The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Feature Distillation: DNN-Oriented JPEG Compression Against Adversarial Examples
Open accessAbstract
Image compression-based approaches for defending against the adversarial-example attacks, which threaten the safety use of deep neural networks (DNN), have been investigated recently. However, prior works mainly rely on directly tuning parameters like compression rate, to blindly reduce image features, thereby lacking guarantee on both defense efficiency (i.e. accuracy of polluted images) and classification accuracy of benign images, after applying defense methods. To overcome these limitations, we propose a JPEG-based defensive compression framework, namely “feature distillation”, to effectively rectify adversarial examples without impacting classification accuracy on benign data. Our framework significantly escalates the defense efficiency with marginal accuracy reduction using a twostep method: First, we maximize malicious features filtering of adversarial input perturbations by developing defensive quantization in frequency domain of JPEG compression or decompression, guided by a semi-analytical method; Second, we suppress the distortions of benign features to restore classification accuracy through a DNN-oriented quantization refine process. Our experimental results show that proposed “feature distillation” can significantly surpass the latest input-transformation based mitigations such as Quilting and TV Minimization in three aspects, including defense efficiency (improve classification accuracy from ∼ 20% to ∼ 90% on adversarial examples), accuracy of benign images after defense (≤ 1% accuracy degradation), and processing time per image (∼ 259× Speedup). Moreover, our solution also can provide the best defense efficiency (∼ 60% accuracy) against the latest BPDA attack with least accuracy reduction (∼ 1%) on benign images among all other input-transformation based defense methods.
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Cites
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Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples
Goodfellow, I. J., Shlens, J., & Szegedy, C. (2014) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1412.6572 · Cited by 10,381
Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks
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Adversarial examples in the physical world
Kurakin, A., Goodfellow, I. J., & Bengio, S. (2018) · Artificial Intelligence Safety and Security · doi:10.1201/9781351251389-8 · Cited by 5,375
DeepFool: A Simple and Accurate Method to Fool Deep Neural Networks
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Ensemble Adversarial Training: Attacks and Defenses
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Obfuscated gradients give a false sense of security: Circumventing defenses to adversarial examples
Athalye, A., Carlini, N., & Wagner, D. (2018) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1802.00420 · Cited by 2,172 · cited 5×
“5) BPDA [3] is the lat-est adaptive attack by recurrently computing the adversarial gradient after applying defense: x ∗ = clip ( x + (cid:15) · sgn ( (cid:79) x J θ,Y ( DEF ( x )))) , where J represents the function of an DNN model and DEF is the applied defense method in BPDA attack.”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluential
Cited by
Enhancing the Transferability of Adversarial Attacks through Variance Tuning
Wang, X., & He, K. (2021) · 2021 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) · doi:10.1109/cvpr46437.2021.00196 · Cited by 471
Advances in Adversarial Attacks and Defenses in Computer Vision: A Survey
Akhtar, N., Mian, A., Kardan, N., & Shah, M. (2021) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3127960 · Cited by 302
Admix: Enhancing the Transferability of Adversarial Attacks
Wang, X., He, X., Wang, J., & He, K. (2021) · 2021 IEEE/CVF International Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV) · doi:10.1109/iccv48922.2021.01585 · Cited by 270
Metadata
- Authors
- Liu, Z., Liu, Q., Liu, T., Xu, N., Lin, X., Wang, Y., & Wen, W.
- Venue
- 2019 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2019-06
- Pages
- 860-868
- ISSN
- 1063-6919 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2963384482
- Cited by
- 285
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 12.02
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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