Cited by 5,375Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningDigital Media Forensic DetectionSecurity and Verification in Computing

Adversarial examples in the physical world

Open access
Kurakin, Alexey, Goodfellow, Ian J., Bengio, Samy·2018·Artificial Intelligence Safety and Security

Abstract

Most existing machine learning classifiers are highly vulnerable to adversarial examples. An adversarial example is a sample of input data which has been modified very slightly in a way that is intended to cause a machine learning classifier to misclassify it. In many cases, these modifications can be so subtle that a human observer does not even notice the modification at all, yet the classifier still makes a mistake. Adversarial examples pose security concerns because they could be used to perform an attack on machine learning systems, even if the adversary has no access to the underlying model. Up to now, all previous work has assumed a threat model in which the adversary can feed data directly into the machine learning classifier. This is not always the case for systems operating in the physical world, for example those which are using signals from cameras and other sensors as input. This paper shows that even in such physical world scenarios, machine learning systems are vulnerable to adversarial examples. We demonstrate this by feeding adversarial images obtained from a cell-phone camera to an ImageNet Inception classifier and measuring the classification accuracy of the system. We find that a large fraction of adversarial examples are classified incorrectly even when perceived through the camera.

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1201/9781351251389-8

Cites

2 of 2 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Claims the paper makes

The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.

Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.

A few free checks a day · papers already verified open instantly · results are public

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Self-check

Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.

The self-check needs the paper’s full text.

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

Research works printed but not linked: 11

  1. Dzmitry Bahdanau, Kyunghyun Cho, and Yoshua Bengio. Neural machine translation by jointly learning to align and translate. In ICLR'2015, arXiv:1409.0473, 2015. · arXiv
  2. Battista Biggio, Igino Corona, Davide Maiorca, Blaine Nelson, Nedim Šrndić, Pavel Laskov, Gior- gio Giacinto, and Fabio Roli. Evasion attacks against machine learning at test time. In Joint European Conference on Machine Learning and Knowledge Discovery in Databases, pp. 387- 402. Springer, 2013.
  3. Nicholas Carlini, Pratyush Mishra, Tavish Vaidya, Yuankai Zhang, Micah Sherr, Clay Shields, David Wagner, and Wenchao Zhou. Hidden voice commands. In 25th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 16), Austin, TX, August 2016. USENIX Association. URL https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/ technical-sessions/presentation/carlini.
  4. Nilesh Dalvi, Pedro Domingos, Sumit Sanghai, Deepak Verma, et al. Adversarial classification. In Proceedings of the tenth ACM SIGKDD international conference on Knowledge discovery and data mining, pp. 99-108. ACM, 2004.
  5. Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, and Geoffrey Hinton. ImageNet classification with deep convolu- tional neural networks. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 25 (NIPS'2012). 2012.
  6. Blaine Nelson, Marco Barreno, Fuching Jack Chi, Anthony D Joseph, Benjamin IP Rubinstein, Udam Saini, Charles A Sutton, J Doug Tygar, and Kai Xia. Exploiting machine learning to subvert your spam filter. N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, and I. Goodfellow. Transferability in Machine Learning: from Phe- nomena to Black-Box Attacks using Adversarial Samples. ArXiv e-prints, May 2016b. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1605.07277. · arXiv
  7. Nicolas Papernot, Patrick Drew McDaniel, Ian J. Goodfellow, Somesh Jha, Z. Berkay Celik, and Ananthram Swami. Practical black-box attacks against deep learning systems using adversarial examples. CoRR, abs/1602.02697, 2016a. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1602.02697. · arXiv
  8. Mahmood Sharif, Sruti Bhagavatula, Lujo Bauer, and Michael K. Reiter. Accessorize to a crime: Real and stealthy attacks on state-of-the-art face recognition. In Proceedings of the 23rd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, October 2016. To appear.
  9. Daniel F Smith, Arnold Wiliem, and Brian C Lovell. Face recognition on consumer devices: Re- flections on replay attacks. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 10(4): 736-745, 2015.
  10. Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian J. Goodfel- low, and Rob Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks. ICLR, abs/1312.6199, 2014. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1312.6199. · arXiv
  11. Christian Szegedy, Vincent Vanhoucke, Sergey Ioffe, Jonathon Shlens, and Zbigniew Wojna. Re- thinking the inception architecture for computer vision. CoRR, abs/1512.00567, 2015. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1512.00567. · arXiv

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Kurakin, A., Goodfellow, I. J., & Bengio, S.
Venue
Artificial Intelligence Safety and Security
Published
2018-07-27
Pages
99-112
OpenAlex
W2460937040
Cited by
5,375
References
2
Citations by year
2026: 240 · 2025: 604 · 2024: 688 · 2023: 729 · 2022: 643 · 2021: 821 · 2020: 766 · 2019: 520 · 2018: 284 · 2017: 72 · 2016: 6 · 2012: 2
FWCI
894.75
Type
book chapter
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Chapman & Hall/CRC eBooks (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Digital Media Forensic Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
adversarial examples, physical-world attacks, adversarial robustness, image classification, InceptionV3, ImageNet

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review