Cited by 1,192Cryptography and Data SecurityQuantum Information and CryptographyCryptography and Residue Arithmetic

CRYSTALS - Kyber: A CCA-Secure Module-Lattice-Based KEM

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Bos, Joppe, Ducas, Leo, Kiltz, Eike, Lepoint, T, Lyubashevsky, Vadim, Schanck, John M., Schwabe, Peter, Seiler, Gregor +1 more·2018·2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)

Abstract

Rapid advances in quantum computing, together with the announcement by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to define new standards for digitalsignature, encryption, and key-establishment protocols, have created significant interest in post-quantum cryptographic schemes. This paper introduces Kyber (part of CRYSTALS - Cryptographic Suite for Algebraic Lattices - a package submitted to NIST post-quantum standardization effort in November 2017), a portfolio of post-quantum cryptographic primitives built around a key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM), based on hardness assumptions over module lattices. Our KEM is most naturally seen as a successor to the NEWHOPE KEM (Usenix 2016). In particular, the key and ciphertext sizes of our new construction are about half the size, the KEM offers CCA instead of only passive security, the security is based on a more general (and flexible) lattice problem, and our optimized implementation results in essentially the same running time as the aforementioned scheme. We first introduce a CPA-secure public-key encryption scheme, apply a variant of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transform to create a CCA-secure KEM, and eventually construct, in a black-box manner, CCA-secure encryption, key exchange, and authenticated-key-exchange schemes. The security of our primitives is based on the hardness of Module-LWE in the classical and quantum random oracle models, and our concrete parameters conservatively target more than 128 bits of postquantum security.

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Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. Abhishek Banerjee, Chris Peikert, and Alon Rosen. 2012. Pseudorandom Func- tions and Lattices. In EUROCRYPT 2012 (LNCS), David Pointcheval and Thomas Johansson (Eds.), Vol. 7237. Springer, Heidelberg, 719-737.
  2. Daniel J. Bernstein. 2008. ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20. In Workshop Record of SASC 2008: The State of the Art of Stream Ciphers. http://cr.yp.to/papers.html# chacha.
  3. Joppe W. Bos, Craig Costello, Léo Ducas, Ilya Mironov, Michael Naehrig, Valeria Nikolaenko, Ananth Raghunathan, and Douglas Stebila. 2016. Frodo: Take off the Ring! Practical, Quantum-Secure Key Exchange from LWE. In ACM CCS 16, Edgar R. Weippl, Stefan Katzenbeisser, Christopher Kruegel, Andrew C. Myers, and Shai Halevi (Eds.). ACM Press, 1006-1018.
  4. Peter Campbell, Michael Groves, and Dan Shepherd. 2014. Soliloquy: A caution- ary tale. In ETSI 2nd Quantum-Safe Crypto Workshop. 1-9.
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Authors
Bos, J., Ducas, L., Kiltz, E., Lepoint, T., Lyubashevsky, V., Schanck, J. M., Schwabe, P., Seiler, G., & Stehle, D.
Affiliations
  • NXP (Belgium) (BE)
  • Ruhr University Bochum (DE)
  • SRI International (US)
  • IBM Research - Zurich (CH)
  • University of Waterloo (CA)
  • Radboud University Nijmegen (NL)
Venue
2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2018-04
Pages
353-367
OpenAlex
W2866028610
Cited by
1,192
References
68
Citations by year
2026: 205 · 2025: 287 · 2024: 237 · 2023: 148 · 2022: 97 · 2021: 78 · 2020: 63 · 2019: 42 · 2018: 24 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 1
FWCI
21.12
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Licence
public-domain
Locations
  • IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (publishedVersion)
  • Centrum Wiskunde & Informatica (CWI), the national research institute for mathematics and computer science in the Netherlands (submittedVersion, public-domain)
  • Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion, public-domain)
  • Data Archiving and Networked Services (DANS) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
  • HAL (submittedVersion)
  • Radboud Repository (Radboud University) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • Bpifrance
  • Government of Canada
  • Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung (166734)
  • Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek
  • Horizon 2020 Framework Programme
  • Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
  • FP7 Ideas: European Research Council (335086)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptography and Data Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Quantum Information and Cryptography
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic
Keywords
Kyber, crystals, module lattices, key encapsulation mechanism, post-quantum cryptography, CCA security, module learning with errors, Fujisaki-Okamoto transform, authenticated key agreement, key exchange, public-key encryption, NIST post-quantum standardization, quantum random oracle model

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