Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 160 of the 161 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 65 of the 205 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Abstract
We present a detailed survey of the Zero Trust (ZT) security paradigm which has a growing number of advocates in the critical infrastructure risk management space. The article employs a descriptive approach to present the fundamental tenets of ZT and provides a review of numerous potential options available for successful realization of this paradigm. We describe the role of authentication and access control in Zero Trust Architectures (ZTA) and present an in-depth discussion of state-of-the-art techniques for authentication and access control in different scenarios. Furthermore, we comprehensively discuss the conventional approaches to encryption, micro-segmentation, and security automation available for instantiating a ZTA. The article also details various challenges associated with contemporary authentication mechanisms, access control schemes, trust and risk computation techniques, micro-segmentation approaches, and Software-Defined Perimeter, that can impact the implementation of ZT in its true sense. Based upon our analysis, we finally pinpoint the potential future research directions for successful realization of ZT in critical infrastructures.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This survey synthesizes Zero Trust Architecture tenets and state-of-the-art techniques for authentication, access control, encryption, micro-segmentation/SDP, and security automation, with a focus on critical infrastructure. It finds that no single technology or architecture can successfully implement ZTA and identifies persistent shortcomings and future research directions.
Key findings
- The survey identifies authentication, access control, encryption, micro-segmentation/SDP, and security automation as essential ZTA techniques, but concludes that all have shortcomings and that no single technology or architecture can successfully implement ZTA.
- It reviewed more than 180 articles and reports and reports specific security concerns: 128-bit AES on Arduino needed only 30 minutes to break via differential and correlation power analysis, and 2048-bit RSA could be cracked in around eight hours by a 20-million-qubit quantum computer, while only 128 qubits currently exist.
- It recommends context-aware/continuous authentication, risk-aware access control such as Function-Based Access Control (FBAC), lightweight encryption, micro-segmentation/SDP, and ML-supported trust/security automation; one cited microservices perimeterization approach (eZTrust) achieved 2–5 times lower packet latency and 1.5–2.5 times lower CPU overhead than other approaches.
- Device authentication findings include PUF vulnerability to modelling attacks, ECC vulnerability to quantum attacks, device fingerprinting usable only on specific devices, and a lightweight mutual authentication scheme taking around 125 ms on constrained devices but evaluated only on a Texas development kit.
Methods
- Descriptive survey/horizon scan of ZTA for critical infrastructure, comparing its approach with existing reviews in Table 1 and organizing analysis around NIST ZTA tenets and logical components.
- Reviewed more than 180 articles and reports using keywords including zero trust architecture, authentication, access control, encryption, micro-segmentation, and security automation.
- Qualitative synthesis of state-of-the-art techniques, challenges, and future research directions; no primary experiments or new empirical evaluation are reported.
Limitations
- The paper states that no single technology or architecture can successfully implement ZTA; all essential techniques—authentication, access control, encryption, and security automation—have shortcomings, and trust computation for enterprise networks or critical infrastructure lacks direct literature, so ad hoc IoT techniques are described as extendable.
- The paper states that risk computation implementation details remain obscure; current trust algorithms are designed for ad hoc or P2P networks and are not directly applicable to enterprise/CPS settings; micro-segmentation is difficult for complex workflows, legacy/monolithic applications, and translating workflow access into network/application policies; SDP requires major network/client/server changes and its central controller can become an attack target.
- Evident from the text: the provided full text is fragmented/truncated, with some sections and tables incomplete, and the survey is qualitative without primary empirical validation of its recommendations.
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Claims the paper makes
62 Valid · 44 Not valid · 138 Not checked · 172 Own results and interpretations
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“For example, context-aware mechanisms that need an accelerometer to determine the position of a device for risk assessment (e.g., in [25]) will not work for laptops or desktops that have no accelerometer.”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > B. CONTEXT-AWARE USER AUTHENTICATION
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [25] matched to “Context-Aware Multimodal FIDO Authenticator for Sustainable IT Services” (2018) source
Section 3.2 says CAMFA uses mobile-device placement to calculate risk. Section 5.1 says its placement classifier uses readings from sensors including an accelerometer. A device without an accelerometer could not run that classifier as described; the laptop/desktop example is a conditional application of that limitation, not a device population the paper tested. Page numbers were not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“For example, an approach that uses the touch dynamics (e.g., [33]) for continuous authentication will not work on some other devices such as laptops or desktops.”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > C. CONTINUOUS AUTHENTICATION
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [33] matched to “Touchalytics: On the Applicability of Touchscreen Input as a Behavioral Biometric for Continuous Authentication” (2013) source
The Introduction (p. 2) identifies the cited approach as continuous authentication using touchscreen input. Related Work (p. 3) distinguishes touchscreen data from mouse and touchpad data, supporting the point that this touch-dynamics approach would not work on laptops or desktops that lack touchscreen input. (LLM, conf=0.88)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The two most common approaches, which we will discuss here, are micro-segmentation and software defined perimeters.”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > VI. SEGMENTATION AND SOFTWARE DEFINED PERIMETER
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [3] matched to “Zero Trust Architecture” (2020) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 describe micro-segmentation and software-defined perimeters as ZTA approaches. Section 3.1 also identifies enhanced identity governance as a third approach, and the paper does not rank the two named approaches as the most common. (LLM, conf=0.87)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
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The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“e.g.[101] demonstrated that 128-bit AES implemented on Arduino needed only 30 minutes to break by leveraging the differential and correlation power analysis”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > A. LIGHTWEIGHT ENCRYPTION
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [101] matched to “Power analysis attacks on the AES-128 S-box using differential power analysis (DPA) and correlation power analysis (CPA)” (2017) sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Discussion (§4.3) reports about 30 minutes per full 16-byte key attack and says both DPA and CPA attacks were achievable on the Arduino Uno. However, the implementation described in §3.3 ran only AES-128’s AddRoundKey and SubBytes steps, not the full AES-128 algorithm implied by the citing sentence. (LLM, conf=0.86)
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“However, this simplification comes at the cost of security (e.g.[101] demonstrated that 128-bit AES implemented on Arduino needed only 30 minutes to break by leveraging the differential and correlation power analysis).”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > A. LIGHTWEIGHT ENCRYPTION
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [101] matched to “Power analysis attacks on the AES-128 S-box using differential power analysis (DPA) and correlation power analysis (CPA)” (2017) source
Section 4.3 (Discussion; page unavailable) reports approximately 25 minutes to collect traces and no more than 5 minutes to compute the DPA and CPA results—about 30 minutes per attack. Section 6 (Conclusion; page unavailable) says both techniques recovered the full AES-128 key from an Arduino Uno in a white-box test. The broader claim about simplification is the citing authors’ framing, not a finding this citation must establish. (LLM, conf=0.92)
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
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In the citing paper
“Moreover, it adds a layer of complexity for attackers as they must navigate through multiple micro-segments to reach their target [10].”
From Flexible zero trust architecture for the cybersecurity of industrial IoT infrastructures (2024) · cites this paper as [10]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Furthermore, it facilitates breach containment by enabling efficient traffic monitoring and alignment with security policies.”
From Flexible zero trust architecture for the cybersecurity of industrial IoT infrastructures (2024) · cites this paper as [10]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“It enhances network visibility by imposing stringent communication rules among workloads.”
From Flexible zero trust architecture for the cybersecurity of industrial IoT infrastructures (2024) · cites this paper as [10]
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In the citing paper
“They describe the benefits of implementing micro-segmentation through SDN but also the challenges associated with this approach, such as substantial network modifications and single-point-of-failure risks of a central controller.”
From Flexible zero trust architecture for the cybersecurity of industrial IoT infrastructures (2024) · cites this paper as [10]
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In the citing paper
“This approach allows granular control and isolation of network segments, thus creating additional layers of defense against threats.”
From Flexible zero trust architecture for the cybersecurity of industrial IoT infrastructures (2024) · cites this paper as [10]
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Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > IV. ACCESS CONTROL
“FIDO2 [62] A joint effort between the FIDO Alliance and the World Wide Web Consortium”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > References
“62. R. Feng, X. Xu, X. Zhou, and J. Wan, "A trust evaluation algorithm for wireless sensor networks based on node behaviors and ds evidence theory,"”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > C. SECURITY SITUATION AWARENESS
“In [147], the authors present a policy management framework for ZTA referred to as FURZE (Fuzzy Risk Framework for ZT Networks)”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > References
“147. U. Franke and J. Brynielsson, "Cyber situational awareness-a systematic review of the literature,"”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > MICRO-SEGMENTATION AND SDP
“As micro-segmentation is only applicable for application level access control, protection of physical devices and resources necessitates the consideration of SDNbased mechanisms such as those proposed in [131], [132]”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > Micro-segmentation in IoT -
“In IoT devices, microsegmentation can be achieved using Software Defined Networking (SDN) along with Network Function Virtualisation (NFV).”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
“Authors in [183] have shown five key approaches for which no known way of applying the Shor's algorithm exists.”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
“These approaches are code-based encryption, latticebased encryption/signature, multivariate-quadratic-equation signatures, and hash-based signatures.”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > A. LIGHTWEIGHT ENCRYPTION
“PRESENT [104], which uses either an 80or 128-bit encryption key.”
§ Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey > A. LIGHTWEIGHT ENCRYPTION
“PRESENT [104] Encryption (80 or 256 bit key)”
Citations
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Grover, L. K. (1996) · Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '96 · doi:10.1145/237814.237866 · Cited by 8,830 · cited 1×
“Similarly, for hash functions, Grover’s algorithm [185] can facilitate quantum birthday attack to find collision, thereby necessitating an output of larger size.”
BackgroundAlgorithms for quantum computation: discrete logarithms and factoring
Shor, P. W. (2002) · Proceedings 35th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science · doi:10.1109/sfcs.1994.365700 · Cited by 8,713 · cited 1×
“Similarly, the authors of [183] showed that almost all of the current public-key mechanisms can be broken by Shor’s algorithms [184].”
BackgroundPRESENT: An Ultra-Lightweight Block Cipher
Bogdanov, A., Knudsen, L. R., Leander, G., Paar, C., Poschmann, A., Robshaw, M. J. B., Seurin, Y., & Vikkelsoe, C. (2007) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-74735-2_31 · Cited by 2,867 · cited 1×
“One of the promising alternatives of AES for lightweight encryption is PRESENT [104], which uses either an 80-or 128-bit encryption key.”
MethodTowards a Better Understanding of Context and Context-Awareness
Abowd, G. D., Dey, A. K., Brown, P. J., Davies, N., Smith, M., & Steggles, P. (1999) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-48157-5_29 · Cited by 2,634 · cited 1×
“The word ‘context’ can be defined as any information that can establish the situation of an entity [20].”
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Hoffstein, J., Pipher, J., & Silverman, J. H. (1998) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/bfb0054868 · Cited by 1,947 · cited 1×
“Likewise, another approach that is referred to as NTRU is proposed in [115].”
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“However, numerous shortcomings of the afore-mentioned approaches are mentioned in [183].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialRose, S., Borchert, O., Mitchell, S., & Connelly, S. (2020) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-207 · Cited by 1,174
Guide to Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC) Definition and Considerations
Hu, V. C., Ferraiolo, D., Kuhn, R., Schnitzer, A., Sandlin, K., Miller, R., & Scarfone, K. (2014) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-162 · Cited by 917 · cited 2×
“As described by NIST, the ACM is a logical component that assesses access requests and decides whether the subject is authorized to execute the requested operation [68].”
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“For example, [33], [34] use the touch dynamics on the screen and extract features such as orientation of the finger, pressure exerted on the screen, area occluded and time instances.”
Background
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Cited by
Items 201–300 of 381
Ngema, N., Nleya, B., & Maswanganyi, R. C. (2026) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s26123813 · Cited by 4
“Since the Zero Trust Architecture is still in its preliminary stages within the aviation sector, the focus is still on the framework itself, algorithms, trust evaluations, access controls, and identity authentication [6].”
Butka, A., & Bobda, C. (2026) · Journal of Hardware and Systems Security · doi:10.1007/s41635-026-00185-1 · Cited by 1
“Prior surveys on SoC and NoC security [28, 88 , 100] and on zero-trust architecture [38, 51, 107] comprehensively characterize the attack surfaces and core implementation requirements of each domain.”
FORTRESS: A Federated Learning and Transformer-Based Zero Trust Framework for O-RAN Security
Ratnayake, H., Siriwardhana, Y., Wijewardhana, U., et al. (2026) · Joint European Conference on Networks and Communications & 6G Summit (EuCNC/6G Summit) · doi:10.1109/eucnc/6gsummit68295.2026.11577317 · Cited by 1
“The main components of ZTA are Policy Engine (PE), Policy Administrator (PA), Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs), and Policy Information Points (PIPs) [12], [13].”
Barbosa, G. N. N., Lopez, M. A., Nguyen, T. M. T., & Mattos, D. M. F. (2026) · Annals of Telecommunications · doi:10.1007/s12243-026-01197-2 · Cited by 3
Zero Trust Paradigm (ZTP): an advancing approach of cybersecurity in emerging technologies
Sasikala, S., & Saranya, G. (2026) · Journal of Cyber Security Technology · doi:10.1080/23742917.2026.2704951 · Cited by 1
Securing 5G Positioning via Zero Trust Architecture
Adam, R. Y., & Meng, W. (2024) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-981-99-9785-5_39 · Cited by 1
Liu, F., Luo, Z., Wang, Z., Yin, L., Zhang, Y., Ren, J., & Peng, Y. (2023) · International Conference on Network and Information Systems for Computers (ICNISC) · doi:10.1109/icnisc60562.2023.00092 · Cited by 3
Zenith Armor : Advancing Security with Zero Trust Measures
Singh, J. (2024) · INTERANTIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT · doi:10.55041/ijsrem31326 · Cited by 1
Adaptive Sharing of IoT Resources Through SDN-Based Microsegmentation of Services Using Mininet
Martínez, A. R. G., Padrón, J. D., Zambrano-Martínez, J. L., & Calafate, C. T. (2024) · Lecture notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-57523-5_18 · Cited by 2
Eng, K., King, J., Schillaci, C., & Rawal, A. (2024) · Assurance and Security for AI-enabled Systems · doi:10.1117/12.3013114 · Cited by 1
“As seen from Energy Internet’s advancement, extensive data integration and improved efficiency presents increased security risks due to more open network structures and evolving complex threats [35].”
BackgroundSecuring the Future: Framework Fundamentals for Cyber Resilience in Advancing Organizations
(2024) · Journal of System and Management Sciences · doi:10.33168/jsms.2024.1008 · Cited by 8
xG Security: Zero-Trust and Moving Target Defense in Decentralized Learning Environment
Abdelhay, Z., & Refaey, A. (2024) · International Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing Conference (IWCMC) · doi:10.1109/iwcmc61514.2024.10592368 · Cited by 1
“The framework follows the Zero-Trust Architecture [18], where access rules are enforced by the controller using a drop-all policy.”
MethodNI-SPA: SPA-Based Dynamic Access Control Utilizing In-Network Behavior
Kataoka, S., Kotani, D., & Okabe, Y. (2024) · doi:10.1145/3672200.3673876 · Cited by 1
Security Mechanisms Used in Systems Based on Zero Trust Architecture: A Systematic Mapping
Manzano, C., Márquez, G., & Hernán Astudillo, R. (2024) · Latin American Computer Conference (CLEI) · doi:10.1109/clei64178.2024.10700484 · Cited by 2
“These mechanisms are also very essential in the implementation of ZTA-based systems [38].”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialSensor Based IOT Enabled Healthcare Systems and Role of AI and Security
Gupta, S. K., Kapoor, M., & Debnath, S. K. (2025) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-82810-2_2 · Cited by 1
Zero Trust Security Implementation: A Brief Study
Rao, A., & Ranga, V. (2025) · International Conference on Electronics, AI and Computing (EAIC) · doi:10.1109/eaic66483.2025.11101299 · Cited by 1
“The TA takes inputs from the policy database, attributes, user role, behavioral information, threat-related information, etc. as per the deployment of the organizations [15].”
Semi-Quantum Communication for Cyber Secure Microgrid Under Zero-Trust Architecture
Li, H., An, Z., Jiao, F., Zhang, X., Zhang, Y., Shi, L., Huo, F. W., & Zhou, Y. (2025) · IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications · doi:10.1109/tia.2025.3626477 · Cited by 1
“To compensate for the shortcomings of traditional architectures, Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) [11] has introduced the concept of “Never Trust, Always Verify” [12] and reshaped the security boundary through dynamic trust assessment mechanisms such as continuous authentication and least privilege…”
Secured Scalable Blockchain Networks for Trustworthy Distributed Deep Learning in VANETs
Ma, Z. (2023) · Carleton University's Institutional Repository (MacOdrum Library, Carleton University) · doi:10.22215/etd/2023-15779 · Cited by 3
Attack Detection and Countermeasures at Edge Devices
Ahmed, F., & Arafin, M. T. (2025) · Wiley eBooks · doi:10.1002/9781394191529.ch20 · Cited by 1
On Using Zero Trust to Securing Industrial Control Systems in the Power Systems Industry
Farraj, A. (2025) · 2025 IEEE Texas Power and Energy Conference (TPEC) · doi:10.1109/tpec63981.2025.10906998
(2023) · IEEE Internet Computing · doi:10.1109/mic.2023.3289665
ZTD$_{JAVA}$: Mitigating Software Supply Chain Vulnerabilities via Zero-Trust DependenciesPreprint
Amusuo, P. C., Robinson, K. A., Singla, T., Peng, H., Machiry, A., Torres-Arias, S., Simon, L., & Davis, J. C. (2023) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2310.14117
“…[7], Zero-Trust Architecture is a set of cybersecurity concepts focused on protecting services ( resources ) within a system, grants no The Zero-Trust Architecture has been applied to security-sensitive domains [41] including network infrastructure [42], [43] and cloud systems [8], [9], [11].”
Avaliação do Impacto da Arquitetura de Confiança Zero em Aplicações de Controle Industrial
Cruz, L. D. S., & da Fonseca, I. E. (2023) · Anais de XXXV Simpósio Brasileiro de Telecomunicações e Processamento de Sinais · doi:10.14209/sbrt.2023.1570913109 · Cited by 1
Zero-Trust in Instant Messaging
Gergov, I., & Obreshkov, N. (2023) · International Scientific Conference on Computer Science (COMSCI) · doi:10.1109/comsci59259.2023.10315901
“The third principle, "do not rule out the possibility of a breach," implies that any interaction can be compromised and handled [11].”
BackgroundUser Authentication in the IoT and IIoT Environment
Mahfouz, A. (2024) · Advances in information security, privacy, and ethics book series · doi:10.4018/979-8-3693-3451-5.ch008
Securing software defined networking in cloud infrastructure through transport layer security
Jalali, M., & Reed, M. J. (2024) · International Conference on Cloud and Big Data Computing (ICCBDC) · doi:10.1145/3694860.3694872
“It has been noted that while cloud systems have been seen as providing a solution for security over legacy systems, e.g. in the form of zero-trust frameworks [19], maintaining security in these dynamic environments also introduces new security vectors in the underlying infrastructure.”
Parmar, Y., Caullery, F., & Kale, S. (2024) · doi:10.1109/vcris63677.2024.10813447
“Ensuring secure and efficient computation is paramount, particularly within a zero-trust architecture [13] where no component is inherently trusted, and each must verify the security and integrity of data and operations.”
Chamley, M. W., Elgamal, E. M., & Prasad, P. W. C. (2024) · Lecture notes in electrical engineering · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-71773-4_6
Recent Advances in IoT Security for Real-Time Data Integration
Mohammed, A. H. (2024) · International Journal of Scientific Research in Computer Science Engineering and Information Technology · doi:10.32628/cseit2410612425
Exploring the Effect of AI Trust on Firm Creativity to Generate Performance at AI-Ready Firms
Rozyanti, A. P., Cahyani, D. P., Kinanti, L., & Maharani, A. (2024) · Jurnal Manajemen dan Organisasi · doi:10.29244/jmo.v15i4.60027
“Trust in AI should be directed towards its ethical and responsible use by encouraging an environment conducive to the exploration and development of new ideas and solutions, and AI should not be used as a mechanism to limit the ability of creativity (Syed et al ., 2022; Amato et al ., 2019).”
An eBPF-based packet capture system with embedded application metadata for network forensics
Okabe, M., & Tsunoda, H. (2024) · International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops (CANDARW) · doi:10.1109/candarw64572.2024.00065
Building Futuristic Data Centers: A Technical Deep Dive into Next-Generation Infrastructure
Mosali, S. R. (2025) · International Journal of Scientific Research in Computer Science Engineering and Information Technology · doi:10.32628/cseit251112260
Ferreira, R., Adão, T. O., Morais, R., Costa, A. R., & Peres, E. (2025) · Procedia Computer Science · doi:10.1016/j.procs.2025.02.120
Maturity Model for Corporate Sector Based on Zero Trust Adoption
Ilyas, M., Akal, M., & Althebyan, Q. (2024) · International Conference on Engineering and Emerging Technologies (ICEET) · doi:10.1109/iceet65156.2024.10913750
Enhancing Security in ASP.NET Core Applications: Implementing Oauth, JWT, and Zero-Trust Models
Chinthalapudi, S. S. (2025) · doi:10.38124/ijisrt/25mar1677 · Cited by 1
Shaik, N. (2025) · Global Journal of Engineering and Technology Advances · doi:10.30574/gjeta.2025.23.1.0110
Fan, Z., Yuan, C., Si, X., & Yuan, S. (2023) · International Conference on Networking Systems of AI (INSAI) · doi:10.1109/insai60116.2023.00057
Advancements in Network Infrastructure for Large-Scale Educational and Industrial Systems
Kosaraju, P. (2025) · International Journal of Scientific Research in Computer Science Engineering and Information Technology · doi:10.32628/cseit25113340
ZETIn: Infraestrutura baseada em Zero Trust para Segurança e Conectividade em Redes em Malha Ad-Hoc
Barbosa, G. N. N., & Mattos, D. M. F. (2025) · doi:10.5753/sbrc.2025.6448
Mettu, B. P. R. (2025) · European Journal of Computer Science and Information Technology · doi:10.37745/ejcsit.2013/vol13n446883
Privacy Enhancement for Meta Computing via Conjecture Pricing
Pan, S., Zhang, J., Li, P., et al. (2024) · doi:10.1109/icmc60390.2024.00037
“It roots at emerging distributed technologies like zero trust-oriented secure multi-party computation [5], [6], blockchain [7], federated learning [8], etc., and is believed able to achieve intelligent, fault-tolerant, secure, and privacy-protected computing services.”
Alharthi, D. N., & Abbas, M. M. (2024) · IEEE Annual Information Technology, Electronics and Mobile Communication Conference (IEMCON) · doi:10.1109/iemcon62851.2024.11093133 · Cited by 1
Navigating Cybersecurity in Industry 5.0: From Risks to Solutions
Kiran, U., & Suryawanshi, S. (2025) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-87837-4_10
Stocker, V., & Mandalari, A. M. (2025) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.5386101 · Cited by 1
Abramov, V., Hlushak, O., Plokha, A., et al. (2025) · Cybersecurity Education Science Technique · doi:10.28925/2663-4023.2025.29.845
Biswas, P., Safare, R., Syed, U., Mannava, R., Nadella, J., & Dabbara, V. C. (2025) · Algorithms for intelligent systems · doi:10.1007/978-981-96-5265-5_60
Behavior‐based Confidence Scoring to Support Access Management in Zero Trust Systems
Schulker, D., Wang, J., Mellon, J., & Garrett, R. C. (2025) · INCOSE International Symposium · doi:10.1002/iis2.70076 · Cited by 1
A Minimal Overlay-Based Framework for Transitioning Legacy Infrastructure to Zero Trust
Wang, W., Sadjadi, S. M., Rishe, N. D., & Mahara, A. (2025) · IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security · doi:10.1109/cns66487.2025.11195028
“1) Problem: ZT adoption in legacy environments is hindered by three key challenges: First, frameworks often lack actionable implementation guidance [4]; second, static infrastructures resist dynamic policy enforcement [5]; and third, full system replacement is often infeasible due to cost and…”
The Role of Quantum—Enhanced Digital Signature in Strengthening Cryptographic Security
Subramanian, S., Priya, V., Madhumathi, C. S., Balaji, S., Sivaraman, P., & Alhameed, M. H. (2025) · Blockchain technologies · doi:10.1007/978-981-96-9148-7_7
Quantum-Enhanced Digital Signatures: A Secure and Scalable Approach for the Post-quantum Era
Azhagiri, M., Gowr, P. S., Joseph, M., et al. (2025) · Blockchain technologies · doi:10.1007/978-981-96-9148-7_8
Chelladurai, S. P., Subramanian, S., Roselin, S. E., Pandiarajan, T., Sivaraman, P., & Jeribi, F. (2025) · Blockchain technologies · doi:10.1007/978-981-96-9148-7_4
TIMeFoRCE: An Identity and Access Management Framework for IoT Devices in A Zero Trust Architecture
Morris, V., Kornegay, K., Falaye, J., Richardson, S., Tienteu, M., & Tchuenkou, L. J. D. (2025) · Advances in Science Technology and Engineering Systems Journal · doi:10.25046/aj100601
Zero trust security architecture enhanced with federated learning for modern network environments
Shinde, S. R., Gade, S., Singh, T., Takale, D. G., Shingare, P., & Kanathia, S. (2025) · EPJ Web of Conferences · doi:10.1051/epjconf/202534101021 · Cited by 2
Augmenting Zero Trust Architecture with Temporal Attack Graph
Gain, A., & Barik, M. S. (2025) · IEEE India Council International Subsections Conference (INDISCON) · doi:10.1109/indiscon66021.2025.11254872
“By eliminating trusted perimeters and dynamically assessing trust through contextual real-time data, ZTA enhances security resilience, particularly in the cloud, IoT, and hybrid work environments [1].”
Learning State Machines for Adaptive Authentication
Saram, B. D., & Bhareti, K. (2025) · International Conference on Business Analytics for Technology and Security (ICBATS) · doi:10.1109/icbats66542.2025.11258451
“Most conventional and static adaptive authentication methods are either too rigid or have rules that do not respond to changes in the environment, or are extremely complex [15], which causes user inconvenience [11].”
Trust Evaluation of Intelligent Ships and Shore-based Service Platforms in a Zero Trust Environment
Xu, J., Huang, D., Na, Y., et al. (2025) · CAA Symposium on Fault Detection, Supervision and Safety for Technical Processes (SAFEPROCESS) · doi:10.1109/safeprocess67117.2025.11267916
“[5] In 2020, the National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) outlined seven tenets for Zero-Trust (ZT) security framework ,requiring authentication, authorization, and continuous validation for network access [2] [3] [4].”
Evolutionary Game-Based Multi-Agent Coordination Control Under a Zero-Trust Architecture
Xiong, L., Huang, D., & Na, Y. (2025) · CAA Symposium on Fault Detection, Supervision and Safety for Technical Processes (SAFEPROCESS) · doi:10.1109/safeprocess67117.2025.11268230
Cybersecurity at the Edge: Defending Decentralized Cities in a Borderless Threat Landscape
Bata, F., Albadareen, M., Khassawneh, B., Aljawarneh, M. M., Al-Na'amneh, Q., Alsarhan, A., & Alhazaimeh, A. S. (2025) · IGI Global eBooks · doi:10.4018/979-8-3373-4455-3.ch005
Lightweight Packet Authentication for Security Enhancement in the CYPHONIC Cloud
Suda, M., Suzuki, Y., Aihata, R., et al. (2025) · IEEE Global Conference on Consumer Electronics (GCCE) · doi:10.1109/gcce65946.2025.11275177
Salman, D. S., Ahmed, A. A., Awad, A. S., et al. (2025) · International Conference on Cyber Resilience (ICCR) · doi:10.1109/iccr67387.2025.11292369
A Review of Zero Trust Architecture Security Research
Zhang, T., & Chen, L. (2025) · International Conference on Network Communication and Information Security (ICNCIS) · doi:10.1109/icncis67521.2025.11296039 · Cited by 3
Majdoubi, C., Mendili, S. E., Gahi, Y., & El‐Khatib, K. (2025) · Information · doi:10.3390/info17010021 · Cited by 1
Multi-Agent Cyber Defense with Multi-Level Zero-Trust Actions
Imani, M., Lan, T., & Bastian, N. D. (2025) · IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM) · doi:10.1109/milcom64451.2025.11310760
“Recent high-profile cyber incidents reveal a persistent pattern: attackers often gain initial access through a single vulnerable endpoint and exploit implicit trust to move laterally within a network [1], [2].”
Xevgenis, M. G., Polychronaki, M., Kogias, D. G., et al. (2026) · Electronics · doi:10.3390/electronics15020266
“ZTA is built on the notions of least privilege, granular access control, and dynamic and strict policy enforcement wherein no user or device is implicitly trusted–irrespective of stature or location [5].”
Zero Trust Meets AI: A Survey Across Multi-Cloud and Hybrid Environments
Albuali, A. (2025) · International Conference on Communications and Networking (ComNet) · doi:10.1109/comnet68251.2025.11325246 · Cited by 1
“Rather than presuming safety inside a perimeter, it requires continuous authentication and tightly scoped authorization based on context, risk, and behavioral assessment [8].”
InfluentialA Zero-Trust based Security Protection Scheme for Industrial IoT
Cheng, R. (2025) · IEEE International Conference on Frontiers Technology of Information and Computer (ICFTIC) · doi:10.1109/icftic68075.2025.11324911 · Cited by 1
“Through enhanced identity verification, fine-grained dynamic access control, and micro-segmentation between resources, Zero Trust effectively mitigates threats originating from both internal and external attack vectors [5, 6] .”
Future trends and emerging technologies in IoT security
Farhan, M., Latif, R. M. A., Ullah, F., & Naeem, M. R. (2026) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-44-338297-0.00014-3
Liu, Y., Liu, G., Zhu, T., Wang, J., Zhu, Q., Du, H., & Niyato, D. (2025) · International Conference on Wireless Communications and Signal Processing (WCSP) · doi:10.1109/wcsp68525.2025.1010901
Kountché, D. A., Gordan, M., Soroudi, M., McCrum, D. P., Zavvos, E., Connolly, L., König, S., Schauer, S., Carrasco, J. C., Aubert, J., et al. (2026) · Signals and communication technology · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-11119-7_2
RecZTA: A Reputation-Based Architecture with Dual-Layer PEPs for Zero Trust Access
Lin, Z., Yan, L., Zhou, Z., Yu, Y., Xiao, P., & Yang, S. (2025) · IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom) · doi:10.1109/trustcom66490.2025.00071
“The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), in its Zero Trust guidance, stipulates that once authentication is complete, access to resources must be granted based on policy, and should enforce principles such as least privilege, ‘assume breach’ and ‘trust but verify’ [6].”
POLYNIX: A Hybrid Policy Enforcement Framework for Zero-Trust Security in Virtualized Systems
Arunachalam, K., Kayyidavazhiyil, A., & Santikellur, P. (2026) · doi:10.1109/ccnc65079.2026.11366307
“The framework aligns with zero-trust principles [19] by en-2026 forcing deny-by-default semantics, validating policy decisions based on identity and system state, and supporting continuous verification.”
Implementing Zero Trust Architecture: Principles, Models and Challenges
Durga, R. K. (2025) · International Journal of Scientific Research and Modern Technology. · doi:10.38124/ijsrmt.v4i12.1050
Ruambo, F. A., Zou, D., Lopes, I. O., Yuan, B., Hammoudeh, M. A. A., Zakarya, M., & Muthanna, M. S. A. (2026) · Computers & Electrical Engineering · doi:10.1016/j.compeleceng.2026.111002 · Cited by 2
Sanubala, K. C., Chatur, U., Langaliya, V., et al. (2026) · Communications in computer and information science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-16038-6_1
Khanday, A. R., & Kumar, R. (2025) · IEEE DELCON - International Conference on Recent Smart Technologies in Engineering for Sustainable Development (DELCON) · doi:10.1109/delcon68055.2025.11399972 · Cited by 1
“These flaws show how urgently a unified, layer-aware security framework that can identify contemporary attack vectors and based on that, suggest some workable countermeasures for the whole healthcare edge ecosystem is needed [10].”
Seeking Trust in Resource-Constrained Edge Networks with Mobile Agents: Complications with ZTA
Henry, J., Richins, D., Weldon, S. G., Vijayalakshmi, S. K., Price, T., & Brunette, W. (2026) · IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications (WMCSA) · doi:10.1145/3789514.3792057
Abdelmagid, A. M., Ezell, B. C., & McShane, M. K. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.6328741 · Cited by 2
Chden, Z., Wang, T., Zhou, N., & Chen, D. (2025) · IEEE International Conference on Big Data (BigData) · doi:10.1109/bigdata66926.2025.11401974
A Multi-Cloud Framework for Zero Trust Workload Authentication
Deochake, S., Murphy, R., & Gearheart, J. (2025) · Annual Computer Security Applications Conference Workshops (ACSAC Workshops) · doi:10.1109/acsacw69556.2025.00061 · Cited by 6
Cybersecurity and Data Protection: Navigating the Complex Regulatory Landscape
Makinde, O. F. (2026) · IGI Global eBooks · doi:10.4018/979-8-3373-4967-1.ch008 · Cited by 1
Rushdy, A., & Thorig, I. (2025) · International Conference on Innovations in Engineering, Science and Technology for Sustainable Development (ICEST) · doi:10.1109/icest65883.2025.11428620
“…Interoperability / multi-cloud & tool integration [5], [6], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12] Micro-segmentation complexity (policy & network) [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13] Identity/IAM management & governance [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [13], [14] Observability & continuous verification…”
InfluentialPreventing Unattended Session Misuse in SSO Using Continuous Monitoring
Shekhawat, A., & Kamra, V. (2025) · doi:10.1109/acet67282.2025.11430291
“This method preserves a smooth and user-friendly experience while bolstering adherence to the Zero Trust principle of "Never Trust, Always Verify" [11][12].”
Alam, F., Mifthak, M. M., Purohit, S., et al. (2026) · Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy · doi:10.3390/jcp6020056
“These interconnects can be organized in mesh, tree, or fat-tree topologies using east–west or north–south routing algorithms, which are optimized for better Quality of Service (QoS), load balancing, and energy efficiency [56,57].”
Prakash, C., & Lind, M. L. (2025) · International Conference on Innovation and Intelligence for Informatics, Computing, and Technologies (3ICT) · doi:10.1109/3ict68299.2025.11442248
“The first tenet, resources, encompasses a broad array of entities, including users, devices, applications, and services, that require protection from adversaries [15].”
InfluentialLightweight Edge Intelligence: Adapting 1.5B LLM via LoRA for Log Analysis in Campus Networks
Li, Z. (2026) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2026.3681475 · Cited by 1
“In practice, campus networks often contain a mixture of legacy systems, unmanaged endpoints, and unauthorized devices commonly referred to as ‘‘Shadow IT,’’ resulting in monitoring gaps that conflict with the assumptions of Zero Trust Architecture [1], [2].”
Passwordless Authentication System using ECC and Zero Trust Architecture
Annambhotla, Y. L., Kuushalie, A., Pranavi, C. V. S., et al. (2025) · International Conference on Smart Electronics and Communication (ICOSEC) · doi:10.1109/icosec67334.2025.11459807
“It reveals the urgency of further development of the standardized approaches in order to enhance existing schemes, eliminate security defects and solve practical issues [10].”
Chinthala, M. M. R., & Kalloji, M. (2025) · International Conference on Smart Electronics and Communication (ICOSEC) · doi:10.1109/icosec67334.2025.11459755
“Syed [14] and others investigated designs that don't trust anyone.”
Formal Security of Zero Trust Architectures
Poirrier, A. (2024) · theses.fr (ABES) · doi:10.70675/368679edzc429z4365z9ed8z98bd52899a61 · Cited by 7
Autry, C. P., & Magal, M. (2025) · International Conference on Electrical, Computer and Energy Technologies (ICECET) · doi:10.1109/icecet63943.2025.11472581
“The development of decentralized OISP represents a fundamental shift in cybersecurity strategy, recognizing that traditional Zero Trust architectures [9], while effective in many scenarios, remain vulnerable due to their reliance on centralized identity stores and long-lived cryptographic keys.”
Zero Trust Architecture for Secure IoT-Enabled Medical Device Networks
Chauhan, D., & Gaikwad, V. P. (2026) · Communications in computer and information science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-22065-3_2
Zero Trust for NHIs Based on Robust Identity and Access Management for a Resilient IoT Future
Mthethwa, S., Dlamini, M. T., & Jembere, E. (2026) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s26082392
“A study conducted by [13,16] examined and compiled the fundamental tenets and associated components of ZTA.”
An AI-Enabled Zero‑Trust Framework for Security Validation PlatformsPreprint
Vajpayee, P., Tandan, B., & Hossain, G. (2026) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-9397236/v1
Neupane, S. R., Shrestha, N., & Sun, W. (2026) · Information · doi:10.3390/info17040378
Gupta, A., Gupta, S., Sharma, S., Singh, J., Ali, F., & Kwak, D. (2026) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-026-44587-1 · Cited by 1
Keshava, R. (2026) · International Conference on Innovative Computing, Intelligent Communication and Smart Electrical Systems (ICSES) · doi:10.1109/icses66558.2026.11478821
“It has been demonstrated that micro-segmentation is effective in restricting lateral flow, and behavioral analytics powered by AI is more effective at identifying abnormal behavior that can be used to predict insider threats or external intrusions[4].”
A Rethink of Network Security Through Zero Trust Architecture
Apaloo, E. A., & Ekambaram, M. (2026) · Advances in computational intelligence and robotics book series · doi:10.4018/979-8-3373-8252-4.ch007
VATTIPALLI, G. P., & Nandan, D. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.6641709 · Cited by 1
DPU for Cybersecurity: Enabling Inline Defense and Self-Protection
Li, X.-W., Liao, Y.-K., & Yan, G.-H. (2026) · Journal of Computer Science and Technology · doi:10.1007/s11390-026-6034-y
Archibong, E., Asuquo, P., & Stephen, B. U.-A. (2026) · Discover Networks · doi:10.1007/s44354-026-00023-4 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Syed, N. F., Shah, S. W., Shaghaghi, A., Anwar, A., Baig, Z., & Doss, R.
- Affiliations
- Deakin University (AU)
- Venue
- IEEE Access
- Published
- 2022
- Volume
- 10
- Pages
- 57143-57179
- ISSN
- 2169-3536 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4285205927
- Cited by
- 406
- References
- 161
- Citations by year
- 2026: 131 · 2025: 141 · 2024: 88 · 2023: 37 · 2022: 9
- FWCI
- 98.90
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Locations
- IEEE Access (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion)
- Deakin Research Online (Deakin University) (submittedVersion)
- Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Figshare (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Australian Department of Defence
- Defence Science and Technology Group’s Operations Research Network
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Access Control and Trust
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cybersecurity and Information Systems
- Keywords
- zero-trust architecture, authentication, access control, encryption, micro-segmentation, security automation, software-defined perimeter, critical infrastructure security, network security
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-09-28, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-09-28 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.