Cited by 48IoT and Edge/Fog ComputingSecurity and Verification in ComputingNetwork Security and Intrusion Detection

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Reverse Engineering IoT Devices: Effective Techniques and Methods

Shwartz, Omer, Mathov, Yael, Bohadana, Michael, Elovici, Yuval, Oren, Yossi·2018·IEEE Internet of Things Journal

Abstract

Recent Internet of Things (IoT) botnet attacks have called the attention to the fact that there are many vulnerable IoT devices connected to the Internet today. Some of these Web-connected devices lack even basic security practices such as strong password authentication. As a consequence, many IoT devices are already infected with malware and many more are vulnerable to exploitation. In this paper we analyze the security level of 16 popular IoT devices. We evaluate several low-cost black-box techniques for reverse engineering these devices, including software and fault injection-based techniques used to bypass password protection. We use these techniques to recover device firmware and passwords. We also discover several common design flaws which lead to previously unknown vulnerabilities. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by modifying a laboratory version of the Mirai botnet to automatically add these devices to a botnet. We also discuss how to improve the security of IoT devices without significantly increasing their cost or affecting their usability.

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Crossref · 10.1109/jiot.2018.2875240

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  • Directly interacting with flash memory is useful when suppliers confuse or delete the interface to protect intellectual property; the Tencent blade team extracts Amazon Echo firmware by this method.

    “As some suppliers confuse or delete the interface to protect their intellectual property rights, it becomes very useful to directly interact with flash memory; for example, the Tencent blade team extracts Amazon Echo firmware by this method [25].”

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Metadata

Authors
Shwartz, O., Mathov, Y., Bohadana, M., Elovici, Y., & Oren, Y.
Affiliations
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (IL)
Venue
IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Published
2018-12
Volume
5
Issue
6
Pages
4965-4976
ISSN
  • 2327-4662 (ISSN-L)
  • 2372-2541
OpenAlex
W2897864851
Cited by
48
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 6 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 2
FWCI
2.17
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
IEEE Internet of Things Journal (publishedVersion)
Funders
Israel Science Foundation (702/16, 703/16)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
Keywords
IoT device security, reverse engineering, IoT botnets, Mirai botnet, password recovery, fault injection, black-box attacks, password authentication, IoT vulnerabilities

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