Towards an Explainable Approach for Insider Threat Detection: Constraint Network Learning
Abstract
Insider threats are considered a major threat to information and communication technology (ICT) systems creating an important source of vulnerabilities from a security perspective. The technical knowledge that insiders have about the ICT systems, such as its IT infrastructure, the high load of data generated by other employees of the company which hides insiders' activities, their access rights as well as the confidentiality of the data of which they have access to, creates the perfect scenario for a powerful yet undetected attack. State of the art techniques and security operations center tools struggle to come up with effective solutions to recognise these threats. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a novel artificial intelligence based constraint learning technique to help their detection. The approach creates an optimized constraint network representing the nominal behaviour of an employee and detects threatening events when their associated costs are above a certain threshold. The threshold is learnt alongside with the constraint network model. The proposed approach is based on detection models able to provide human interpretable feedback regarding the detection performed. These information are crucial in helping system operators to understand why the detection has occurred and to help them acting promptly on the threat. The explanation comes directly from the structure of the detection model and relies on the identification of which constraints are being violated. The approach is tested on the CERT insider threat dataset v4.2 and the results obtained look promising, achieving at least the same accuracy as other state of the art techniques as well as providing the details regarding the broken constraints of the threat. A comparison with state of the art techniques applied on this dataset is also provided, showing the strength of our results.
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Orizio et al. [33] model got an accuracy score of 99.91%.
“The experimental results showed that the model got an accuracy score of 99.91%, a False Positive Rate (FPR) of 0.06%, a precision of 99.84%, and an F-measure of 55.00%.”
From Enhancing Insider Threat Detection in Imbalanced Cybersecurity Settings Using the Density-Based Local Outlier Factor Algorithm (2024) · cites this paper as [33]
Orizio et al. [33] model got a precision of 99.84%.
“The experimental results showed that the model got an accuracy score of 99.91%, a False Positive Rate (FPR) of 0.06%, a precision of 99.84%, and an F-measure of 55.00%.”
From Enhancing Insider Threat Detection in Imbalanced Cybersecurity Settings Using the Density-Based Local Outlier Factor Algorithm (2024) · cites this paper as [33]
Orizio et al. [33] model got an F-measure of 55.00%.
“The experimental results showed that the model got an accuracy score of 99.91%, a False Positive Rate (FPR) of 0.06%, a precision of 99.84%, and an F-measure of 55.00%.”
From Enhancing Insider Threat Detection in Imbalanced Cybersecurity Settings Using the Density-Based Local Outlier Factor Algorithm (2024) · cites this paper as [33]
Orizio et al. [33] model got a False Positive Rate (FPR) of 0.06%.
“The experimental results showed that the model got an accuracy score of 99.91%, a False Positive Rate (FPR) of 0.06%, a precision of 99.84%, and an F-measure of 55.00%.”
From Enhancing Insider Threat Detection in Imbalanced Cybersecurity Settings Using the Density-Based Local Outlier Factor Algorithm (2024) · cites this paper as [33]
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Bridging the Gap: A Pragmatic Approach to Generating Insider Threat Data
Glasser, J., & Lindauer, B. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops · doi:10.1109/spw.2013.37 · Cited by 344 · see citing works
Insider Threat Detection with Deep Neural Network
Yuan, F., Cao, Y., Shang, Y., Liu, Y., Tan, J., & Fang, B. (2018) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-93698-7_4 · Cited by 168 · see citing works
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Chattopadhyay, P., Wang, L., & Tan, Y.-P. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems · doi:10.1109/tcss.2018.2857473 · Cited by 115 · see citing works
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Liu, L., De Vel, O., Chen, C., Zhang, J., & Xiang, Y. (2018) · 2018 IEEE International Conference on Data Mining Workshops (ICDMW) · doi:10.1109/icdmw.2018.00014 · Cited by 79 · see citing works
Classifier Suites for Insider Threat Detection
Noever, D. (2019) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1901.10948 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
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Insider Threat Detection Using Machine Learning Approach
Bin Sarhan, B., & Altwaijry, N. (2022) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app13010259 · Cited by 111 · see citing works
Al-Shehari, T. A., Rosaci, D., Al-Razgan, M., Alfakih, T., Kadrie, M., Afzal, H., & Nawaz, R. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2024.3373694 · Cited by 51 · see citing works
- Authors
- Orizio, R., Vuppala, S., Basagiannis, S., & Provan, G.
- Affiliations
- University College Cork (IE)
- United Technologies Research Center (IE)
- Venue
- 2020 International Conference on Intelligent Data Science Technologies and Applications (IDSTA)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2020-10-19
- Pages
- 42-49
- OpenAlex
- W3107392334
- Cited by
- 10
- References
- 6
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 2
- FWCI
- 0.57
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- International Conference on Intelligent Data Science Technologies and Applications (IDSTA) (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme InfraStress (833088)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
- Keywords
- insider threat detection, explainable AI, constraint violation, threshold learning, CERT insider threat dataset, security operations center
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