Attacks on Machine Learning: Adversarial Examples in Connected and Autonomous Vehicles
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Connected and autonomous vehicles (CAV a.k.a. driverless cars) offset human response for transportation infrastructure, enhancing traffic efficiency, travel leisure, and road safety. Behind the wheels of these mobile robots lies machine learning (ML) to automate mundane driving tasks and make decisions from situational awareness. Attacking ML, the brain of driverless cars, can cause catastrophes. This paper proposes a novel approach to attack CAV by fooling its ML model. Using adversarial examples in CAVs, the work demonstrates how adversarial machine learning can generate attacks hardly detectable by current ML classifiers for CAV misbehavior detection. First, adversarial datasets are generated by a traditional attack engine, which CAV misbehavior detection ML models can easily detect. Building attack ML model takes two phases: training and testing. Using supervised learning, Phase I trains the model on the time-series data, converted from the adversarial datasets. Phase II tests the model, which leads, for the next round of model improvement. The initial round deploys K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) and Random Forest (RF) algorithms, respectively. The next round, guided by deep learning (DL) models, uses Logistic Regression (LG) of neural network and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) of recurrent neural network. The results, in precision-recall (PR) and receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves, validate the effectiveness of the proposed adversarial ML models. This work reveals the vulnerability in ML. At the same time, it shows the promise to protect critical infrastructure by studying the opponent strategies. Future work includes retraining the adversarial ML models with real-world datasets from pilot CAV sites.
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Citations
Cites
Potential cyberattacks on automated vehicles
Petit, J., & Shladover, S. E. (2014) · IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems · doi:10.1109/tits.2014.2342271 · Cited by 779
Making machine learning robust against adversarial inputs
Goodfellow, I., McDaniel, P., & Papernot, N. (2018) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/3134599 · Cited by 358
Cited by
A machine-learning-based data-centric misbehavior detection model for internet of vehicles
Sharma, P., & Liu, H. (2021) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2020.3035035 · Cited by 183
Self-citationTowards 6G-Enabled Internet of Vehicles: Security and Privacy
Moya Osorio, D. P., Ahmad, I., Sánchez, J. D. V., Gurtov, A., Scholliers, J., Kutila, M., & Porambage, P. (2022) · IEEE Open Journal of the Communications Society · doi:10.1109/ojcoms.2022.3143098 · Cited by 180
Misbehavior Detection for Position Falsification Attacks in VANETs Using Machine Learning
Ercan, S., Ayaida, M., & Messai, N. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2021.3136706 · Cited by 109
Machine Learning for Security in Vehicular Networks: A Comprehensive Survey
Talpur, A., & Gurusamy, M. (2022) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2021.3129079 · Cited by 107
“In [182], authors perform an experimental study over a vehicular network to fool its supervised model and demonstrate how ML-generated attacks over ML are undetectable by existing ML classifiers in vehicular applications.”
BackgroundAbdel Hakeem, S. A., & Kim, H. (2025) · IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems · doi:10.1109/tits.2025.3558849 · Cited by 90
Metadata
- Authors
- Sharma, P., Austin, D., & Liu, H.
- Venue
- 2019 IEEE International Symposium on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2019-11
- Pages
- 1-7
- OpenAlex
- W3011407574
- Cited by
- 57
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 1.90
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Sharma, P., Austin, D., & Liu, H. (2019). Attacks on Machine Learning: Adversarial Examples in Connected and Autonomous Vehicles. 2019 IEEE International Symposium on Technologies for Homeland Security (HST). https://doi.org/10.1109/hst47167.2019.9032989
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