The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Leakage-Resilient Cryptography
Open accessAbstract
We construct a stream-cipher S whose implementation is secure even if a bounded amount of arbitrary (adversarially chosen) information on the internal state ofS is leaked during computation. This captures all possible side-channel attacks on S where the amount of information leaked in a given period is bounded, but overall can be arbitrary large. The only other assumption we make on the implementation of S is that only data that is accessed during computation leaks information. The stream-cipher S generates its output in chunks K1, K2, . . . and arbitrary but bounded information leakage is modeled by allowing the adversary to adaptively chose a function fl: {0,1}* rarr {0, 1}lambdabefore Klis computed, she then gets fl(taul) where taulis the internal state ofS that is accessed during the computation of Kg. One notion of security we prove for S is that Kg is indistinguishable from random when given K1,..., K1-1,f1(tau1),..., fl-1(taul-1) and also the complete internal state of S after Kg has been computed (i.e. S is forward-secure). The construction is based on alternating extraction (used in the intrusion-resilient secret-sharing scheme from FOCS'07). We move this concept to the computational setting by proving a lemma that states that the output of any PRG has high HILLpseudoentropy (i.e. is indistinguishable from some distribution with high min-entropy) even if arbitrary information about the seed is leaked. The amount of leakage lambda that we can tolerate in each step depends on the strength of the underlying PRG, it is at least logarithmic, but can be as large as a constant fraction of the internal state of S if the PRG is exponentially hard.
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Cites
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Cited by
A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks
Standaert, F.-X., Malkin, T. G., & Yung, M. (2009) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-01001-9_26 · Cited by 925
Introduction to differential power analysis
Kocher, P., Jaffe, J., Jun, B., & Rohatgi, P. (2011) · Journal of Cryptographic Engineering · doi:10.1007/s13389-011-0006-y · Cited by 632
Provably Secure Higher-Order Masking of AES
Rivain, M., & Prouff, E. (2010) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-15031-9_28 · Cited by 526
Bitansky, N., Canetti, R., Chiesa, A., & Tromer, E. (2012) · Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference · doi:10.1145/2090236.2090263 · Cited by 493
Simultaneous Hardcore Bits and Cryptography against Memory Attacks
Akavia, A., Goldwasser, S., & Vaikuntanathan, V. (2009) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-00457-5_28 · Cited by 490
Separating succinct non-interactive arguments from all falsifiable assumptions
Gentry, C., & Wichs, D. (2011) · Proceedings of the forty-third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing · doi:10.1145/1993636.1993651 · Cited by 456
Public-Key Cryptosystems Resilient to Key Leakage
Naor, M., & Segev, G. (2009) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-03356-8_2 · Cited by 403
Masking against Side-Channel Attacks: A Formal Security Proof
Prouff, E., & Rivain, M. (2013) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-38348-9_9 · Cited by 383
A Leakage-Resilient Mode of Operation
Pietrzak, K. (2009) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-01001-9_27 · Cited by 261
Self-citationSignature Schemes with Bounded Leakage Resilience
Katz, J., & Vaikuntanathan, V. (2009) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-10366-7_41 · Cited by 257
Overcoming the Hole in the Bucket: Public-Key Cryptography Resilient to Continual Memory Leakage
Brakerski, Z., Kalai, Y. T., Katz, J., & Vaikuntanathan, V. (2010) · 2010 IEEE 51st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science · doi:10.1109/focs.2010.55 · Cited by 242
“Dziembowski and Pietrzak [17], [34] construct stream ciphers in this model, in which the secret key is updated over time [4] and the adversary can leak a bounded amount of information between key updates (subject to the limitation just mentioned) but an unbounded amount of information overall.”
Metadata
- Authors
- Dziembowski, S., & Pietrzak, K.
- Venue
- 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2008-10
- Pages
- 293-302
- ISSN
- 0272-5428 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2133701468
- Cited by
- 504
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 28.04
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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