The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Leakage-Resilient Cryptography
Open accessAbstract
We construct a stream-cipher S whose implementation is secure even if a bounded amount of arbitrary (adversarially chosen) information on the internal state ofS is leaked during computation. This captures all possible side-channel attacks on S where the amount of information leaked in a given period is bounded, but overall can be arbitrary large. The only other assumption we make on the implementation of S is that only data that is accessed during computation leaks information. The stream-cipher S generates its output in chunks K1, K2, . . . and arbitrary but bounded information leakage is modeled by allowing the adversary to adaptively chose a function fl: {0,1}* rarr {0, 1}lambdabefore Klis computed, she then gets fl(taul) where taulis the internal state ofS that is accessed during the computation of Kg. One notion of security we prove for S is that Kg is indistinguishable from random when given K1,..., K1-1,f1(tau1),..., fl-1(taul-1) and also the complete internal state of S after Kg has been computed (i.e. S is forward-secure). The construction is based on alternating extraction (used in the intrusion-resilient secret-sharing scheme from FOCS'07). We move this concept to the computational setting by proving a lemma that states that the output of any PRG has high HILLpseudoentropy (i.e. is indistinguishable from some distribution with high min-entropy) even if arbitrary information about the seed is leaked. The amount of leakage lambda that we can tolerate in each step depends on the strength of the underlying PRG, it is at least logarithmic, but can be as large as a constant fraction of the internal state of S if the PRG is exponentially hard.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Kocher, P., Jaffe, J., & Jun, B. (1999) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-48405-1_25 · Cited by 7,407
Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
Kocher, P. C. (1996) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-68697-5_9 · Cited by 4,387
Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele
v. Neumann, J. (1928) · Mathematische Annalen · doi:10.1007/bf01448847 · Cited by 2,572
Differential fault analysis of secret key cryptosystems
Biham, E., & Adi Shamir, Z. (1997) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/bfb0052259 · Cited by 1,671
A Pseudorandom Generator from any One-way Function
HÅstad, J., Impagliazzo, R., Levin, L. A., & Luby, M. (1999) · SIAM Journal on Computing · doi:10.1137/s0097539793244708 · Cited by 1,653
Electromagnetic Analysis: Concrete Results
Gandolfi, K., Mourtel, C., & Olivier, F. (2001) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-44709-1_21 · Cited by 1,311
ElectroMagnetic Analysis (EMA): Measures and Counter-measures for Smart Cards
Quisquater, J.-J., & Samyde, D. (2001) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-45418-7_17 · Cited by 1,077
Private Circuits: Securing Hardware against Probing Attacks
Ishai, Y., Sahai, A., & Wagner, D. (2003) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-45146-4_27 · Cited by 1,073
Tamper resistance: a cautionary note
Anderson, R., & Kühn, M. (1996) · Cited by 921
The primes contain arbitrarily long arithmetic progressions
Green, B., & Tao, T. (2008) · Annals of Mathematics · doi:10.4007/annals.2008.167.481 · Cited by 803
Lest we remember: cold boot attacks on encryption keys
Halderman, J. A., Schoen, S. D., Heninger, N., Clarkson, W., Paúl, W., Calandrino, J. A., Feldman, A. J., Appelbaum, J., & Felten, E. W. (2008) · UCLA - Biblioteca de Ciencias y Tecnologia Felix Morales Bueno · Cited by 456
A universal statistical test for random bit generators
Maurer, U. M. (1992) · Journal of Cryptology · doi:10.1007/bf00193563 · Cited by 263
Side channel cryptanalysis of product ciphers
Kelsey, J., Schneier, B., Wagner, D., & Hall, C. (2000) · Journal of Computer Security · doi:10.3233/jcs-2000-82-304 · Cited by 257
Side channel cryptanalysis of product ciphers
Kelsey, J., Schneier, B., Wagner, D., & Hall, C. (1998) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/bfb0055858 · Cited by 192
Exposure-Resilient Functions and All-or-Nothing Transforms
Canetti, R., Dodis, Y., Halevi, S., Kushilevitz, E., & Sahai, A. (2000) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-45539-6_33 · Cited by 191
Private Circuits II: Keeping Secrets in Tamperable Circuits
Ishai, Y., Prabhakaran, M., Sahai, A., & Wagner, D. (2006) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/11761679_19 · Cited by 175
Constructing Locally Computable Extractors and Cryptosystems in the Bounded-Storage Model
Vadhan, S. (2003) · Journal of Cryptology · doi:10.1007/s00145-003-0237-x · Cited by 155
Perfectly Secure Password Protocols in the Bounded Retrieval Model
Crescenzo, G. D., Lipton, R., & Walfish, S. (2006) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/11681878_12 · Cited by 151
Intrusion-Resilient Secret Sharing
Dziembowski, S., & Pietrzak, K. (2007) · Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science · doi:10.1109/focs.2007.4389495 · Cited by 118
Self-citationIntegrality gaps of 2 - o(1) for Vertex Cover SDPs in the Lovész-Schrijver Hierarchy
Georgiou, K., Magen, A., Pitassi, T., & Tourlakis, I. (2007) · Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science · doi:10.1109/focs.2007.35 · Cited by 115
Dense Subsets of Pseudorandom Sets
Reingold, O., Trevisan, L., Tulsiani, M., & Vadhan, S. (2008) · Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science · doi:10.1109/focs.2008.38 · Cited by 106
On Perfect and Adaptive Security in Exposure-Resilient Cryptography
Dodis, Y., Sahai, A., & Smith, A. (2001) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/3-540-44987-6_19 · Cited by 100
Deterministic Extractors for Bit‐Fixing Sources and Exposure‐Resilient Cryptography
Kamp, J., & Zuckerman, D. (2006) · SIAM Journal on Computing · doi:10.1137/s0097539705446846 · Cited by 92
A block cipher based pseudo random number generator secure against side-channel key recovery
Petit, C., Standaert, F., Pereira, O., Malkin, T., & Yung, M. M. (2008) · ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ASIA CCS) · doi:10.1145/1368310.1368322 · Cited by 70
Intrusion-Resilient Key Exchange in the Bounded Retrieval Model
Cash, D., Ding, Y. Z., Dodis, Y., Wenke Lee, B., Lipton, R., & Walfish, S. (2007) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-70936-7_26 · Cited by 66
A Provably-Secure Strongly-Randomized Cipher
Maurer, U. M. (1991) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/3-540-46877-3_33 · Cited by 40
A Block Cipher based PRNG Secure Against Side-Channel Key Recovery.Preprint
Petit, C., Standaert, F., Pereira, O., et al. (2007) · IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive · Cited by 18
Trevisan, L. (2009) · ACM SIGACT News · doi:10.1145/1556154.1556170 · Cited by 17
How to Protect Yourself without Perfect Shredding
Canetti, R., Eiger, D., Goldwasser, S., et al. (2008) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-540-70583-3_42 · Cited by 14
Cited by
A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks
Standaert, F.-X., Malkin, T. G., & Yung, M. (2009) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-01001-9_26 · Cited by 925
Introduction to differential power analysis
Kocher, P., Jaffe, J., Jun, B., & Rohatgi, P. (2011) · Journal of Cryptographic Engineering · doi:10.1007/s13389-011-0006-y · Cited by 632
Provably Secure Higher-Order Masking of AES
Rivain, M., & Prouff, E. (2010) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-15031-9_28 · Cited by 526
Bitansky, N., Canetti, R., Chiesa, A., & Tromer, E. (2012) · Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference · doi:10.1145/2090236.2090263 · Cited by 493
Simultaneous Hardcore Bits and Cryptography against Memory Attacks
Akavia, A., Goldwasser, S., & Vaikuntanathan, V. (2009) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-642-00457-5_28 · Cited by 490
Metadata
- Authors
- Dziembowski, S., & Pietrzak, K.
- Venue
- 2008 49th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2008-10
- Pages
- 293-302
- ISSN
- 0272-5428 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2133701468
- Cited by
- 504
- References
- 29
- FWCI
- 28.04
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.