Experimenting with digital signatures over a dnp3 protocol in a multitenant cloud-based SCADA architecture
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The ideas presented in this paper are summarized as follows. The first idea entails improving the security of supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) architectures by means of asymmetric cryptography and digital signatures and measuring the performance overhead. This allows achieving some obvious subsequent goals such as data-origin authentication, and the traceability and implicit non-repudiation of commands given to intelligent field and direct control equipment. The possibility to include digital signatures with a minimum impact on a standard and a reliable data communication protocol, such as Distributed Network Protocol version 3 (DNP3), also known to have a mature, industrially validated, open-source implementation, has been tested and the results are presented. A second idea concerns designing and developing a multitenant cloud-based architecture for a SCADA environment. This hypothesis focuses on certain SCADA operators that manage multiple industrial control systems (ICS) and intend to consolidate process data in a centralized manner.
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Modbus is mainly utilised for applications where the volume of information exchange is low.
“Modbus is, for the most part, utilised for applications where the volume of information exchange is low [19].”
From Architecture and security of SCADA systems: A review (2021) · cites this paper as [19]
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- MARIUS MARIAN (Member, IEEE) was born in Craiova, Romania, in 1975. He received the B.S. and M.S. degrees in computer science from the University of Craiova, in 1998 and 2000, respectively, and the Ph.D. degree in security of information systems from Politecnico di Torino, Italy, in 2003. Since 2003, he continued his postdoctoral research activity at Politecnico of Torino, on certificate distribution and certificate revocation mechanisms associated to public-key infrastructures. Since 2005, he has been a Lecturer with the Department of Computers and Information Technology, University of Craiova, Romania. His research interests focus on security of information systems and industrial control systems, and on security risk management. His professional member- ships include ACM and SRAIT (Romanian association of control, computing and information technology engineers). ADELIN CUSMAN was born in Tg. Carbunesti, Romania, in 1980. He received the degree in elec- tronic engineering from the Polytechnic University of Timisoara, Romania. He is currently the Chief Technical Manager with the Centrul de Calcul S.A., an EU Accredited Certificate Authority that operates in Romania. With over 15 years of expe- rience in electronic and software development, his main areas of research and expertise focus on cryptographic applications, software engineering, digital electronics, IoT design and IoT systems development, smart contracts, and blockchain technology for the automation of multi-step processes. FLORIN STÎNGĂ was born in Craiova, Romania, in 1975. He received the B.Eng., M.S., and Ph.D. degrees in system engineering from the University of Craiova, in 2000, 2003, and 2012, respec- tively. He is currently a Lecturer with the Depart- ment of Automation and Electronics, Faculty of Automation, Computers and Electronics, Craiova. His research interests are in embedded systems, estimation and control of dynamical systems. He is a member of two national professional associ- ations SRAIT (Romanian Association for Automation and Information Technology) and SRR (Romanian Robotics Society). DRAGOS ¸IONICĂ was born in Craiova, Romania, in 1980. He received the B.S. degree in mathematics-informatics and the M.S. degree in artificial intelligence from the University of Bucharest, Romania, in 2003 and 2005, respec- tively. He is currently a Chief Executive Officer with the Centrul de Calcul SA, one of the six European Union Accredited Certification Author- ities that operate in Romania. In recent years, he has been the main drive behind the development of a number of technical skills and research ideas within the company all related to the field and practical applications of PKI. He is also interested in using new trends in PKI, data protection, smart contracts, and blockchain technology.
- DAN POPESCU (Member, IEEE) was born in Craiova, Romania, in 1953. He received the Dipl. Eng. degree in automation and computers, and the Ph.D. degree in automatic control from the University of Craiova, in 1977 and 1997, respectively. He is currently a Professor with the Department of Automation and Electronics, Uni- versity of Craiova. From 2004 to 2008, he was the Dean of the Faculty of Automation, Computers and Electronics, and from 2008 to 2016, he was a Vice-Rector for Research at the University of Craiova. His research interests include control engineering, modeling and simulation, robust control, and time-delay systems. He has been a member of IFAC-Robust Control Tech- nical Committee, since 2008.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Architecture and security of SCADA systems: A review
Yadav, G., & Paul, K. (2021) · International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection · doi:10.1016/j.ijcip.2021.100433 · Cited by 261 · see citing works
- Authors
- Marian, M., Cusman, A., Stinga, F., Ionica, D., & Popescu, D.
- Affiliations
- University of Craiova (RO)
- Venue
- IEEE Access
- Published
- 2020
- Volume
- 8
- Pages
- 156484-156503
- ISSN
- 2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3080877474
- Cited by
- 18
- References
- 38
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 3 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 4
- FWCI
- 1.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- IEEE Access (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Funders
- European Regional Development Fund, Competitiveness Operational Program, under Grant TISIPRO (P_40_416/105736 (2016–2021))
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Industrial Automation and Control Systems
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Keywords
- digital signatures, DNP3, SCADA security, public-key cryptography, industrial control systems, origin authentication, non-repudiation, performance overhead
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