Hardware Trojan attacks: Threat analysis and countermeasures
Abstract
Security of a computer system has been traditionally related to the security of the software or the information being processed. The underlying hardware used for information processing has been considered trusted. The emergence of hardware Trojan attacks violates this root of trust. These attacks, in the form of malicious modifications of electronic hardware at different stages of its life cycle, pose major security concerns in the electronics industry. An adversary can mount such an attack with an objective to cause operational failure or to leak secret information from inside a chip-e.g., the key in a cryptographic chip, during field operation. Global economic trend that encourages increased reliance on untrusted entities in the hardware design and fabrication process is rapidly enhancing the vulnerability to such attacks. In this paper, we analyze the threat of hardware Trojan attacks; present attack models, types, and scenarios; discuss different forms of protection approaches, both proactive and reactive; and describe emerging attack modes, defenses, and future research pathways.
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Hardware Trojan attacks require the adversary to have physical access to the integrated circuits.
“It requires the adversary to have physical access to the integrated circuits [63,64].”
From Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure. (2023) · cites this paper as [63]
Hardware Trojan attacks are malicious modifications of electronic hardware at various stages of its operation and can lead to control interference and leaking of secret data.
“Additionally, hardware Trojan attacks refer to malicious modifications of electronic hardware at various stages of its operation. These attacks are a serious security concern for the electronics industry as they can lead to control interference and the leaking of secret data.”
From Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure. (2023) · cites this paper as [63]
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- Authors
- Bhunia, S., Hsiao, M. S., Banga, M., & Narasimhan, S.
- Affiliations
- Case Western Reserve University (US)
- Virginia Tech (US)
- Intel (United States) (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the IEEE
- Published
- 2014-08
- Volume
- 102
- Issue
- 8
- Pages
- 1229-1247
- ISSN
- 0018-9219 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-2256
- OpenAlex
- W1976955200
- Cited by
- 766
- References
- 65
- Citations by year
- 2026: 40 · 2025: 58 · 2024: 58 · 2023: 67 · 2022: 72 · 2021: 87 · 2020: 75 · 2019: 76 · 2018: 93 · 2017: 69 · 2016: 45 · 2015: 25 · 2014: 1
- FWCI
- 74.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Proceedings of the IEEE (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (NSF) (CNS-1054744, DUE-1245756)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
- Keywords
- hardware Trojans, hardware security, root of trust, attack models, countermeasures
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