Sabotage Attack Detection for Additive Manufacturing Systems
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper presents a novel multi-modal sabotage attack detection system for Additive Manufacturing (AM) machines. By utilizing multiple side-channels, we improve system state estimation significantly in comparison to uni-modal techniques. Besides, we analyze the value of each side-channel for performing attack detection in terms of mutual information shared with the machine control parameters. We evaluate our system on real-world test cases and achieve an attack detection accuracy of 98.15%. AM, or 3D Printing, is seeing practical use for the rapid prototyping and production of industrial parts. The digitization of such systems not only makes AM a crucial technology in Industry 4.0 but also presents a broad attack surface that is vulnerable to kinetic cyberattacks. In the field of AM security, sabotage attacks are cyberattacks that introduce inconspicuous defects to a manufactured component at any specific process of the AM digital process chain, resulting in the compromise of the component's structural integrity and load-bearing capabilities. Defense mechanisms that detect such attacks using side-channel analysis have been studied. However, most current works focus on modeling the state of AM systems using a single side-channel, thus limiting their effectiveness at attack detection. In this paper, we demonstrate the value of a multi-modal sabotage attack detection system in comparison to uni-modal techniques.
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Cites
Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative Execution
Kocher, P., Genkin, D., Gruss, D., Haas, W., Hamburg, M., Lipp, M., Mangard, S., Prescher, T., Schwarz, M., & Yarom, Y. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1801.01203 · Cited by 1,850
A Survey of Hardware Trojan Taxonomy and Detection
Tehranipoor, M., & Koushanfar, F. (2010) · IEEE Design & Test of Computers · doi:10.1109/mdt.2010.7 · Cited by 1,424
Cited by
Additive Manufacturing Cyber-Physical System: Supply Chain Cybersecurity and Risks
Gupta, N., Tiwari, A., Bukkapatnam, S. T. S., & Karri, R. (2020) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2020.2978815 · Cited by 144
“Thorough survey on risk taxonomy for additive manufacturing is presented in previous published works [16], [17].”
BackgroundDigital Twin-Based Cyber-Attack Detection Framework for Cyber-Physical Manufacturing Systems
Balta, E. C., Pease, M., Moyne, J., Barton, K., & Tilbury, D. M. (2024) · IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering · doi:10.1109/tase.2023.3243147 · Cited by 125
Yanamandra, K., Chen, G. L., Xu, X., Mac, G., & Gupta, N. (2020) · Composites Science and Technology · doi:10.1016/j.compscitech.2020.108318 · Cited by 72
“Once considered a remote possibility, side channel attacks related to capturing power consumption or vibration of the machine and using it for reverse engineering have been successfully demonstrated [27].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Yu, S.-Y., Malawade, A. V., Chhetri, S. R., & Al Faruque, M. A.
- Venue
- IEEE Access
- Published
- 2020
- Volume
- 8
- Pages
- 27218-27231
- ISSN
- 2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3005395976
- Cited by
- 46
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 3.23
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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