A Survey on SCADA Systems: Secure Protocols, Incidents, Threats and Tactics
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 161 of the 172 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are the underlying monitoring and control components of critical infrastructures. Legacy SCADA systems operated on isolated networks, but increasing connection to the Internet and corporate networks introduces severe security issues. The survey provides an overview of SCADA architecture, communication protocols, incidents, threats, and tactics that aim to secure SCADA systems.
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Ouiazzane, S., Addou, M., & Barramou, F. (2024) · Lecture notes in networks and systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-47672-3_13 · Cited by 3
Katulić, F., Groš, S., Sumina, D., et al. (2024) · Lecture notes in networks and systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-61891-8_18 · Cited by 3
Realigning Academic Cybersecurity Research With Industrial Needs in Cyber-Physical Systems
Verma, A. K., Navas-Fonseca, A., Burgos-Mellado, C., & Dragičević, T. (2025) · IEEE Open Journal of the Industrial Electronics Society · doi:10.1109/ojies.2025.3593689 · Cited by 5
“The adversaries usually target the essential software-based control system network traditionally known as the SCADA system [48], which is well connected with the corporate network.”
Rani, I. B., Vinodh Ewards, S. E., Palmer, G. M., & Kathrine, G. J. W. (2023) · International Conference on Sustainable Computing and Smart Systems (ICSCSS) · doi:10.1109/icscss57650.2023.10169805 · Cited by 3
“Since Modbus devices lack encryption features, attackers could issue harmful commands to them, leading to the hacking of the control device and ultimately causing physical damage to the boilers [6].”
BackgroundBig Data against Security Threats: The SPEAR Intrusion Detection System
Pliatsios, D., Sarigiannidis, P. G., Psannis, K. E., et al. (2020) · World Symposium on Communication Engineering (WSCE) · doi:10.1109/wsce51339.2020.9275580 · Cited by 3
“SG faces security challenges similar to typical computer networks since all devices involved in SG are susceptible to cyber-attacks [16, 17].”
BackgroundSelf-citationEvaluating a Process-Aware IDS for Smart Grids on Distributed Hardware
Menzel, V., GroBhanten, K. O., & Remke, A. (2023) · IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR) · doi:10.1109/csr57506.2023.10224985 · Cited by 3
“results in an increasing number of attacks on the SCADA system [4], [5].”
BackgroundMan-in-the-Middle Attack Against a Network Control System: Practical Implementation and Detection
Chavoshi, H. R., Salasi, A., Payam, O., & Khaloozadeh, H. (2023) · International Scientific Conference on Information Technology and Management Science of Riga Technical University (ITMS) · doi:10.1109/itms59786.2023.10317671 · Cited by 9
“[2] The data packet of TCP/IP within the Ethernet frame is shown in Although NCS and TCP/IP Provide many advantages, they pose some security risks.”
A comprehensive review of cyber-physical security risks in new power system
Huang, H., Song, Y., Wei, Q., Geng, Y., & Wang, H. (2025) · Security and Safety · doi:10.1051/sands/2025005 · Cited by 3
An early warning method for oil temperature in offshore wind power gearbox based on TCN-LSTM-ECA
Peng, S., Wan, A., AL-Bukhaiti, K., Ji, Y., & Ma, S. (2025) · Wind Engineering · doi:10.1177/0309524x251371546 · Cited by 4
“In this study, the data utilized were obtained from a SCADA system (Pliatsios et al., 2020).”
Wan, M., Liu, X., An, S., Tan, A., Jin, X. H., & Sheng, C. (2025) · Expert Systems with Applications · doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2025.129753 · Cited by 2
Machine Learning-Based Network Monitoring for Cybersecurity Threat Detection
Eshmawi, A. A., Al-Nowami, A., Mirza, M., Abu-Raya, N., Al-Thabit, R., Shiaeles, S. N., Choi, J., & Ashraf, I. (2025) · Journal of Network and Systems Management · doi:10.1007/s10922-025-10001-w · Cited by 5
“…perception-to-cloud stacks [15], while sector-specific studies in energy and critical infrastructure demonstrate tangible gains from AI-based detection and prognostics, improving detection rates and response times but also exposing new operational dependencies and integration challenges [16 , 17 ].”
Network-Based Real-Time Detection of Data Manipulation Attacks in Industrial Control Systems
Raman, M. R. G., Khandekar, S., Murarishetti, R., Caven, C. Z. Y., Eric, N. G. F., & Zhou, J. (2025) · International Journal of Information Security · doi:10.1007/s10207-025-01172-3 · Cited by 4
Rajeh, W. (2022) · International Conference on Computing and Information Technology (ICCIT) · doi:10.1109/iccit52419.2022.9711639 · Cited by 2
“…include the following: 1) on-field devices such as RTUs, intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), Process Control Systems (PCS), and Process Automation Controllers (PACs); 2) communications such as ethernet, wireless networks, DNP3, Modbus protocols; 3) and monitoring and controlling equipment [2].”
BackgroundSičanica, Z., Sučić, S., & Milašinović, B. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3159715 · Cited by 3
“lists how Big Data analytics can be integrated into such systems, especially in the context of intrusion detection [37].”
BackgroundSecurity in SCADA System: A Technical Report on Cyber Attacks and Risk Assessment Methodologies
Ali, S. M. (2024) · Lecture notes in networks and systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-54820-8_35 · Cited by 4
Low-Cost SCADA/HMI with Tiny Machine Learning for Monitoring Indoor CO 2 Concentration
Wardana, I. N. K., Fahmy, S. A., & Gardner, J. W. (2024) · IEEE International Instrumentation and Measurement Technology Conference · doi:10.1109/i2mtc60896.2024.10561089 · Cited by 2
“SCADA systems are commonly used to monitor and control critical infrastructure components in industrial sectors [12], and typically include an interface that facilitates interaction with human operators, referred to as the human-machine interface (HMI) [13].”
BackgroundCybersecurity Strategies for Smart Grids: Leveraging Agile IoT and IIoT Integration
Alshra’a, A. S., Muhammad, M., & German, R. (2024) · Advances in information security, privacy, and ethics book series · doi:10.4018/979-8-3693-3451-5.ch013 · Cited by 2
Developing a Robust Communication Infrastructure for a Distributed Smart Grid IDS
Menzel, V., Speckamp, J., & Remke, A. (2024) · IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR) · doi:10.1109/csr61664.2024.10679379 · Cited by 3
“Due to the characteristics and operational conditions of SCADA systems, such as lower computational capabilities and real-time constraints, conventional IT security solutions are often not suitable [5].”
BackgroundSpecht, F., & Otto, J. (2024) · IEEE International Conference on Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation (ETFA) · doi:10.1109/etfa61755.2024.10711134 · Cited by 9
“P4: Approaches addressing protocols working without the network and transport layers lack generality and are custom-built to the particular protocol [14].”
BackgroundApproximated Explicit NMPC via Reinforcement Learning for Homomorphically Encrypted Process Control
Dzurková, D., Valábek, P., Mészáros, O., Kalúz, M., & Klaučo, M. (2024) · IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) · doi:10.1109/cdc56724.2024.10885839 · Cited by 2
“[10], [11] 3) We also provide benchmarks connected to this deployment.”
Cameron, A., Alam, A., Anjum, N., Khan, J. A., & Mylonas, A. (2025) · Array · doi:10.1016/j.array.2025.100391 · Cited by 2
“These proactive acquisition and investigation are recognised as significantly enhancing an organisation’s ability to recover from such attacks [13,14].”
Li, Y., Qi, G., Jin, X., et al. (2025) · Journal of energy resources technology. · doi:10.1115/1.4069063 · Cited by 2
Asma, K., Raja, M. A. Z., Chang, C., Raja, M. J. A. A., Shu, C.-M., & Shoaib, M. (2025) · Journal of Industrial Information Integration · doi:10.1016/j.jii.2025.100940 · Cited by 1
False Data Injection Attack Against Cyber-Physical Systems Protected by a Watermark
Guibene, K., Messai, N., Ayaida, M., Khoukhi, L., Rivenq, A., & Hillali, Y. E. (2022) · Globecom · doi:10.1109/globecom48099.2022.10001170 · Cited by 3
“However, such protocols do not provide high network security capabilities [18], attackers can alter and modify network packets by performing false data injection attacks, which can lead to unplanned system downtime, unexpected behavior or even system degradation.”
BackgroundProtecting Security-Critical Real-Time Systems against Fault Attacks in Many-Core Platforms
Norollah, A., Kazemi, Z., Derafshi, D., Beitollahi, H., & Fazeli, M. (2022) · doi:10.1109/rtest56034.2022.9850010 · Cited by 3
Mingo, H. C., & Burrell, D. N. (2023) · Advances in information security, privacy, and ethics book series · doi:10.4018/978-1-6684-7207-1.ch008 · Cited by 2
Cvetkovic, A. M., Blagojević, V. M., Anastasov, J. A., et al. (2023) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s23187779 · Cited by 2
“Therefore, the MTU can send information to the RTU to provide an emergency shutdown of the process, to prevent hazardous situations by starting or stopping pumps or adjusting the speed of pumps, and to regulate the flow of fluids or gases by opening/closing valves [9].”
BackgroundMethodSurvey on evolving threats in TCP/IP header attacks: Emerging trends and future directions
Owoko, W. (2024) · World Journal of Advanced Engineering Technology and Sciences · doi:10.30574/wjaets.2024.11.2.0127 · Cited by 3
“A comprehensive analysis on cyber security discusses common risks and threats, providing solutions to prevent them [107], emphasizing the necessity for organizations to prioritize cybersecurity measures.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Pliatsios, D., Sarigiannidis, P., Lagkas, T., & Sarigiannidis, A. G.
- Affiliations
- University of Western Macedonia (GR)
- Venue
- IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials
- Published
- 2020
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1942-1976
- ISSN
- 1553-877X (ISSN-L)
- 2373-745X
- OpenAlex
- W3017165746
- Cited by
- 320
- References
- 172
- Citations by year
- 2026: 36 · 2025: 61 · 2024: 57 · 2023: 57 · 2022: 64 · 2021: 38 · 2020: 7
- FWCI
- 20.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
- doi.org
- Locations
- IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- Funders
- European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Programme (787011)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Industrial Automation and Control Systems
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Keywords
- SCADA systems, industrial cybersecurity, critical infrastructure security, security threats, security breaches, security tactics, legacy systems, power system security
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.