The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Truthful incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing
Abstract
With the prosperity of smart devices, crowdsourcing has emerged as a new computing/networking paradigm. Through the crowdsourcing platform, service requesters can buy service from service providers. An important component of crowdsourcing is its incentive mechanism. We study three models of crowdsourcing, which involve cooperation and competition among the service providers. Our simplest model generalizes the well-known user-centric model studied in a recent Mobicom paper. We design an incentive mechanism for each of the three models, and prove that these incentive mechanisms are individually rational, budget-balanced, computationally efficient, and truthful.
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Cites
Reputation-based incentive protocols in crowdsourcing applications
Zhang, Y., & van der Schaar, M. (2012) · 2012 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM · doi:10.1109/infcom.2012.6195597 · Cited by 315
Cited by
A Learning-Based Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning
Zhan, Y., Li, P., Qu, Z., Zeng, D., & Guo, S. (2020) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2020.2967772 · Cited by 602
Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsensing: Crowdsourcing With Smartphones
Yang, D., Xue, G., Fang, X., & Tang, J. (2016) · IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking · doi:10.1109/tnet.2015.2421897 · Cited by 439
Self-citationABCrowd An Auction Mechanism on Blockchain for Spatial Crowdsourcing
Kadadha, M., Mizouni, R., Singh, S., Otrok, H., & Ouali, A. (2020) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2020.2965897 · Cited by 48
Metadata
- Authors
- Zhang, X., Xue, G., Yu, R., Yang, D., & Tang, J.
- Venue
- 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2015-04
- Pages
- 2830-2838
- OpenAlex
- W1486008480
- Cited by
- 180
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 20.35
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Zhang, X., Xue, G., Yu, R., Yang, D., & Tang, J. (2015). Truthful incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing. 2015 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM). https://doi.org/10.1109/infocom.2015.7218676
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