information/OAPA.html (vor)
Locations
  • IEEE Access (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
  • Ministry of Science and Technology, Taiwan (MOST 107-2218-E-194-014)
  • Taiwan Information Security Center at National Sun Yat-sen University
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Security in Wireless Sensor Networks
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › IoT Networks and Protocols
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
Keywords
low-power wireless networks, Internet of Things security, battery exhaustion, resource-constrained devices, wireless sensor networks, authentication vulnerabilities, network security defense, protocol vulnerabilities

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