The DOI matches its Crossref record; 160 of the 161 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 65 of the 205 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey
Open accessAbstract
We present a detailed survey of the Zero Trust (ZT) security paradigm which has a growing number of advocates in the critical infrastructure risk management space. The article employs a descriptive approach to present the fundamental tenets of ZT and provides a review of numerous potential options available for successful realization of this paradigm. We describe the role of authentication and access control in Zero Trust Architectures (ZTA) and present an in-depth discussion of state-of-the-art techniques for authentication and access control in different scenarios. Furthermore, we comprehensively discuss the conventional approaches to encryption, micro-segmentation, and security automation available for instantiating a ZTA. The article also details various challenges associated with contemporary authentication mechanisms, access control schemes, trust and risk computation techniques, micro-segmentation approaches, and Software-Defined Perimeter, that can impact the implementation of ZT in its true sense. Based upon our analysis, we finally pinpoint the potential future research directions for successful realization of ZT in critical infrastructures.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This survey synthesizes Zero Trust Architecture tenets and state-of-the-art techniques for authentication, access control, encryption, micro-segmentation/SDP, and security automation, with a focus on critical infrastructure. It finds that no single technology or architecture can successfully implement ZTA and identifies persistent shortcomings and future research directions.
Key findings
- The survey identifies authentication, access control, encryption, micro-segmentation/SDP, and security automation as essential ZTA techniques, but concludes that all have shortcomings and that no single technology or architecture can successfully implement ZTA.
- It reviewed more than 180 articles and reports and reports specific security concerns: 128-bit AES on Arduino needed only 30 minutes to break via differential and correlation power analysis, and 2048-bit RSA could be cracked in around eight hours by a 20-million-qubit quantum computer, while only 128 qubits currently exist.
- It recommends context-aware/continuous authentication, risk-aware access control such as Function-Based Access Control (FBAC), lightweight encryption, micro-segmentation/SDP, and ML-supported trust/security automation; one cited microservices perimeterization approach (eZTrust) achieved 2–5 times lower packet latency and 1.5–2.5 times lower CPU overhead than other approaches.
- Device authentication findings include PUF vulnerability to modelling attacks, ECC vulnerability to quantum attacks, device fingerprinting usable only on specific devices, and a lightweight mutual authentication scheme taking around 125 ms on constrained devices but evaluated only on a Texas development kit.
Methods
- Descriptive survey/horizon scan of ZTA for critical infrastructure, comparing its approach with existing reviews in Table 1 and organizing analysis around NIST ZTA tenets and logical components.
- Reviewed more than 180 articles and reports using keywords including zero trust architecture, authentication, access control, encryption, micro-segmentation, and security automation.
- Qualitative synthesis of state-of-the-art techniques, challenges, and future research directions; no primary experiments or new empirical evaluation are reported.
Limitations
- The paper states that no single technology or architecture can successfully implement ZTA; all essential techniques—authentication, access control, encryption, and security automation—have shortcomings, and trust computation for enterprise networks or critical infrastructure lacks direct literature, so ad hoc IoT techniques are described as extendable.
- The paper states that risk computation implementation details remain obscure; current trust algorithms are designed for ad hoc or P2P networks and are not directly applicable to enterprise/CPS settings; micro-segmentation is difficult for complex workflows, legacy/monolithic applications, and translating workflow access into network/application policies; SDP requires major network/client/server changes and its central controller can become an attack target.
- Evident from the text: the provided full text is fragmented/truncated, with some sections and tables incomplete, and the survey is qualitative without primary empirical validation of its recommendations.
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62 Valid · 44 Not valid · 138 Not checked · 172 Own results and interpretations
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In the paper
“For example, context-aware mechanisms that need an accelerometer to determine the position of a device for risk assessment (e.g., in [25]) will not work for laptops or desktops that have no accelerometer.”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > B. CONTEXT-AWARE USER AUTHENTICATION
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [25] source
Section 3.2 says CAMFA uses mobile-device placement to calculate risk. Section 5.1 says its placement classifier uses readings from sensors including an accelerometer. A device without an accelerometer could not run that classifier as described; the laptop/desktop example is a conditional application of that limitation, not a device population the paper tested. Page numbers were not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
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In the paper
“For example, an approach that uses the touch dynamics (e.g., [33]) for continuous authentication will not work on some other devices such as laptops or desktops.”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > C. CONTINUOUS AUTHENTICATION
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [33] source
The Introduction (p. 2) identifies the cited approach as continuous authentication using touchscreen input. Related Work (p. 3) distinguishes touchscreen data from mouse and touchpad data, supporting the point that this touch-dynamics approach would not work on laptops or desktops that lack touchscreen input. (LLM, conf=0.88)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“The two most common approaches, which we will discuss here, are micro-segmentation and software defined perimeters.”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > VI. SEGMENTATION AND SOFTWARE DEFINED PERIMETER
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [3] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 describe micro-segmentation and software-defined perimeters as ZTA approaches. Section 3.1 also identifies enhanced identity governance as a third approach, and the paper does not rank the two named approaches as the most common. (LLM, conf=0.87)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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In the paper
“e.g.[101] demonstrated that 128-bit AES implemented on Arduino needed only 30 minutes to break by leveraging the differential and correlation power analysis”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > A. LIGHTWEIGHT ENCRYPTION
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [101] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Discussion (§4.3) reports about 30 minutes per full 16-byte key attack and says both DPA and CPA attacks were achievable on the Arduino Uno. However, the implementation described in §3.3 ran only AES-128’s AddRoundKey and SubBytes steps, not the full AES-128 algorithm implied by the citing sentence. (LLM, conf=0.86)
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“However, this simplification comes at the cost of security (e.g.[101] demonstrated that 128-bit AES implemented on Arduino needed only 30 minutes to break by leveraging the differential and correlation power analysis).”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > A. LIGHTWEIGHT ENCRYPTION
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [101] source
Section 4.3 (Discussion; page unavailable) reports approximately 25 minutes to collect traces and no more than 5 minutes to compute the DPA and CPA results—about 30 minutes per attack. Section 6 (Conclusion; page unavailable) says both techniques recovered the full AES-128 key from an Arduino Uno in a white-box test. The broader claim about simplification is the citing authors’ framing, not a finding this citation must establish. (LLM, conf=0.92)
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
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In the citing paper
“Moreover, it adds a layer of complexity for attackers as they must navigate through multiple micro-segments to reach their target [10].”
From Flexible zero trust architecture for the cybersecurity of industrial IoT infrastructures (2024) · cites this paper as [10]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Furthermore, it facilitates breach containment by enabling efficient traffic monitoring and alignment with security policies.”
From Flexible zero trust architecture for the cybersecurity of industrial IoT infrastructures (2024) · cites this paper as [10]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“It enhances network visibility by imposing stringent communication rules among workloads.”
From Flexible zero trust architecture for the cybersecurity of industrial IoT infrastructures (2024) · cites this paper as [10]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“They describe the benefits of implementing micro-segmentation through SDN but also the challenges associated with this approach, such as substantial network modifications and single-point-of-failure risks of a central controller.”
From Flexible zero trust architecture for the cybersecurity of industrial IoT infrastructures (2024) · cites this paper as [10]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“This approach allows granular control and isolation of network segments, thus creating additional layers of defense against threats.”
From Flexible zero trust architecture for the cybersecurity of industrial IoT infrastructures (2024) · cites this paper as [10]
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Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > IV. ACCESS CONTROL
“FIDO2 [62] A joint effort between the FIDO Alliance and the World Wide Web Consortium”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > References
“62. R. Feng, X. Xu, X. Zhou, and J. Wan, "A trust evaluation algorithm for wireless sensor networks based on node behaviors and ds evidence theory,"”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > C. SECURITY SITUATION AWARENESS
“In [147], the authors present a policy management framework for ZTA referred to as FURZE (Fuzzy Risk Framework for ZT Networks)”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > References
“147. U. Franke and J. Brynielsson, "Cyber situational awareness-a systematic review of the literature,"”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > MICRO-SEGMENTATION AND SDP
“As micro-segmentation is only applicable for application level access control, protection of physical devices and resources necessitates the consideration of SDNbased mechanisms such as those proposed in [131], [132]”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > Micro-segmentation in IoT -
“In IoT devices, microsegmentation can be achieved using Software Defined Networking (SDN) along with Network Function Virtualisation (NFV).”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
“Authors in [183] have shown five key approaches for which no known way of applying the Shor's algorithm exists.”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
“These approaches are code-based encryption, latticebased encryption/signature, multivariate-quadratic-equation signatures, and hash-based signatures.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > A. LIGHTWEIGHT ENCRYPTION
“PRESENT [104], which uses either an 80or 128-bit encryption key.”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > A. LIGHTWEIGHT ENCRYPTION
“PRESENT [104] Encryption (80 or 256 bit key)”
Citations
Cites
A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search
Grover, L. K. (1996) · Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '96 · doi:10.1145/237814.237866 · Cited by 8,830 · cited 1×
“Similarly, for hash functions, Grover’s algorithm [185] can facilitate quantum birthday attack to find collision, thereby necessitating an output of larger size.”
BackgroundAlgorithms for quantum computation: discrete logarithms and factoring
Shor, P. W. (2002) · Proceedings 35th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science · doi:10.1109/sfcs.1994.365700 · Cited by 8,713 · cited 1×
“Similarly, the authors of [183] showed that almost all of the current public-key mechanisms can be broken by Shor’s algorithms [184].”
BackgroundPRESENT: An Ultra-Lightweight Block Cipher
Bogdanov, A., Knudsen, L. R., Leander, G., Paar, C., Poschmann, A., Robshaw, M. J. B., Seurin, Y., & Vikkelsoe, C. (2007) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-74735-2_31 · Cited by 2,867 · cited 1×
“One of the promising alternatives of AES for lightweight encryption is PRESENT [104], which uses either an 80-or 128-bit encryption key.”
MethodTowards a Better Understanding of Context and Context-Awareness
Abowd, G. D., Dey, A. K., Brown, P. J., Davies, N., Smith, M., & Steggles, P. (1999) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-48157-5_29 · Cited by 2,634 · cited 1×
“The word ‘context’ can be defined as any information that can establish the situation of an entity [20].”
BackgroundNTRU: A ring-based public key cryptosystem
Hoffstein, J., Pipher, J., & Silverman, J. H. (1998) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/bfb0054868 · Cited by 1,947 · cited 1×
“Likewise, another approach that is referred to as NTRU is proposed in [115].”
BackgroundThe OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework
(2012) · doi:10.17487/rfc6749 · Cited by 1,383
Bernstein, D. J., & Lange, T. (2017) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature23461 · Cited by 1,242 · cited 4×
“However, numerous shortcomings of the afore-mentioned approaches are mentioned in [183].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialRose, S., Borchert, O., Mitchell, S., & Connelly, S. (2020) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-207 · Cited by 1,174
Guide to Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) Definition and Considerations
Hu, V. C., Ferraiolo, D., Kuhn, R., Schnitzer, A., Sandlin, K., Miller, R., & Scarfone, K. (2014) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-162 · Cited by 917 · cited 2×
“As described by NIST, the ACM is a logical component that assesses access requests and decides whether the subject is authorized to execute the requested operation [68].”
BackgroundMethodFrank, M., Biedert, R., Ma, E., Martinovic, I., & Song, D. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2012.2225048 · Cited by 844 · cited 2×
“For example, [33], [34] use the touch dynamics on the screen and extract features such as orientation of the finger, pressure exerted on the screen, area occluded and time instances.”
Background
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- WJ, 2020, XTEA (eXtended TEA)
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Cited by
Items 301–381 of 381
Zhao, X., & Zhao, X. (2025) · International Conference on Big Data, Artificial Intelligence and Risk Management (ICBAR) · doi:10.1145/3800227.3800388
Risk-adaptive authorization in zero trust with dynamic trust and tokens
КОСТЮК, Ю. В., СКЛАДАННИЙ, П. М., & Гнатченко, Д. Д. (2026) · PROBLEMS IN PROGRAMMING · doi:10.15407/pp2026.01.066 · Cited by 3
Federated Learning-Based Secure Access Control and Anomaly Detection in IoMT Systems
Manoj, N. V. S., Aswathi, M., Nandana, N., & Sankaran, S. (2025) · IEEE International Symposium on Smart Electronic Systems (iSES) · doi:10.1109/ises67504.2025.00057
“Inadequate Access Control: Conventional RBAC is unable to prevent insider abuse or credential theft [14].”
Zero Trust Architecture: Redefining Security in the Digital World
Dube, A., Mpande, B., Dzehonye, F., et al. (2026) · Lecture notes in electrical engineering · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-20533-9_3
Zero Trust-Based Cyber-Physical Security for Financial Fraud Detection in Engineering Projects
Swain, R. R., Grace, L. K. J., Chandna, M., Sharma, D., Mahato, N., & venkadeshwaran, K. (2025) · International Conference on Decision Aid Sciences and Applications (DASA) · doi:10.1109/dasa68193.2025.11498901
“The frequency of cyberattacks is increasing, and they are becoming more sophisticated, which makes it more difficult to stop them[28].”
Imran, M. (2026) · IEEE International Conference on Communication Systems and Network Technologies (CSNT) · doi:10.1109/csnt69054.2026.11502525
“This layer also supports the application-specific security mechanisms suited to the operational domain, including the industrial control systems, the healthcare monitoring, the sentiment analysis [23]–[26], and the consumer-oriented IoT applications.”
COBRA-Z: Collaborative Blockchain Risk Assessment for Zero Trust Architecture
Carminati, B., Ferrari, E., Rondanini, C., Shahid, M. A., & Clementi, L. (2026) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-20026-6_16
Mavani, C., & Mistry, H. (2026) · Lecture notes in networks and systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-21013-5_42
Zero Trust Architectures for Securing Foundation Model Lifecycles in Enterprise AI Systems
Mohile, A. (2026) · International Conference on Research Methodologies in Knowledge Management, Artificial Intelligence and Telecommunication Engineering (RMKMATE) · doi:10.1109/rmkmate69073.2026.11518852
“Extensive coverage of the ZTA architectures by Syed et al and Mensah results in the realization of the architectural, operational and policy level controls that are required to protect dynamic enterprise systems, such as that of data-intensive AI pipelines [7], [8], [20]”
393A Review of Future Trends in Cybersecurity, Emerging Technologies, and Challenges
Narimane, S. A. A. D. (2025) · De Gruyter eBooks · doi:10.1515/9783112212158-015
Das, R., Khan, S. Z., Robbani, M. S., Islam, M. R., & Islam, M. I. (2026) · Asia Conference on Power and Electrical Engineering (ACPEE) · doi:10.1109/acpee69242.2026.11524269
“Extensive surveys further reinforce Zero Trust principles, design frameworks, and existing challenges across various application domains [12].”
Terriaga, A. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.6775598
GZTrust: Topology-Aware Trust Management for IoT Networks Under Zero Trust Principles
Wang, X., Han, D., Yuan, J., Wei, X., & Miao, K. (2026) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2026.3697421
“Some representative solutions include vehicular networks [14], wireless sensor networks [15], mobile ad hoc networks [16], and online social networks [17].”
Vincenzo, M. A., Lowen, N. J., & Gandawidjaja, A. (2026) · IEEE Middle East and North Africa Communications Conference (MENACOMM) · doi:10.1109/menacomm69507.2026.11532935 · Cited by 1
“Positioned as a secondary defense layer parallel to existing MFA, FABA aligns with Zero Trust Architecture principles of continuous verification [7][8], yet its implementation as a discrete challenge makes it more comparable to TOTP or push-based MFA than passive monitoring systems[5][20] C.”
Incident Response Planning and Real-Time Event Correlation
Olasehan, O. A. (2026) · IGI Global eBooks · doi:10.4018/979-8-3373-4581-9.ch003
Zero Trust Architecture and Enterprise Applications
Canay, Ö., & Arslan, H. (2026) · IGI Global eBooks · doi:10.4018/979-8-3373-4581-9.ch006
Hamza, Y. A., & Dabagh, N. B. A. (2026) · Communications in computer and information science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-24239-6_1
Pappu, K., Bhushan, B., & Jaiswal, N. (2026) · International Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Systems, and Emerging Technologies (ICAISET) · doi:10.1109/icaiset66439.2026.11541783 · Cited by 2
“Deviations adjust a trust score per-agent in [0 , 1] , extending zero-trust continuous verification [4], [26] from network access to agent behavior.”
SATHOS: Self-Adaptive Trust-Hierarchical Orchestration for Zero-Trust DevSecOps Pipelines
Jaiswal, N., Pappu, K., & Gangaiah, Y. K. (2026) · doi:10.1109/icaiset66439.2026.11541429
A Blockchain Attestation Layer for Zero Trust Network Access
Korkuç, Ç., Dogantuna, T., Genç, Y., Afacan, E., & Dener, M. (2026) · International Congress on Human-Computer Interaction, Optimization and Robotic Applications (ICHORA) · doi:10.1109/ichora69329.2026.11537007 · Cited by 3
“Syed et al. presented a detailed study in their survey research that reveals the basic operating principles and centralized access control models of ZTNA [2].”
Liu, F., Youdong, W., Chao, L., et al. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.6878390
Rguig, B., & Housni, K. (2026) · International Conference on Innovative Research in Applied Science, Engineering and Technology (IRASET) · doi:10.1109/iraset68627.2026.11538511
“Recent efforts in Lightweight ZTA attempt to use metadata-only inspection, but often at the cost of detection depth [18] [19].”
The Role of AI in Zero Trust Architectures
Tushar, T., Pradhan, N., Mishra, V., Sharma, A., Jaiswal, P., Yadav, A. K., Sundar, S., Singh, S. P., Mishra, S., Kumar, M., et al. (2026) · Advances in computational intelligence and robotics book series · doi:10.4018/979-8-3693-8397-1.ch006
Hoque, M. E., Sahim, M. S. H., Mim, A. A., Sunny, F. A., & Nakshi, S. S. (2026) · IEEE International Conference on Quantum Photonics, Artificial Intelligence & Networking (QPAIN) · doi:10.1109/qpain69676.2026.11545816
“These investigations used a number of technologies, such as machine learning, deep learning, blockchain, and Zero-Trust security models, among others [8].”
BBKR: A Deep Learning Based Behaviour-Driven Key Rotation Framework for Zero Trust Network Security
Anand, S., Ponce, M. A., & Duong, D. A. (2026) · ACM Workshop on Secure and Trustworthy Cyber-Physical Systems (SaT-CPS) · doi:10.1145/3806008.3811702
Experimental Comparison of Zero Trust and Perimeter-Based Security Architectures in Small Networks
Salim, M., Al-Khayat, M. S., Abdulazeez, O. H., & Miran, A. (2026) · International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals & Devices (SSD) · doi:10.1109/ssd69655.2026.11558953
“Although ZTA has been conceptually widely up taken, empirical data on a comparison between ZTA and traditional perimeter architecture is limited [8].”
ContexGuard: A Modular, Context-Aware Adaptive Security Framework for Dynamic Edge Environments
Aljawarneh, M. M., Shah, S. M., Batah, F., et al. (2026) · VFAST Transactions on Software Engineering · doi:10.21015/vtse.v14i2.2356
“This is a critical paradigm not only to the IoT, but also to next-generation networks: 2022) also continue to explain that ZTA should not just limit to the identity of users but include device health and behavioural patterns [14].”
Self-citationSecPerf: Demystifying Cost of Confidential HPC
Chrapek, M., Shen, S., Iff, P., Chen, T., Khalilov, M., Copik, M., Besta, M., & Hoefler, T. (2026) · IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium (IPDPS) · doi:10.1109/ipdps65963.2026.00075 · Cited by 1
“A smaller TCB reduces the attack surface and increases system assurance. cHPC hardware should operate in a zero-trust manner, which implies no trust unless a formal verification via attestation is conducted [97].”
Shifferaw, J. A., Pirbhulal, S., Abie, H., & Xu, S. (2026) · Communications in computer and information science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-22242-8_5
AI-Driven Zero Trust Enforcement System for Software-Defined Networks
Sun, A. H., & Shanmugasundaram, S. (2026) · doi:10.1109/icietsd68684.2026.11584676
“Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) security model based on a principle that no one, inside or outside a network, should be trusted until their access request is verified, authenticated, and continuously checked [3].”
A knowledge-based multi-agent framework for security control recommendation
Fernández, C., Siddiqui, M. S., & Daza, V. (2026) · Knowledge-Based Systems · doi:10.1016/j.knosys.2026.116558
“Modern tooling used in both local and hybrid setups becomes more complex as it encompasses more moving parts that must be continuously managed (e.g. tools for granular and stricter identity management, authentication and authorisation) [3].”
Worth, P. J., Cunningham, C., & Cardei, I. (2026) · Journal of Information Security · doi:10.4236/jis.2026.173016
Anomaly-Aware Dynamic Trust Thresholding for Zero Trust Architecture for Secure e-Healthcare
Kumar, A., & Sharma, A. (2026) · International Conference on Secure Cyber Computing and Communications (ICSCCC) · doi:10.1109/icsccc69031.2026.11600078
“Syed et al. [4] conducted a comprehensive survey of Zero Trust Architecture and emerging security paradigms, highlighting their evolving nature.”
Zero Trust Architectures in Multi-Cloud and Federated Environments: A Conceptual Security Framework
Kumar, N., & Sangal, A. L. (2026) · International Conference on Secure Cyber Computing and Communications (ICSCCC) · doi:10.1109/icsccc69031.2026.11600312
“NIST SP 800–207 formalizes ZTA as a logical architecture built around three core functions: a Policy Engine (PE) that evaluates access requests [4].”
Kanakadhurga, D., Chandrakala, K. R. M. V., Başaran, K., & Lăzăroiu, G. C. (2026) · Engineering Science and Technology an International Journal · doi:10.1016/j.jestch.2026.102464 · Cited by 1
IoT Intrusion Defense Integrating Blockchain and Traffic Detection within a Zero Trust Architecture
Zhao, X., Liu, R., Liu, N., et al. (2025) · doi:10.1145/3778335.3778344
Konda, B., Yadulla, A. R., Yenugula, M., Tumma, C., Ayyamgari, S., Thumma, B. Y. R., Suresh, N., & Kasula, V. K. (2026) · Applied System Innovation · doi:10.3390/asi9070157
“Geiger et al. [10] proposed, in 2020, a method for anomaly detection in time series by reconstructing signals using Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), providing a new perspective on the problem [20,21].”
One-Class LSTM Behavioral Modeling for Insider Threat Detection in Zero Trust Architectures
Robu, R. C., Marian, C. V., & Cioponea, A. P. (2026) · International Conference on Electronics, Computers and Artificial Intelligence (ECAI) · doi:10.1109/ecai69016.2026.11613700
“AI-assisted ZTA systems combining continuous authentication with behavioral analytics have been explored in [18], [19].”
Hassan, A. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.7315142
Zero Trust Architecture for MQTT-based IoT Networks using eSIM and IoT SAFE
Jayakrishnan, S., Jain, K., Krishnan, P., Hari, N. N., & Sethu Subramanian, N. (2026) · International Conference on Computer Networks, Big Data and IoT (ICCBI) · doi:10.1109/iccbi68589.2026.11619769
“In recent years, Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) has gained a lot of attention in IoT contexts [7], [8].”
Chamkoori, A., & Ghasemi, A. (2026) · Journal of Computer Networks and Communications · doi:10.1155/jcnc/8893656
Increasing SMEs’ Awareness for Cybersecurity and Data Protection
Lee, C.-T., Marchi, M. D., Francalanza, E., & Hauge, J. B. (2026) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-26279-0_6
АРХИТЕКТУРЫ ВЫСОКОНАГРУЖЕННЫХ КОМПЛЕКСНЫХ СИСТЕМ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ
Белкин, Е. Н., & Кондрашев, А. С. (2026) · Современные наукоемкие технологии (Modern High Technologies) · doi:10.17513/snt.40857
AID-ZT4B5G: an Adaptive Intelligent Zero-Trust Multi-Layer Architecture for B5G Networks
Amimour, I., Alioua, A., & Chettab, A. (2026) · International Conference on Cybersecurity, Digital Forensics, and AI Applications (ICCSDFAI) · doi:10.1109/iccsdfai70505.2026.11647895
“This approach keeps internal resources invisible until successful authentication and authorization are established [22].”
Yu, Y.-C., Chang, T., & Sung, P.-C. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.7315143
A systematic review on the current scenarios and future frontiers for securing smart grid systems
Sivakumar, E., Ganesan, G., Premkumar, R., Rani, R. H. J., & Srinivasan, K. (2026) · Discover Computing · doi:10.1007/s10791-026-10348-x · Cited by 2
Akhmetkaliyev, A., Ala’anzy, M. A., Almsafir, M. K., & Musleh, S. (2026) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2026.112695
Ailabouni, F., & Román‐Gallego, J. (2026) · Open Research Europe · doi:10.12688/openreseurope.24781.1
Zero Trust Security Technologies, Applications, and Adoption Challenges
Anderson, J., Aldeen, M. S., Zhang, S., Liao, S., Hu, H., Chowdhury, M., & Cheng, L. (2026) · Lecture notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-33701-6_11
Belesioti, M., Diakoumakos, J., Chochliouros, I. P., Zahariadis, T. B., & Papadakis, A. E. (2026) · International Conference on Distributed Computing in Smart Systems and the Internet of Things (DCOSS-IoT) · doi:10.1109/dcoss-iot69657.2026.00196
“…threats regardless of their origin, and sets clear trust controls, treating every subject as untrusted by default— despite its location or network [14], replacing blind trust with verification and authorizing access accordingly [15] through continuous authentication and authorization procedures.”
Damianou, A., Voulgaridis, A., Votis, K., & Tzovaras, D. K. (2026) · International Conference on Distributed Computing in Smart Systems and the Internet of Things (DCOSS-IoT) · doi:10.1109/dcoss-iot69657.2026.00148
“It is achieved through the integration and analysis of data from multiple sources, including cyber and physical components, enabling a comprehensive view of the system state [14], [15].”
ZTSafe: Safety-Certified Risk-Adaptive Scheduling for Zero-Trust Time-Sensitive Industrial Networks
Zhou, H., Lei, H., & Yang, M. (2026) · Future Internet · doi:10.3390/fi18090466
Askari, M., Shah, G. A., Hassan, K. M. U., et al. (2026) · Information systems engineering and management · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-22426-2_6
Zhou, H., Lei, H., & Yang, M. (2026) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics15174004
Risk-Adaptive Fine-Grained Authorization via Lightweight-LLM Collaboration
Li, M., & Peng, J. (2026) · International Conference on Cyber Security, Artificial Intelligence and Digital Economy (CSAIDE) · doi:10.1145/3819836.3819847
Adaptive Reauthentication Control for Resource-Constrained Internet of ThingsPreprint
Ahmad, I., Gimhana, S., Hewa, T. M., Ahmad, I., Nguyen, D. N., & Harjula, E. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.7411185
Keyhanian, S. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.7428622
Alzahrani, A. A. (2026) · CAAI Transactions on Intelligence Technology · doi:10.1049/cit2.70173
Urs, P. G., & Mureşan, V. (2026) · Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy · doi:10.3390/jcp6050158
“Syed et al. [15], in a comprehensive survey of zero-trust architecture (ZTA), found that only a small minority of surveyed studies addressed OT environments and none demonstrated deployment in safety-critical real-time control systems, confirming that the academic literature had not yet resolved…”
Shagor, M. S. I. (2026) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-10973795/v1
A Survey on Zero Trust Architecture: Principles, Deployment, and Open Challenges
Hajo, M., & Thanoon, K. H. (2026) · Al-Noor Journal of Engineering Management and Computer Science · doi:10.71229/pkffyc08
Jeevana, B., Jasrini, K., Sai, M. H., et al. (2026) · International Conference on Trends in Quantum Computing and Emerging Business Technologies (TQCEBT) · doi:10.1109/tqcebt67648.2026.11681611
“[2] However, this has been proven to be insufficient in the face of insider threats, compromised credentials, and advanced persistent attacks using legitimate user credentials.”
Nagi, S., Panesar, M. S., & Pasricha, S. S. (2026) · Discover Internet of Things · doi:10.1007/s43926-026-00497-2
“This reactive to proactive security change is necessary to protect distributed enterprise ecosystem in the era of intelligent automation [3].”
A Multi-Layer Zero Trust Security Framework for Kubernetes
Shakishnavi, M., Jayasena, K. P. N., & Nishankar, S. (2026) · Moratuwa Engineering Research Conference (MERCon) · doi:10.1109/mercon71835.2026.11691543
“Modern cloud-native applications and microservices have played a significant role in modern infrastructure, facilitating scalability, agility, and faster deployment [12], [13].”
InfluentialA Prototype-Based Zero Trust Architecture for Secure Access Control in Enterprise Networks
Asif, M. H. N., Arko, K. B., Apurbo, T. H., Ahmmed, M. M., Rahman, M. M., Mahmud, M., & Babu, M. A. (2026) · Lecture notes in networks and systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-14775-2_3
Zero-Trust in the Quantum Computing Era: Architectures, Algorithms, and Adaptation
Ftayh, R. F., Issa, S. S., & ГАВЕЛЬ, С. (2026) · Communications in computer and information science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-39711-9_2
Leveraging federated learning for smart grids: A comprehensive survey
Husnoo, M. A., Anwar, A., & Rahman, M. A. (2026) · Cyber-Physical Energy Systems · doi:10.1016/j.cpes.2026.07.002 · Cited by 1
Self-citationNkinyili, T., Omwenga, V. O., & Ogara, S. (2026) · Annals of Computer Science and Information Systems · doi:10.15439/2026f5993
Security policies in quantum computing: a systematic review of literature
Cordero, J. N., Monterrubio, S. M. M., & Elipe, G. T. (2026) · Discover Computing · doi:10.1007/s10791-026-10596-x
“This risk-based analysis can define the importance of access controls and protection of information obtained from quantum processes [3, 7, 48, 64].”
Zero Trust Architecture in Healthcare: A Systematic Mapping Study
Aatouani, M. E., Guemmat, K. E., Bousselham, A., Bahi, S., & Hamdaoui, M. A. (2026) · International Conference on Advanced Computer Information Technologies (ACIT) · doi:10.1109/acit69831.2026.11700098
“The pandemic forced healthcare organizations to rapidly expand remote access and telemedicine capabilities, exposing longstanding vulnerabilities in perimeter-based security models [24].”
Agentic AI for Autonomous Zero-Day Threat Detection in Zero-Trust Enterprise Security Architectures
Kodeboyina, A. K., Chittanoori, B., & Kommisetti, S. R. (2026) · doi:10.1109/icsist70215.2026.11705777
“The security landscape for enterprise has evolved from being fixed perimeters to dynamic identities, cloud workloads, software-defined services, and ever-changing dependencies [1].”
From Sox to Smart Controls and Zero Day Meets Zero Trust
Rao, G. (2026) · doi:10.1109/tic68483.2026.11702892
“It demands constant authentication, access with least privilege and stringent authentication [5].”
Security Challenges in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks: Threat Mitigation Strategies
Gundeti, M. (2026) · IEEE International Conference on Advanced Telecommunication and Networking Technologies (ATNT) · doi:10.1109/atnt70190.2026.11709570
“Adaptive Zero-Trust Architecture: Implementing dynamic 'Zero-Trust' access control profiles within vehicular networks, where every data packet is continuously re-verified for contextual anomalies regardless of its cryptographic authenticity or historical trust origins [30].”
Shakishnavi, M., Jayasena, K. P. N., & Nishankar, S. (2026) · doi:10.1109/apan70967.2026.11709624
“A comprehensive survey of ZTA adoption across enterprise environments concluded that the primary barrier to adoption is not tool availability but integration complexity [15], a finding that directly motivates the approach taken in this paper.”
Lightweight Dual-Fingerprint Neural Fusion for Trusted Device Identification in Power IoT
Yan, Z., Ma, Z., & Lu, L. (2026) · International Conference on Advanced Algorithms and Neural Networks (AANN) · doi:10.1109/aann71145.2026.11709085
“Industrial IoT security work emphasizes device authentication, attack detection, system integrity, and zero-trust access control [25], [26].”
Securing Agentic AI via Hybrid CNN–Transformer Detection and Cryptographic Intent Binding
Sindhu, N., Jagruthi, H., Pai, S., Chiranth, S., Aishvarya, V., & Pavan, J. (2026) · Algorithms for intelligent systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-25627-0_31
The Impact of Zero-Trust in Blockchain
Jayanthi, G., Sushant, S., & Sumesh, E. (2026) · Lecture notes in electrical engineering · doi:10.1007/978-981-92-1243-9_11
Kumar, L. K. S., Yaseen, M., Uyyala, R., & Ravichandarreddy, J. (2026) · International Conference on Soft Computing for Security Applications (ICSCSA) · doi:10.1109/icscsa69367.2026.11708219
“Ultimately, integrating these hybrid capabilities will be essential for realizing fully autonomous, zero-trust network architectures [19].”
Qadri, S. M. (2026) · Frontiers in Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.32996/fcsai.2026.5.9.2
“Recent guidance from CISA, the Cloud Security Alliance, and Carnegie Mellon SEI [4], [5], [10], [11] has explicitly extended ZT thinking to OT and ICS, and a growing body of academic work has proposed ZT-derived architectures for industrial environments [12], [13], [17]-[23].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Syed, N. F., Shah, S. W., Shaghaghi, A., Anwar, A., Baig, Z., & Doss, R.
- Affiliations
- Deakin University (AU)
- Venue
- IEEE Access
- Published
- 2022
- Volume
- 10
- Pages
- 57143-57179
- ISSN
- 2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4285205927
- Cited by
- 406
- References
- 161
- Citations by year
- 2026: 131 · 2025: 141 · 2024: 88 · 2023: 37 · 2022: 9
- FWCI
- 98.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- IEEE Access (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Deakin Research Online (Deakin University) (submittedVersion)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Figshare (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Australian Department of Defence
- Defence Science and Technology Group’s Operations Research Network
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Access Control and Trust
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cybersecurity and Information Systems
- Keywords
- zero-trust architecture, authentication, access control, encryption, micro-segmentation, security automation, software-defined perimeter, critical infrastructure security, network security
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