Cited by 1,838Privacy-Preserving Technologies in DataInternet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-votingPrivacy, Security, and Data Protection

RAPPOR: Randomized Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Response

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Erlingsson, Úlfar, Pihur, Vasyl, Korolova, Aleksandra·2014·Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Abstract

Randomized Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal Response, or RAPPOR, is a technology for crowdsourcing statistics from end-user client software, anonymously, with strong privacy guarantees. In short, RAPPORs allow the forest of client data to be studied, without permitting the possibility of looking at individual trees. By applying randomized response in a novel manner, RAPPOR provides the mechanisms for such collection as well as for efficient, high-utility analysis of the collected data. In particular, RAPPOR permits statistics to be collected on the population of client-side strings with strong privacy guarantees for each client, and without linkability of their reports. This paper describes and motivates RAPPOR, details its differential-privacy and utility guarantees, discusses its practical deployment and properties in the face of different attack models, and, finally, gives results of its application to both synthetic and real-world data.

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  • There is some work on adding discrete noise, but there is no notion whether such methods are optimal.

    “There is some work on adding discrete noise [9], but there is no notion whether such methods are optimal.”

    From Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning (2021) · cites this paper as [9]

  • A number of practical tools, techniques and frameworks have been developed for protecting data used in ML, some of which allow a degree of transparency to the applied privacy processes.

    “A number of practical tools, techniques and frameworks have been developed to used for procting data used in ML [79-81, 84, 85] some of which allow a degree of transparency to the applied privacy processes [78].”
  • Detection methods exploit activation statistics or model properties to determine whether a model is backdoored or whether a training/test example is a backdoor example.

    “Detection methods exploit activation statistics or model properties to determine whether a model is backdoored [151], [152], or whether a training/test example is a backdoor example [47].”

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Authors
Erlingsson, Ú., Pihur, V., & Korolova, A.
Affiliations
  • Google (United States) (US)
  • University of Southern California (US)
Venue
Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Publisher
ACM
Published
2014-11-03
Pages
1054-1067
ISSN
1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W1981029888
Cited by
1,838
References
26
Citations by year
2026: 107 · 2025: 186 · 2024: 254 · 2023: 200 · 2022: 192 · 2021: 238 · 2020: 246 · 2019: 168 · 2018: 120 · 2017: 67 · 2016: 45 · 2015: 14 · 2014: 1
FWCI
24.92
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Privacy, Security, and Data Protection
Keywords
randomized response, differential privacy, privacy-preserving data collection, linkability, attack models

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