The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On the effectiveness of probabilistic packet marking for IP traceback under denial of service attack
Abstract
Effective mitigation of denial of service (DoS) attack is a pressing problem on the Internet. In many instances, DoS attacks can be prevented if the spoofed source IP address is traced back to its origin which allows assigning penalties to the offending party or isolating the compromised hosts and domains from the rest of the network. IP traceback mechanisms based on probabilistic packet marking (PPM) have been proposed for achieving traceback of DoS attacks. We show that probabilistic packet marking-of interest due to its efficiency and implementability vis-a-vis deterministic packet marking and logging or messaging based schemes-suffers under spoofing of the marking field in the IP header by the attacker which can impede traceback by the victim. We show that there is a trade-off between the ability of the victim to localize the attacker and the severity of the DoS attack, which is represented as a function of the marking probability, path length, and traffic volume. The optimal decision problem-the victim can choose the marking probability whereas the attacker can choose the spoofed marking value, source address, and attack volume-can be expressed as a constrained minimax optimization problem, where the victim chooses the marking probability such that the number of forgeable attack paths is minimized. We show that the attacker's ability to hide his location is curtailed by increasing the marking probability, however, the latter is upper-bounded due to sampling constraints. In typical IP internets, the attacker's address can be localized to within 2-5 equally likely sites which renders PPM effective against single source attacks. Under distributed DoS attacks, the uncertainty achievable by the attacker can be amplified, which diminishes the effectiveness of PPM.
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Cites
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Practical network support for IP traceback
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Advanced and authenticated marking schemes for IP traceback
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Tracing Anonymous Packets to Their Approximate Source
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Centertrack: an IP overlay network for tracking DoS floods
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Cited by
A Survey of Defense Mechanisms Against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) Flooding Attacks
Zargar, S. T., Joshi, J., & Tipper, D. (2013) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/surv.2013.031413.00127 · Cited by 1,396
Survey of network-based defense mechanisms countering the DoS and DDoS problems
Peng, T., Leckie, C., & Ramamohanarao, K. (2007) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/1216370.1216373 · Cited by 759
Park, K., & Lee, H. (2001) · Proceedings of the 2001 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications · doi:10.1145/383059.383061 · Cited by 572
Self-citationDetecting SYN flooding attacks
Wang, H., Zhang, D., & Shin, K. G. (2003) · Proceedings.Twenty-First Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies · doi:10.1109/infcom.2002.1019404 · Cited by 568
An algebraic approach to IP traceback
Dean, D., Franklin, M., & Stubblefield, A. (2002) · ACM Transactions on Information and System Security · doi:10.1145/505586.505588 · Cited by 447
Metadata
- Authors
- Park, K., & Lee, H.
- Venue
- Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM 2001. Conference on Computer Communications. Twentieth Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Society (Cat. No.01CH37213)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2002-11-13
- Volume
- 1
- Pages
- 338-347
- OpenAlex
- W2106655090
- Cited by
- 366
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 20.76
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.