Potential cyberattacks on automated vehicles
Abstract
Vehicle automation has been one of the fundamental applications within the field of intelligent transportation systems (ITS) since the start of ITS research in the mid-1980s. For most of this time, it has been generally viewed as a futuristic concept that is not close to being ready for deployment. However, recent development of “self-driving” cars and the announcement by car manufacturers of their deployment by 2020 show that this is becoming a reality. The ITS industry has already been focusing much of its attention on the concepts of “connected vehicles” (United States) or “cooperative ITS” (Europe). These concepts are based on communication of data among vehicles (V2V) and/or between vehicles and the infrastructure (V2I/I2V) to provide the information needed to implement ITS applications. The separate threads of automated vehicles and cooperative ITS have not yet been thoroughly woven together, but this will be a necessary step in the near future because the cooperative exchange of data will provide vital inputs to improve the performance and safety of the automation systems. Thus, it is important to start thinking about the cybersecurity implications of cooperative automated vehicle systems. In this paper, we investigate the potential cyberattacks specific to automated vehicles, with their special needs and vulnerabilities. We analyze the threats on autonomous automated vehicles and cooperative automated vehicles. This analysis shows the need for considerably more redund…
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The most severe and likely attacks on autonomous vehicles are GNSS spoofing and injection of fake messages.
“Petit & Shladover (2014) explore the security issues related to autonomous vehicles and conclude that the most severe and likely attacks are Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) spoofing and injection of fake messages.”
From Shared autonomous vehicle services: A comprehensive review (2020) · cites this paper as Petit & Shladover, 2014
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- Authors
- Petit, J., & Shladover, S. E.
- Affiliations
- University of Twente (NL)
- University of California, Berkeley (US)
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems
- Published
- 2014
- Pages
- 1-11
- ISSN
- 1524-9050 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-0016
- OpenAlex
- W2099005886
- Cited by
- 779
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 31 · 2025: 92 · 2024: 72 · 2023: 86 · 2022: 68 · 2021: 94 · 2020: 103 · 2019: 80 · 2018: 77 · 2017: 50 · 2016: 20 · 2015: 6
- FWCI
- 13.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs)
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Automotive Engineering › Autonomous Vehicle Technology and Safety
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Keywords
- cyberattacks, autonomous vehicles, cooperative intelligent transport systems, connected vehicles, vehicle-to-vehicle communication, vehicle-to-infrastructure communication, cyber threats, system redundancy
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