CoChat

Dynamic ransomware protection using deterministic random bit generator

Kim, HaEun, Yoo, Dongchang, Kang, Ju-Sung, Yeom, Yongjin · 2017 · 2017 IEEE Conference on Application, Information and Network Security (AINS)

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 9 of the 9 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Ransomware has become a very significant cyber threat. The basic idea of ransomware was presented in the form of a cryptovirus in 1995. However, it was considered as merely a conceptual topic since then for over a decade. In 2017, ransomware has become a reality, with several famous cases of ransomware having compromised important computer systems worldwide. For example, the damage caused by CryptoLocker and WannaCry is huge, as well as global. They encrypt victims' files and require user's payment to decrypt them. Because they utilize public key cryptography, the key for recovery cannot be found in the footprint of the ransomware on the victim's system. Therefore, once infected, the system cannot be recovered without paying for restoration. Various methods to deal this threat have been developed by antivirus researchers and experts in network security. However, it is believed that cryptographic defense is infeasible because recovering a victim's files is computationally as difficult as breaking a public key cryptosystem. Quite recently, various approaches to protect the crypto-API of an OS from malicious codes have been proposed. Most ransomware generate encryption keys using the random number generation service provided by the victim's OS. Thus, if a user can control all random numbers generated by the system, then he/she can recover the random numbers used by the ransomware for the encryption key. In this paper, we propose a dynamic ransomware protection method that replaces the random number generator of the OS with a user-defined generator. As the proposed method causes the virus program to generate keys based on the output from the user-defined generator, it is possible to recover an infected file system by reproducing the keys the attacker used to perform the encryption.

Overview

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/ains.2017.8270426

Cites

9 of 9 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Citations

Cites

Show all 9 references

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. barker, 2012, Recommendation for the entropy sources used for random bit generation, ser NIST DRAFT Special Publication 800-90B
  2. 2016, No More Ransome!

Cited by

  • Social Engineering Attacks: A Survey

    Salahdine, F., & Kaabouch, N. (2019) · Future Internet · doi:10.3390/fi11040089 · Cited by 509

    “This involves three main steps: causing a problem such as crashing the network; advertising that the attacker is the only person to fix that problem; solving the problem while getting the desired information and leaving without being detected [18].”
    Background

See all 24

Metadata

Authors
Kim, H., Yoo, D., Kang, J.-S., & Yeom, Y.
Affiliations
Kookmin University (KR)
Venue
2017 IEEE Conference on Application, Information and Network Security (AINS)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2017-11
Pages
64-68
OpenAlex
W2786685397
Cited by
24
References
9
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2023: 5 · 2022: 4 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 2 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 5
FWCI
1.94
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
IEEE Conference on Application, Information and Network Security (AINS) (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Software › Advanced Malware Detection Techniques
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
Keywords
ransomware, random number generators, encryption key recovery, file encryption, public-key cryptography, WannaCry

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Dynamic ransomware protection using deterministic random bit generator. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/ains.2017.8270426
The paper
Kim, H., Yoo, D., Kang, J.-S., & Yeom, Y. (2017). Dynamic ransomware protection using deterministic random bit generator. 2017 IEEE Conference on Application, Information and Network Security (AINS). https://doi.org/10.1109/ains.2017.8270426

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.