Cited by 345Information and Cyber SecurityPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in DataNetwork Security and Intrusion Detection

Bridging the Gap: A Pragmatic Approach to Generating Insider Threat Data

Open access
Glasser, Joshua, Lindauer, Brian·2013·2013 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops

Abstract

The threat of malicious insider activity continues to be of paramount concern in both the public and private sectors. Though there is great interest in advancing the state of the art in predicting and stopping these threats, the difficulty of obtaining suitable data for research, development, and testing remains a significant hinderance. We outline the use of synthetic data to enable progress in one research program, while discussing the benefits and limitations of synthetic insider threat data, the meaning of realism in this context, as well as future research directions.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/spw.2013.37

Cites

15 of 15 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • The CMU CERT dataset is a synthetic insider threat dataset developed by the CERT division of Carnegie Mellon University.

    “The CMU CERT dataset (Glasser and Lindauer 2013) is a synthetic insider threat dataset developed by the CERT division of Carnegie Mellon University.”

    From BRITD: behavior rhythm insider threat detection with time awareness and user adaptation (2024) · cites this paper as Glasser and Lindauer 2013

    The Introduction describes the authors’ task as generating synthetic data for insider-threat research, and the Acknowledgements link the work to Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute (page numbers unavailable in our copy). The paper does not identify the data as the “CMU CERT dataset” or say it was developed by the CERT division, so those specific attributions are not established. (LLM, conf=0.82)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • In cybersecurity datasets such as CERT and UNSW-NB15, node anomalies often correspond to insider accounts, compromised devices, or misconfigured hosts that diverge from expected interaction patterns.

    “In cybersecurity datasets such as CERT [30] and UNSW-NB15 [31], such anomalies often correspond to insider accounts, compromised devices, or misconfigured hosts that diverge from expected interaction patterns.”

    From A Survey of Heterogeneous Graph Neural Networks for Cybersecurity Anomaly Detection (2025) · cites this paper as [30]

    The Decoy Model section (page unavailable) describes synthetic insider-threat incidents embedded alongside normal user activity, supporting the insider-account aspect of the claim. The Introduction cautions that anomalies in synthetic data cannot establish a correlation with malicious insider behavior. Our copy does not describe node anomalies as generally corresponding to compromised devices or misconfigured hosts, or address UNSW-NB15; this verdict concerns the claim attributed to the CERT citation. (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Cybersecurity graphs often contain millions of nodes and edges that evolve in near real time.

    “Cybersecurity graphs often contain millions of nodes and edges that evolve in near real time, yet many existing HGNN architectures remain too computationally expensive for production use [30], [43].”

    From A Survey of Heterogeneous Graph Neural Networks for Cybersecurity Anomaly Detection (2025) · cites this paper as [30]

    The paper’s “Controllable Social Network Topology” section describes a time-varying social network extracted from its synthetic insider-threat data. That supports the idea of an evolving graph, but the section does not say cybersecurity graphs often have millions of nodes and edges or evolve in near real time. (LLM, conf=0.78)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Insider threat events were injected into the normal behavior logs in the CMU CERT v6.2 dataset.

    “Insider threat events were injected into the normal behavior logs.”

    From BRITD: behavior rhythm insider threat detection with time awareness and user adaptation (2024) · cites this paper as Glasser and Lindauer 2013

    The Threat Scenarios passage says insider-threat incidents were instantiated as synthetic data in the same form and scope as normal background data, supporting the description of threat events appearing alongside normal activity logs. Our copy does not identify those data as the CMU CERT v6.2 dataset, so it does not support that dataset-specific part of the claim. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • The CMU CERT v6.2 dataset simulates behavior logs of 4,000 employees over 516 days.

    “This dataset simulates a series of behavior logs (including login logs, HTTP logs, file logs, email logs, device logs, and so on) of 4,000 employees over 516 days.”

    From BRITD: behavior rhythm insider threat detection with time awareness and user adaptation (2024) · cites this paper as Glasser and Lindauer 2013

    The Introduction (page unavailable) says the authors generated synthetic logs from workstations across a large organization for an approximately 500-day period; the Decoy Model section gives examples of logon and HTTP logs. Our copy does not identify the dataset as CMU CERT v6.2 or substantiate the precise figures of 4,000 employees and 516 days. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

2 of the 17 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Cullen, M.J., Russell, S., Bosshardt, M., Juraska, S., Stell- mack, A., Duehr, E., and Jeansonne, K. "Five-factor model of personality and counterproductive cyber behaviors." Poster presented at the annual conference of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Chicago, IL, 2011.
  2. Newman, Mark E. J. "Power laws, Pareto distributions and Zipfs' law." Contemporary Physics, 46 (5):323351, 2005.
  3. Paxton, K. Bradley, and Hager, Thomas. "Use of synthetic data in testing administrative records systems." Proceedings, Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology (FCSM), Wash- ington, DC, 2012.

Cited by

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Authors
Glasser, J., & Lindauer, B.
Affiliations
Software Engineering Institute (US)
Venue
2013 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2013-05
Pages
98-104
OpenAlex
W1991210879
Cited by
344
References
17
Citations by year
2026: 39 · 2025: 43 · 2024: 45 · 2023: 37 · 2022: 31 · 2021: 32 · 2020: 34 · 2019: 21 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 5 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 3
FWCI
6.43
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • U.S. Department of Defense (FA8721-05-C-0003, Contract No. FA8721-05-C-0003)
  • Carnegie Mellon University
  • Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
  • Advanced Research Projects Agency
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
Keywords
insider threats, synthetic data, insider threat detection, data scarcity

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