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Reverse Engineering IoT Devices: Effective Techniques and Methods
Abstract
Recent Internet of Things (IoT) botnet attacks have called the attention to the fact that there are many vulnerable IoT devices connected to the Internet today. Some of these Web-connected devices lack even basic security practices such as strong password authentication. As a consequence, many IoT devices are already infected with malware and many more are vulnerable to exploitation. In this paper we analyze the security level of 16 popular IoT devices. We evaluate several low-cost black-box techniques for reverse engineering these devices, including software and fault injection-based techniques used to bypass password protection. We use these techniques to recover device firmware and passwords. We also discover several common design flaws which lead to previously unknown vulnerabilities. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by modifying a laboratory version of the Mirai botnet to automatically add these devices to a botnet. We also discuss how to improve the security of IoT devices without significantly increasing their cost or affecting their usability.
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Directly interacting with flash memory is useful when suppliers confuse or delete the interface to protect intellectual property; the Tencent blade team extracts Amazon Echo firmware by this method.
“As some suppliers confuse or delete the interface to protect their intellectual property rights, it becomes very useful to directly interact with flash memory; for example, the Tencent blade team extracts Amazon Echo firmware by this method [25].”
From A Survey of IoT Privacy Security: Architecture, Technology, Challenges, and Trends (2024) · cites this paper as [25]
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
A Survey of IoT Privacy Security: Architecture, Technology, Challenges, and Trends
Sun, P., Shen, S., Wan, Y., Wu, Z., Fang, Z., & Gao, X.-Z. (2024) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2024.3372518 · Cited by 172
Metadata
- Authors
- Shwartz, O., Mathov, Y., Bohadana, M., Elovici, Y., & Oren, Y.
- Affiliations
- Ben-Gurion University of the Negev (IL)
- Venue
- IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Published
- 2018-12
- Volume
- 5
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 4965-4976
- ISSN
- 2327-4662 (ISSN-L)
- 2372-2541
- OpenAlex
- W2897864851
- Cited by
- 48
- References
- 0
- Citations by year
- 2026: 6 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 8 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 6 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 2
- FWCI
- 2.17
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE Internet of Things Journal (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- Israel Science Foundation (702/16, 703/16)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › IoT and Edge/Fog Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Keywords
- IoT device security, reverse engineering, IoT botnets, Mirai botnet, password recovery, fault injection, black-box attacks, password authentication, IoT vulnerabilities
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