IEC 61850: Technology standards and cyber-threats
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 13 of the 13 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Substations constitute a fundamental part in providing reliable electricity to consumers. For a substation to maintain electricity reliability and its own real-time operability, communication between its components is inevitable. Before the emergence of IEC 61850, inter-substation communication was established via expensive copper wires with limited capabilities. IEC 61850 is the standard set by the International Electro-technical Commission (IEC) Technical Committee Number 57 Working Group 10 and IEEE for Ethernet (IEEE 802.3)-based communication in electrical substations. Like many power grid systems standards, IEC 61850 was set without extensive consideration for critical security measures. This paper discusses IEC 61850 technology standards and applications thoroughly and points out major security vulnerabilities it introduces in the context of current cyber-physical smart grid systems.
Overview
Integrity signals
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Cites
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Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“IEC 61850 [9,10,11,12,13,14] has become the de facto standard for substation communication within the smart grid.”
From Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid (2021) · cites this paper as [12]
In the citing paper
“Consequently, many implementations of the GOOSE protocol remain vulnerable to attacks from intelligent attackers from within and outside the network [12].”
From Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid (2021) · cites this paper as [12]
In the citing paper
“There have been few research papers [12,24,25] that have demonstrated LAN-based cyberattacks against the GOOSE protocol.”
From Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid (2021) · cites this paper as [12]
In the citing paper
“IEC 61850 is vulnerable to a number of attacks, including password cracking, Denial of Service (DoS), and eavesdropping [12].”
From Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid (2021) · cites this paper as [12]
Citations
Cites
Lucky Thirteen: Breaking the TLS and DTLS Record Protocols
Al Fardan, N. J., & Paterson, K. G. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2013.42 · Cited by 362
Overview of IEC 61850 and Benefits
Mackiewicz, R. E. (2006) · 2005/2006 PES TD · doi:10.1109/tdc.2006.1668522 · Cited by 235
Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters: Breaking and Fixing Authentication over TLS
Bhargavan, K., Lavaud, A. D., Fournet, C., Pironti, A., & Strub, P. Y. (2014) · 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2014.14 · Cited by 173
Exploiting the GOOSE protocol: A practical attack on cyber-infrastructure
Hoyos, J., Dehus, M., & Brown, T. X. (2012) · 2012 IEEE Globecom Workshops · doi:10.1109/glocomw.2012.6477809 · Cited by 137 · cited 4×
“As explained in [1] and depicted in Fig.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialOverview of IEC 61850 and benefits
Mackiewicz, R. E. (2006) · IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting · doi:10.1109/pes.2006.1709546 · Cited by 133
Knapp, E. D., & Samani, R. (2013) · Cited by 75
(2014) · QUT ePrints (Queensland University of Technology) · Cited by 75
A review of security attacks on IEC61850 substation automation system network
Rashid, M. T. A., Yussof, S., Yusoff, Y., & Ismail, R. (2014) · Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Information Technology and Multimedia · doi:10.1109/icimu.2014.7066594 · Cited by 65
IEC 61850 based smart grid security
Elgargouri, A., Virrankoski, R., & Elmusrati, M. (2015) · 2015 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Technology (ICIT) · doi:10.1109/icit.2015.7125460 · Cited by 28 · cited 2×
“IEC 61850 has many benefits including reduced wiring, transducer and commissioning cost, and improved flexibility [4].”
BackgroundThe effects of flooding attacks on time-critical communications in the smart grid
Li, Q., Ross, C., Yang, J., Di, J., Balda, J. C., & Mantooth, H. A. (2015) · IEEE Power & Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference (ISGT) · doi:10.1109/isgt.2015.7131802 · Cited by 24
Falk, H. (2008) · IEEE Power Engineering Society General Meeting · doi:10.1109/pes.2008.4596335 · Cited by 18
Weerathunga, P. E. (2012) · Scholarship@Western (Western University) · Cited by 12
Cheah, R. S.-S., Lee, B., & Lim, L. E. N. (2002) · doi:10.1109/tencon.1993.320049 · Cited by 3
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- cleveland, 2012, IEC 62351 Security Standards for the Power System Information Infrastructure
- fuloria, 0, The Protection of Substation Communications
- nguyen, 0, Internship report Use of iec 61850 for low voltage microgrid power control
- weerathunga, 2012, Security Aspects of Smart Grid Communication
Cited by
Vulnerability and Impact Analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol in the Smart Grid
Reda, H. T., Ray, B., Peidaee, P., Anwar, A., Mahmood, A., Kalam, A., & Islam, N. (2021) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s21041554 · Cited by 80
“IEC 61850 is vulnerable to a number of attacks, including password cracking, Denial of Service (DoS), and eavesdropping [12].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Youssef, T. A., El Hariri, M., Bugay, N., & Mohammed, O. A.
- Affiliations
- Florida International University (US)
- Venue
- 2016 IEEE 16th International Conference on Environment and Electrical Engineering (EEEIC)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2016-06
- Pages
- 1-6
- OpenAlex
- W2510829002
- Cited by
- 40
- References
- 13
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 4 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 1
- FWCI
- 7.93
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE International Conference on Environment and Electrical Engineering and IEEE Industrial and Commercial Power Systems Europe (EEEIC / I&CPS Europe) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Power Systems and Technologies
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Smart Grid and Power Systems
- Keywords
- IEC 61850, cyber threats, smart grid security, Ethernet communication, security vulnerabilities, cyber-physical systems, electricity reliability
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.