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Evolutionary stability of honest signaling in finite populations

Catteeuw, David, Manderick, Bernard, Han, The Anh · 2013 · 2013 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 37 of the 38 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

We study honest signaling in the Philip Sidney game. Until now, researchers concentrated on verifying under what circumstances honest signaling is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). Whereas the concept of ESS assumes infinite populations, we analyze here, for the first time, the more realistic scenario where populations are finite-which allows us to study the effect of varying the population size with respect to the viability of honest signaling. We show that honest signaling is much less frequent than previously observed within the infinite population setting. We observe that population size has a similar effect as selection pressure, namely, the larger the population the more important the difference in fitness between the strategies. Our experiments reveal, furthermore, that evolutionary stability is not very predictive for the viability of honest signaling. Most surprisingly, we found cases where honest signaling is the most prevalent strategy but not evolutionarily stable.

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Crossref · 10.1109/cec.2013.6557917

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Metadata

Authors
Catteeuw, D., Manderick, B., & Han, T. A.
Affiliations
Vrije Universiteit Brussel (BE)
Venue
2013 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2013-06
Pages
2864-2870
OpenAlex
W2076654090
Cited by
5
References
38
Citations by year
2025: 1 · 2023: 1 · 2020: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2014: 1
FWCI
1.04
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation (CEC) (publishedVersion)
  • Teesside University Research Portal (Teesside University) (submittedVersion)
  • VUBIR (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
Keywords
honest signaling, evolutionarily stable strategy, finite population, population size, selection pressure, costly signaling, evolutionary game theory

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Evolutionary stability of honest signaling in finite populations. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/cec.2013.6557917
The paper
Catteeuw, D., Manderick, B., & Han, T. A. (2013). Evolutionary stability of honest signaling in finite populations. 2013 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation. https://doi.org/10.1109/cec.2013.6557917

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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