Evolutionary stability of honest signaling in finite populations
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
We study honest signaling in the Philip Sidney game. Until now, researchers concentrated on verifying under what circumstances honest signaling is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Whereas the concept of ESS assumes infinite populations, we analyze here, for the first time, the more realistic scenario where populations are finite-which allows us to study the effect of varying the population size with respect to the viability of honest signaling. We show that honest signaling is much less frequent than previously observed within the infinite population setting. We observe that population size has a similar effect as selection pressure, namely, the larger the population the more important the difference in fitness between the strategies. Our experiments reveal, furthermore, that evolutionary stability is not very predictive for the viability of honest signaling. Most surprisingly, we found cases where honest signaling is the most prevalent strategy but not evolutionarily stable.
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In the citing paper
“Whereas most models assume infinite populations; it is worth noting that an analysis of the game in finite populations found much lower prevalence of honest signalling [34].”
From Maynard Smith revisited: A multi-agent reinforcement learning approach to the coevolution of signalling behaviour (2025) · cites this paper as [34]
In the citing paper
“the use of inclusive fitness instead of individual reward is in line with Maynard Smith's original formulation [12] and subsequent studies [6,30,34].”
From Maynard Smith revisited: A multi-agent reinforcement learning approach to the coevolution of signalling behaviour (2025) · cites this paper as [34]
Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
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“Since the 1970’s, both biologists [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] and economists [6], [7], [8], [9], [10] have paid much attention to the emergence and stability of honest signaling.”
BackgroundThe genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725 · cited 1×
“This is known as the principle of inclusive fitness [23].”
BackgroundEvolution and the Theory of Games
Smith, J. M. (1988) · Did Darwin Get It Right? · doi:10.1007/978-1-4684-7862-4_22 · Cited by 7,906 · cited 2×
“A strategy B is evolutionarily stable in infinite populations [16] (ESS) if, for all other strategies A”
BackgroundMethodEvolution and the Theory of Games
Smith, J. M. (1982) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511806292 · Cited by 6,922
Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
Hofbauer, J., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139173179 · Cited by 5,502 · cited 1×
“Particularly, the replicator dynamics [16], [17] was employed to describe how strategies may spread in an infinite, well-mixed population under the influence of natural selection.”
MethodMate selection—A selection for a handicap
Zahavi, A. (1975) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(75)90111-3 · Cited by 5,251 · cited 3×
“Since the 1970’s, both biologists [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] and economists [6], [7], [8], [9], [10] have paid much attention to the emergence and stability of honest signaling.”
BackgroundThe genetical evolution of social behaviour. II
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90039-6 · Cited by 4,144
A First Course in Stochastic Processes
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Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
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“Since the 1970’s, both biologists [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] and economists [6], [7], [8], [9], [10] have paid much attention to the emergence and stability of honest signaling.”
Background
Cited by
Evolution of honest signaling by social punishment
Catteeuw, D., Han, T. A., & Manderick, B. (2014) · Genetic and Evolutionary Computation Conference (GECCO) · doi:10.1145/2576768.2598312 · Cited by 19
“Interestingly, that occurs even for low values of c, which is not the case in the original Philip Sidney game [6, 43, 11].”
BackgroundSelf-citationThe signalling game between plants and pollinators
Sun, S., Leshowitz, M. I., & Rychtář, J. (2018) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-018-24779-0 · Cited by 16
Making an Example: Signalling Threat in the Evolution of Cooperation
Cimpeanu, T., & Han, T. A. (2020) · IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC) · doi:10.1109/cec48606.2020.9185749 · Cited by 8
“Pre-play signalling has also been studied in the context of the evolution of honest signalling, showing that honest signalling only emerges when signalling is costly [7].”
BackgroundSelf-citationMacmillan-Scott, O., & Musolesi, M. (2025) · PLOS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1013302 · Cited by 1
“At time t , each player has an action a and state s - this state is made up of both players’ actions in the previous round.”
CDC (Cindy and David’s Conversations) game: Advising President to survive pandemic
Ma, Z. S., & Yang, L. (2023) · iScience · doi:10.1016/j.isci.2023.107079 · Cited by 1
“, Catteeuw 2013, 2014, Tanimoto 2015, 2019, 2021).(25,26,43-45) Another limitation of our study is that the CDC model does not have an explicit and direct punishment/reward mechanism to either Cindy or David, unlike some existing studies (e.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Catteeuw, D., Manderick, B., & Han, T. A.
- Affiliations
- Vrije Universiteit Brussel (BE)
- Venue
- 2013 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2013-06
- Pages
- 2864-2870
- OpenAlex
- W2076654090
- Cited by
- 5
- References
- 38
- Citations by year
- 2025: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2014: 1
- FWCI
- 1.04
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC) (publishedVersion)
- Teesside University Research Portal (Teesside University) (submittedVersion)
- VUBIR (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- honest signaling, evolutionarily stable strategy, finite population, population size, selection pressure, costly signaling, evolutionary game theory
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- Catteeuw, D., Manderick, B., & Han, T. A. (2013). Evolutionary stability of honest signaling in finite populations. 2013 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation. https://doi.org/10.1109/cec.2013.6557917
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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