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Software exploitable hardware Trojans in embedded processor

Wang, Xinmu, Mal-Sarkar, Tatini, Krishna, Aswin, Narasimhan, Seetharam, Bhunia, Swarup · 2012 · 2012 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems (DFT)

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Growing threat of hardware Trojan attacks in untrusted foundry or design house has motivated researchers around the world to analyze the threat and develop effective countermeasures. In this paper, we focus on analyzing a specific class of hardware Trojans in embedded processor that can be enabled by software or data to leak critical information. These Trojans pose a serious threat in pervasively deployed embedded systems. An attacker can trigger these Trojans to extract valuable information from a system during field deployment. We show that an adversary can design a low-overhead hard-to-detect Trojan that can leak either secret keys stored in a processor, the code running in it, or the data being processed.

Overview

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/dft.2012.6378199

Cites

5 of 5 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

Show all 5 references

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. tyson, 2012, China-made US Military Chip Has Security Backdoor

Cited by

Metadata

Authors
Wang, X., Mal-Sarkar, T., Krishna, A., Narasimhan, S., & Bhunia, S.
Affiliations
Case Western Reserve University (US)
Venue
2012 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems (DFT)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2012-10
Pages
55-58
ISSN
1550-5774 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2029675347
Cited by
47
References
6
Citations by year
2025: 3 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 1 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 5 · 2016: 2 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 2
FWCI
0.63
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Proceedings (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
Keywords
hardware Trojans, embedded processors, information leakage, secret key extraction, code extraction, data extraction, untrusted foundry, hardware security

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.