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On the Intruder Detection for Sinkhole Attack in Wireless Sensor Networks
Abstract
In a wireless sensor network, multiple nodes would send sensor readings to a base station for further processing. It is well-known that such a many-to-one communication is highly vulnerable to the sinkhole attack, where an intruder attracts surrounding nodes with unfaithful routing information, and then performs selective forwarding or alters the data passing through it. A sinkhole attack forms a serious threat to sensor networks, particularly considering that such networks are often deployed in open areas and of weak computation and battery power. In this paper, we present a novel algorithm for detecting the intruder in a sinkhole attack. The algorithm first finds a list of suspected nodes, and then effectively identifies the intruder in the list through a network flow graph. The algorithm is also robust to deal with cooperative malicious nodes that attempt to hide the real intruder. We have evaluated the performance of the proposed algorithm through both numerical analysis and simulations, which confirmed the effectiveness and accuracy of the algorithm. Our results also suggest that its communication and computation overheads are reasonably low for wireless sensor networks.
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Citations
Cited by
IoT security: Review, blockchain solutions, and open challenges
Khan, M. A., & Salah, K. (2018) · Future Generation Computer Systems · doi:10.1016/j.future.2017.11.022 · Cited by 2,488
“5 Sinkhole and wormhole attacks denial-ofservice Network layer Intermediatelevel Rank verification through hash chain function, trust level management, nodes/communication behavior analysis, anomaly detection through IDS, cryptographic key management, graph traversals, and measuring signal strength [41, 42, 43, 44, 45…”
BackgroundMethodRouting Attacks and Countermeasures in the RPL-Based Internet of Things
Wallgren, L., Raza, S., & Voigt, T. (2013) · International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks · doi:10.1155/2013/794326 · Cited by 483
Anomaly detection in wireless sensor networks: A survey
Xie, M., Han, S., Tian, B., & Parvin, S. (2011) · Journal of Network and Computer Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jnca.2011.03.004 · Cited by 355
Anomaly detection in wireless sensor networks
Rajasegarar, S., Leckie, C., & Palaniswami, M. (2008) · IEEE Wireless Communications · doi:10.1109/mwc.2008.4599219 · Cited by 310
A Survey of Potential Security Issues in Existing Wireless Sensor Network Protocols
Tomic, I., & McCann, J. A. (2017) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2017.2749883 · Cited by 274
Bhushan, B., & Sahoo, G. (2018) · Wireless Personal Communications · doi:10.1007/s11277-017-4962-0 · Cited by 181
Towards a secure ITS: Overview, challenges and solutions
Sleem, L., Noura, H. N., & Couturier, R. (2020) · Journal of Information Security and Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jisa.2020.102637 · Cited by 21
Metadata
- Authors
- H. Ngai, E., Liu, J., & Lyu, M.
- Venue
- 2006 IEEE International Conference on Communications
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2006
- Pages
- 3383-3389
- ISSN
- 1550-3607 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2129919733
- Cited by
- 211
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 8.63
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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