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A Practical Performance Benchmark of Post-Quantum Cryptography Across Heterogeneous Computing Environments
Open accessAbstract
The emergence of large-scale quantum computing presents an imminent threat to contemporary public-key cryptosystems, with quantum algorithms such as Shor’s algorithm capable of efficiently breaking RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). This vulnerability has catalyzed accelerated standardization efforts for post-quantum cryptography (PQC) by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and global security stakeholders. While theoretical security analysis of these quantum-resistant algorithms has advanced considerably, comprehensive real-world performance benchmarks spanning diverse computing environments—from high-performance cloud infrastructure to severely resource-constrained IoT devices—remain insufficient for informed deployment planning. This paper presents the most extensive cross-platform empirical evaluation to date of NIST-selected PQC algorithms, including CRYSTALS-Kyber and NTRU for key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs), alongside BIKE as a code-based alternative, and CRYSTALS-Dilithium and Falcon for digital signatures. Our systematic benchmarking framework measures computational latency, memory utilization, key sizes, and protocol overhead across multiple security levels (NIST Levels 1, 3, and 5) in three distinct hardware environments and various network conditions. Results demonstrate that contemporary server architectures can implement these algorithms with negligible performance impact (<5% additional latency), making immediate adoption feasible for cloud services. In contrast, resource-constrained devices experience more significant overhead, with computational demands varying by up to 12× between algorithms at equivalent security levels, highlighting the importance of algorithm selection for edge deployments. Beyond standalone algorithm performance, we analyze integration challenges within existing security protocols, revealing that naive implementation of PQC in TLS 1.3 can increase handshake size by up to 7× compared to classical approaches. To address this, we propose and evaluate three optimization strategies that reduce bandwidth requirements by 40–60% without compromising security guarantees. Our investigation further encompasses memory-constrained implementation techniques, side-channel resistance measures, and hybrid classical-quantum approaches for transitional deployments. Based on these comprehensive findings, we present a risk-based migration framework and algorithm selection guidelines tailored to specific use cases, including financial transactions, secure firmware updates, vehicle-to-infrastructure communications, and IoT fleet management. This practical roadmap enables organizations to strategically prioritize systems for quantum-resistant upgrades based on data sensitivity, resource constraints, and technical feasibility. Our results conclusively demonstrate that PQC is deployment-ready for most applications, provided that implementations are carefully optimized for the specific performance characteristics and security requirements of target environments. We also identify several remaining research challenges for the community, including further optimization for ultra-constrained devices, standardization of hybrid schemes, and hardware acceleration opportunities.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
This paper benchmarks five post-quantum cryptography algorithms—Kyber, NTRU, BIKE, Dilithium, and Falcon—across a server, laptop, and IoT-like device, measuring speed, memory, energy, and TLS overhead. It concludes that PQC is practical across environments, with Kyber generally best for KEMs, Falcon best for verification-heavy signatures, and BIKE the most resource-intensive.
## Key findings
- On Server E1, all operations complete in ≤ 0.28 ms across algorithms and security levels; the paper says this implies negligible overhead for cloud/data-center workloads.
- At NIST Security Level 3 on Device E3, Kyber is fastest among KEMs: 1.18 ms key generation, 0.90 ms encryption, and 1.12 ms decryption; BIKE is slowest: 3.05 ms, 1.85 ms, and 2.75 ms respectively.
- TLS 1.3 handshakes with PQC KEMs stay under 3 ms: Kyber 2.2 ms, NTRU 2.4 ms, BIKE 2.8 ms; classical ECDHE is 1.8 ms.
- Memory at NIST Level 3 on Device E3 peaks at 850 KB for Kyber, 900 KB for NTRU, 1250 KB for BIKE, 980 KB for Dilithium, and 1250 KB for Falcon.
- The paper reports NIST Level 3 results are 10–25% better than NIST benchmark values on Server E1, and says PQC key generation is over 1000x faster than RSA for Kyber.
## Methods
- The study benchmarks five algorithms: CRYSTALS-Kyber, NTRU, BIKE, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, and Falcon, across three environments: a server (E1), laptop (E2), and constrained device (E3).
- It measures operation latency, key/ciphertext/signature sizes, peak RSS memory, TLS handshake overhead, fragmentation under MTU settings (1500, 512, 256 bytes), concurrency scaling (1 to 16 threads), and energy consumption on Device E3.
- Each operation was run 1000 times; analysis used arithmetic mean, median, standard deviation, 95th percentile, outlier handling, paired t-tests, bootstrapping, and validation against NIST-published benchmarks.
## Limitations
- The paper itself notes gaps in prior work rather than its own, but its design still leaves evident limits: it tests only three hardware platforms and only the algorithms listed, so results may not generalize to other devices or PQC schemes (evident from the study scope).
- It focuses on one implementation stack (liboqs 0.7.2 and OpenSSL-OQS 1.1.1m-OQS), so findings may depend on those software versions and compiler settings (evident from the methodology).
- The text says the study measured estimated energy consumption on Device E3; it does not state whether energy was measured across all platforms or with hardware power instrumentation beyond that device (stated in the paper).
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5 Valid · 7 Not valid · 6 Not checked · 141 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Recent advancements suggest that within the next decade, quantum computing hardware may reach the threshold required to break 2048-bit RSA and comparable ECC implementations [2,3].”
- Also stated in: § 2.1. Quantum Attacks and Their Impact on Classical Cryptography · hedged
“Gidney and Ekerå [2] suggesting that factoring 2048-bit RSA could become feasible within the next decade given aggressive quantum hardware advancements.”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [2] Gidney, 2021, How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 h using 20 million noisy qubits, Quantum sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Conclusion estimates that about 20 million physical qubits would be needed to factor RSA-2048, supporting the RSA resource-threshold part of the claim. It does not predict that hardware will reach that threshold within a decade; the Conclusion says predicting relevant advances is beyond its scope. Section 3.4 also says the feasibility of applying its optimizations to elliptic-curve discrete logarithms remains to be studied, so it does not establish a comparable ECC threshold. (LLM, conf=0.87)
- Not matchedcites [3] Gheorghiu, 2022, Benchmarking quantum computers and the impact of quantum noise, NPJ Quantum Inf.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
hedgedstates a possible cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Also stated in: § 2.1. Quantum Attacks and Their Impact on Classical Cryptography · hedged
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“This comparison validates our methodology while highlighting the ongoing performance improvements in PQC implementations.”
- Also stated in: § 5.2. Practical Deployment Considerations · plain
“The comparative analysis with NIST's benchmark results validates our methodology”
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [4] Alagic, G., Alperin-Sheriff, J., Apon, D., Cooper, D., Dang, Q., Kelsey, J., Liu, Y.K., Miller, C., Moody, D., and Peralta, R. (2022). Status Report on the Third Round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process, National Institute of Standards and Technology. Technical Report NIST IR 8413. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 2.3 (p. 27) says NIST considered performance benchmarks across multiple platforms, so the report provides a basis for comparison. It does not assess the citing authors’ methodology or say that their comparison validates it. (LLM, conf=0.82)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
- Also stated in: § 5.2. Practical Deployment Considerations · plain
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In contrast, resource-constrained devices experience more significant overhead, with computational demands varying by up to 12× between algorithms at equivalent security levels, highlighting the importance of algorithm selection for edge deployments.”
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Second, we identify and quantify critical performance trade-offs that inform algorithm selection for resource-constrained environments, including specific optimizations that yield up to 40% performance improvement on targeted platforms.”
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In contrast, resource-constrained devices experience more significant overhead, with computational demands varying by up to 12× between algorithms at equivalent security levels, highlighting the importance of algorithm selection for edge deployments.”
plainstates an association- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption not shown here.
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Citations
Cites
A fast quantum mechanical algorithm for database search
Grover, L. K. (1996) · Proceedings of the twenty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing - STOC '96 · doi:10.1145/237814.237866 · Cited by 8,830 · cited 1×
“Beyond factoring-based attacks, Grover’s algorithm offers a quadratic speedup for brute-forcing symmetric cryptographic keys [8], motivating the need to increase key sizes in block ciphers and hash functions.”
Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and discrete logarithms on a quantum computer
Shor, P. W. (1997) · SIAM Journal on Computing · doi:10.1137/s0097539795293172 · Cited by 8,472 · cited 2×
“However, quantum algorithms such as Shor’s algorithm [1] can solve these problems in polynomial time, rendering current public-key infrastructure (PKI) fundamentally vulnerable.”
NTRU: A ring-based public key cryptosystem
Hoffstein, J., Pipher, J., & Silverman, J. H. (1998) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/bfb0054868 · Cited by 1,947 · cited 1×
“Originally devised in the 1990s [19], NTRU has undergone extensive refinements to defend against various lattice-and algebraic-based attacks.”
CRYSTALS - Kyber: A CCA-Secure Module-Lattice-Based KEM
Bos, J., Ducas, L., Kiltz, E., Lepoint, T., Lyubashevsky, V., Schanck, J. M., Schwabe, P., Seiler, G., & Stehle, D. (2018) · 2018 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2018.00032 · Cited by 1,192 · cited 1×
“CRYSTALS-Kyber is a Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) based on the module learning-with-errors (MLWE) problem [12,13].”
How to factor 2048 bit RSA integers in 8 hours using 20 million noisy qubits
Gidney, C., & Ekerå, M. (2021) · Quantum · doi:10.22331/q-2021-04-15-433 · Cited by 830 · cited 2×
“Recent studies have refined Shor’s approach and provided more concrete resource estimates, with Gidney and Ekerå [2] suggesting that factoring 2048-bit RSA could become feasible within the next decade given aggressive quantum hardware advancements.”
Cybersecurity in an Era with Quantum Computers: Will We Be Ready?
Mosca, M. (2018) · IEEE Security & Privacy · doi:10.1109/msp.2018.3761723 · Cited by 581 · cited 1×
“However, as Mosca [10] emphasizes, the most urgent concern lies in public-key infrastructures (PKIs), where classical algorithms could be retroactively broken once a sufficiently powerful quantum computer is built.”
Post-quantum key exchange - a new hope.
Alkım, E., Ducas, L., Pöppelmann, T., & Schwabe, P. (2015) · Cited by 517
Status report on the third round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization process
Alagic, G., Apon, D., Cooper, D., Dang, Q., Dang, T., Kelsey, J., Lichtinger, J., Liu, Y.-K., Miller, C., Moody, D., et al. (2022) · doi:10.6028/nist.ir.8413 · Cited by 395
Status report on the first round of the NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization process
Alagic, G., Alperin-Sheriff, J., Apon, D., Cooper, D., Dang, Q., Liu, Y.-K., Miller, C., Moody, D., Peralta, R., Perlner, R., et al. (2019) · doi:10.6028/nist.ir.8240 · Cited by 364
Status report on the third round of the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization process
Alagic, G., Apon, D., Cooper, D., Dang, Q., Dang, T., Kelsey, J., Lichtinger, J., Liu, Y.-K., Miller, C., Moody, D., et al. (2022) · doi:10.6028/nist.ir.8413-upd1 · Cited by 301
Research works printed but not linked: 18
- Chen, M., Yang, F., and Guo, J. (2022, January 2–5). Post-Quantum Cryptography on IoT Devices: Performance and Security Implications. Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM), Virtual.
- Hamburg, M. (2022, January 13–15). Post-quantum key-exchange for the Internet: Analysis of performance and security. Proceedings of the Real World Crypto Symposium, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
- Abdulrahman, A., Chen, J.P., Chen, Y.J., Hwang, V., Kannwischer, M.J., and Yang, B.Y. (2022, January 13–16). Faster Kyber on Arm Cortex-M4 with NEON. Proceedings of the International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security, Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
- Pornin, 2021, Efficient Implementation of Falcon Signatures, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., 2021, 506
- Sendrier, 2022, BIKE-2: A New BIKE Design with Enhanced Decoding, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., 2022, 187
- Kannwischer, M.J., Rijneveld, J., Schwabe, P., and Stoffelen, K. (2019, January 3–5). PQM4: Post-quantum crypto library for the ARM Cortex-M4. Proceedings of the Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design: 10th International Workshop, Darmstadt, Germany.
- Mera, 2020, Energy analysis of post-quantum cryptography algorithms on IoT devices, IEEE Internet Things J., 8, 1020
- Wang, 2023, Ultra-Low-Memory Post-Quantum Cryptography on Microcontrollers, IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur., 18, 1631
- Kudinov, M., Kuzovkova, A., Kuzovkov, A., and Useinov, R. (2022, January 14–23). Post-Quantum Cryptography Acceleration for IoT: An FPGA-based CRYSTALS-Kyber Accelerator. Proceedings of the Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference (DATE), Antwerp, Belgium.
- Sikeridis, D., Kampanakis, P., and Devetsikiotis, M. (2021, January 14–23). Evaluating the performance of post-quantum TLS. Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Communications, Montreal, QC, Canada.
- Kwiatkowski, K., and Valenta, L. (2019, January 22–25). Towards Post-Quantum Cryptography in TLS. Proceedings of the The NIST Second PQC Standardization Conference, University of California, Santa Barbara, CA, USA.
- Langley, A., and Hamburg, M. (2019, January 24–27). Post-quantum cryptography in TLS 1.3. Proceedings of the Network and Distributed Systems Security (NDSS) Symposium, San Diego, CA, USA.
- Crockett, 2023, A Scalability Assessment of Post-Quantum TLS in Cloud Environments, IACR Cryptol. ePrint Arch., 2023, 318
- Drucker, N., and Gueron, S. (2022, January 23–25). Performance Analysis of Post-quantum TLS 1.3 on Constrained Devices. Proceedings of the Selected Areas in Cryptography—SAC 2021, Taipei, Taiwan.
- Fouque, 2022, Side-Channel Attacks on Post-Quantum Cryptographic Schemes, IACR Trans. Cryptogr. Hardw. Embed. Syst., 2022, 1
- Xu, Z., Pemberton, O., and Achutha, R. (2022, January 18–21). A Systematic Evaluation of the Security of Post-Quantum Cryptography Against Side-Channel Attacks. Proceedings of the Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems—CHES 2022, Leuven, Belgium.
- Basu, K., Soni, D., Nabeel, M., and Karri, R. (2021, January 1–5). FPGA Acceleration of Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms. Proceedings of the Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference (DATE), Virtual.
- Banerjee, U., Pathak, A., and Chandrakasan, A.P. (June, January 27). Accelerating Post-Quantum Cryptography Through Specialized Hardware for Integer Polynomial Multiplication. Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), Austin, TX, USA.
Cited by
Resilience of Post-Quantum Cryptography in Lightweight IoT Protocols: A Systematic Review
Almutairi, M. M., & Sheldon, F. T. (2025) · Eng—Advances in Engineering · doi:10.3390/eng6120346 · Cited by 29
“Temporary hybrid schemes (classical + PQC keys) are widely used to ensure backward compatibility [6,21].”
InfluentialHybrid cryptographic approach for strengthening IoT and 5G/B5G network security
Kumar, A., Singh, P., Kamble, D. P., & Singh, I. (2025) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-025-21861-2 · Cited by 16
A Comprehensive Survey on Pre Versus Post Quantum Security Schemes for 5G-Enabled IoT Applications
Choudhury, B., Hota, A., Karmakar, M., Saha, S., Nag, A., & Nandi, S. (2025) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2025.3608623 · Cited by 22
“Like Kyber, Dilithium relies on NTT-based polynomial multiplication, although it packs only 4 coefficients per 128-bit vector register due to the larger coefficient size [158].”
Quantum-Resilient Cryptography: A Survey on Classical and Quantum Algorithms
Sharath, H. A., Vrindavanam, J., V, Dana, S., & Prasad, S. N. (2025) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2025.3612982 · Cited by 13
“NIST has selected lattice-based algorithms like CRYSTALS-Kyber: for encryption and CRYSTALS-Dilithium and FALCON: for digital signatures for standardization due to their quantum resistance [40], [43], [47].”
InfluentialKhan, M. A., Noor, F., Javaid, S., & Żywiołek, J. (2025) · Discover Internet of Things · doi:10.1007/s43926-025-00238-x · Cited by 16
“…and hybrid schemes [141] Elliptic Curve TLS requires 2.1 KB [141] Key generation and encapsulation cycles Kyber/Saber: 100,000–150,000 cycles [140] RSA-3072: more than 500,000 cycles Hardware throughput Kyber ASIC in TSMC 40 nm achieves 877,000 operations per second with 2272 kOPS/W power…”
Influential
Metadata
- Authors
- Abbasi, M., Cardoso, F., Váz, P., Silva, J., & Martins, P.
- Affiliations
- Universidade Politécnica de Coimbra (PT)
- ISLA Santarém - Instituto Politécnico (PT)
- Universidade Politécnica de Viseu (PT)
- Corresponding author
- Martins, Pedro
- Venue
- Cryptography
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2025-05-21
- Volume
- 9
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 32
- ISSN
- 2410-387X (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4410581134
- Semantic Scholar
- b094ea7ba3820a7040a902439527d95c3cac7983
- Cited by
- 76
- References
- 16
- Citations by year
- 2026: 57 · 2025: 19
- FWCI
- 30.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Cryptography (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Portuguese National Funding Agency for Science, Research and Technology (RCAAP Project by FCT) (submittedVersion, other-oa)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Cryptography and Data Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Cryptography and Residue Arithmetic
- Physical Sciences › Physics and Astronomy › Atomic and Molecular Physics, and Optics › Quantum Information and Cryptography
- Keywords
- performance benchmarking, NIST PQC standardization, CRYSTALS-Kyber, NTRU, BIKE, CRYSTALS-Dilithium, falcons, key encapsulation mechanism, digital signatures, resource-constrained devices, Internet of Things security, TLS 1.3, side-channel attack resistance, cloud deployment, edge deployment
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