The Long Road to Computational Location Privacy: A Survey
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The widespread adoption of continuously connected smartphones and tablets developed the usage of mobile applications, among which many use location to provide geolocated services. These services provide new prospects for users: getting directions to work in the morning, leaving a check-in at a restaurant at noon and checking next day's weather in the evening are possible right from any mobile device embedding a GPS chip. In these location-based applications, the user's location is sent to a server, which uses them to provide contextual and personalized answers. However, nothing prevents the latter from gathering, analyzing and possibly sharing the collected information, which opens the door to many privacy threats. Indeed, mobility data can reveal sensitive information about users, among which one's home, work place or even religious and political preferences. For this reason, many privacy-preserving mechanisms have been proposed these last years to enhance location privacy while using geolocated services. This paper surveys and organizes contributions in this area from classical building blocks to the most recent developments of privacy threats and location privacy-preserving mechanisms. We divide the protection mechanisms between online and offline use cases, and organize them into six categories depending on the nature of their algorithm. Moreover, this paper surveys the evaluation metrics used to assess protection mechanisms in terms of privacy, utility and performance. Finally, open challenges and new directions to address the problem of computational location privacy are pointed out and discussed.
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Citations
Cites
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t-Closeness: Privacy Beyond k-Anonymity and l-Diversity
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Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets
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“nor of Massachusetts in an “anonymised” health dataset [45] or the re-identification of users from AOL Web search logs [46] or a Netflix dataset [47]).”
RAPPOR: Randomized Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Response
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Unique in the Crowd: The privacy bounds of human mobility
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“They first evaluated seven state-of-the-art algorithms, showing that with those datasets, the best performing ones only achieved a re-identification rate of 20 %, which is far from the theoretical bound announced by De Montjoye [62] and others.”
Influential
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Physical Security and Safety of IoT Equipment: A Survey of Recent Advances and Opportunities
Yang, X., Shu, L., Liu, Y., Hancke, G. P., Ferrag, M. A., & Huang, K. (2022) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2022.3141408 · Cited by 93
Sequential Trajectory Data Publishing With Adaptive Grid-Based Weighted Differential Privacy
Xie, G., Xu, H., Xu, J., Zhao, S., Li, Y., Wang, C.-D., Hu, X., & Tian, Y. (2024) · IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering · doi:10.1109/tkde.2024.3449433 · Cited by 6
“Nevertheless,thesemethods couldnotresistbackgroundknowledgeandre-identification attack[10],[11].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Primault, V., Boutet, A., Mokhtar, S. B., & Brunie, L.
- Venue
- IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
- Published
- 2019
- Volume
- 21
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 2772-2793
- ISSN
- 1553-877X (ISSN-L)
- 2373-745X
- OpenAlex
- W2894779347
- Cited by
- 173
- References
- 8
- FWCI
- 10.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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