Cited by 54Digital Media Forensic DetectionAdvanced Steganography and Watermarking TechniquesMisinformation and Its Impacts

SpoC: Spoofing Camera Fingerprints

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Cozzolino, Davide, Thies, Justus, Rossler, Andreas, Niesner, Matthias, Verdoliva, Luisa·2021·2021 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops (CVPRW)

Abstract

Thanks to the fast progress in synthetic media generation, creating realistic false images has become very easy. Such images can be used to wrap rich fake news with enhanced credibility, spawning a new wave of high-impact, high-risk misinformation campaigns. Therefore, there is a fast-growing interest in reliable detectors of manipulated media. The most powerful detectors, to date, rely on the subtle traces left by any device on all images acquired by it. In particular, due to proprietary in-camera processes, like demosaicing or compression, each camera model leaves trademark traces that can be exploited for forensic analyses. The absence or distortion of such traces in the target image is a strong hint of manipulation. In this paper, we challenge such detectors to gain better insight into their vulnerabilities. This is an important study in order to build better forgery detectors able to face malicious attacks. Our proposal consists of a GAN-based approach that injects camera traces into synthetic images. Given a GAN-generated image, we insert the traces of a specific camera model into it and deceive state-of-the-art detectors into believing the image was acquired by that model. Likewise, we deceive independent detectors of synthetic GAN images into believing the image is real. Experiments prove the effectiveness of the proposed method in a wide array of conditions. Moreover, no prior information on the attacked detectors is needed, but only sample images from the target camera.

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  • Deep learning-based deepfake detectors are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, with detection performance degrading sharply even in black-box scenarios.

    “It is also worth pointing out that deep learning-based methods are vulnerable to adversarial attacks with detection performance that degrades sharply even in a black-box scenario [13,27,45].”

    From Audio-Visual Person-of-Interest DeepFake Detection (2023) · cites this paper as [13]

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Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. [6]6. Andrew Brock, Jeff Donahue, and Karen Simonyan. Large scale GAN training for high fidelity natural image synthe- sis. In International Conference on Learning Representa- tions, 2019. 1
  2. [19]19. Ian Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples. In Inter- national Conference on Learning Representations, 2015. 2, 3
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  4. [29]29. Tero Karras, Timo Aila, Samuli Laine, and Jaakko Lehtinen. Progressive Growing of GANs for Improved Quality, Stabil- ity, and Variation. In International Conference on Learning Representations, 2018. 1, 6, 8, 11
  5. [34]34. Yanpei Liu, Xinyun Chen, Shanghai Jiao Tong, Chang Liu, and Dawn Song. Delving into tranferable adversarial exam- ples and black-box attacks. In International Conference on Learning Representations, 2017. 3
  6. [41]41. Falko Matern, Christian Riess, and Mark Stamminger. Ex- ploiting visual artifacts to expose deepfakes and face ma- nipulations. In IEEE WACV Workshop on Image and Video Forensics, 2019. 1
  7. [58]58. Po-Wei Wu, Yu-Jing Lin, Che-Han Chang, Edward Y. Chang, and Shih-Wei Liao. Relgan: Multi-domain image- to-image translation via relative attributes. In IEEE Interna- tional Conference on Computer Vision (ICCV), 2019. 6, 8, 11

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Authors
Cozzolino, D., Thies, J., Rossler, A., Niesner, M., & Verdoliva, L.
Affiliations
  • University of Naples Federico II (IT)
  • Technical University of Munich (DE)
Venue
2021 IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops (CVPRW)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2021-06
Pages
990-1000
OpenAlex
W2990537444
Cited by
54
References
59
Citations by year
2026: 2 · 2025: 6 · 2024: 6 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 13 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 1
FWCI
3.35
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition Workshops (CVPRW) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • mediaTUM – the media and publications repository of the Technical University Munich (Technical University Munich) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
  • Air Force Research Laboratory
  • Ministry of Education
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Digital Media Forensic Detection
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Advanced Steganography and Watermarking Techniques
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
Keywords
camera fingerprinting, synthetic media, image forgery detection, demosaicing, image compression artifacts, misinformation

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