The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 8 of the 51 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3
Open accessPublished version of a preprint
Abstract
The presence of wireless communication grows undeniably more prevalent each year. Since the introduction of the IEEE 802.11 standard for Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) in 1997, technologies have progressed to provide wireless accessibility to industries and consumers with growing ease and convenience. As the usage of personal devices, such as phones and watches, that connect to the Internet through Wi-Fi increases, wireless attacks on users are becoming more critical. This paper provides a novel attack model to offer an organized and comprehensive view of the possible attacks on Wi-Fi latest security standards. All existing attacks will be investigated, with emphasis on more recent attacks, such as the KRACK and PMKID Dictionary attacks. The main contribution of this paper is to analyze the technology offered in the new Wi-Fi Protected Access III (WPA3) security scheme and provide the first comprehensive security analysis and discussion to determine whether it has addressed the vulnerabilities of its predecessor. An interesting finding of this paper is that WPA3 still lacks in addressing all the issues existing in WPA2 and exploring other mitigations for future research.
Overview
CoChat Summary
TL;DR
This paper presents a four-phase attack flow model for Wi-Fi networks and evaluates whether WPA3 mitigates each known attack. It concludes WPA3 fixes several WPA2 vulnerabilities—deauthentication, offline dictionary attacks, handshake capture decryption, and KRACK—but still leaves evil twin, SSL stripping, DNS spoofing, and parts of rogue AP and ARP spoofing unaddressed.
Key findings
- Table 1 reports WPA3 solves deauthentication, handshake capture dictionary attack, PMKID hash dictionary attack, handshake capture en/decryption, and KRACK; it partially addresses rogue access point and ARP spoofing; it does not solve evil twin, SSL stripping, or DNS spoofing.
- WPA3’s SAE/dragonfly handshake and PMF/SA query make deauthentication and offline dictionary attacks infeasible: the paper states an adversary cannot derive the PMK/PTK without \(r_A\), \(r_B\), and the password element, and obtaining \(m_A\) from \(E_A\) and PE is computationally intractable.
- Remaining feasible attacks include rogue AP key phishing when the client is not connected, evil twin MITM, ARP spoofing client session hijacking, SSL stripping, and DNS spoofing after an MITM position; ARP spoofing MITM is blocked only if client isolation is enabled.
- The model defines four outcomes: denial of service, deception, impersonation, and stolen information.
Methods
- Design: a conceptual attack flow model organized into states, attacks, and outcomes across four phases, applied first to WPA2-PSK and then to WPA3.
- Analysis: case-based security evaluation with assumptions and proofs for each attack, summarized in Table 1; no empirical dataset, measurements, or experimental validation are reported.
- Data/sample: not stated in the paper; the work is a protocol and literature analysis rather than an empirical study.
Limitations
- Stated: WPA3 still lacks solutions for all WPA2 issues; future research is required for ARP spoofing protection and rogue AP/evil twin defenses, and SSL stripping/DNS spoofing are out of WPA3’s layer 3 scope.
- Stated: rogue AP is only partially addressed, with client education recommended; evil twin currently has no protection.
- Evident: the security proofs are qualitative and conceptual, with no experimental validation or quantitative performance data; conclusions depend on assumptions such as client isolation being enabled and KRACK patches being applied.
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Claims the paper makes
8 Valid · 3 Not valid · 42 Not checked · 143 Own results and interpretations
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“This process exploits the four-way handshake that wireless security protocols use to authenticate their users when connecting to the network.”
§ A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3 > 2.3.2. Limitations
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [2] Vanhoef, M., and Piessens, F. (November, January 30). Key reinstallation attacks: Forcing nonce reuse in WPA2. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Dallas, TX, USA. source
The Introduction says the attack targets the 4-way handshake used by protected Wi-Fi networks. Section 2.3 explains that the handshake provides mutual authentication when a client connects, and Section 3 identifies it as vulnerable to a key reinstallation attack. (LLM, conf=0.92)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“It has also been demonstrated that WPA2 can be exploited by a method known as KRACK, for which we will go into further depth in Section 4.2.7.”
§ A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3 > 2.3.2. Limitations
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [2] Vanhoef, M., and Piessens, F. (November, January 30). Key reinstallation attacks: Forcing nonce reuse in WPA2. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Dallas, TX, USA. source
The Introduction (page unavailable) states that both WPA- and WPA2-certified products are affected by the attacks. The Abstract (page unavailable) describes the key reinstallation attack against the Wi-Fi handshake, supporting the claim that WPA2 can be exploited by KRACK. (LLM, conf=0.94)
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Vanhoef and Piessens discovered a vulnerability in the four-way handshake that would give any adversary the ability to decrypt a user's traffic without needing to capture the handshake and have knowledge of the key [2].”
§ A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3 > 3.2.6. Attack-KRACK Exploit
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [2] Vanhoef, M., and Piessens, F. (November, January 30). Key reinstallation attacks: Forcing nonce reuse in WPA2. Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Dallas, TX, USA. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction and Conclusion say the four-way handshake is vulnerable to key reinstallation attacks that can enable frame decryption; §6.4 says the attack does not recover the session key. But §3.3 requires an adversary in a man-in-the-middle position to manipulate handshake messages, including a retransmission of message 3. The paper therefore does not support the claim that any adversary can decrypt traffic without capturing handshake messages. (LLM, conf=0.87)
hedgedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
In the paper
“WPA3 uses the password-based Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) technique to authenticate the client to the AP [28].”
§ A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3 > 4.1. Overview
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [28] (2018, October 30). Wi-Fi Certified WPA3 Technology Overview. Available online: https://www.wi-fi.org/downloads-registered-guest.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
In the paper
“However, WEP has been proven to be easily broken [8][9][10].”
§ A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3 > 2.1. Wireless Equivalency Protocol
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [8][9][10]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
boostedstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Not matched
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- Probably not a substantial claim. 36
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Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The check wasn’t confident either way, so it gives no verdict — never disputed.
In the citing paper
“When using the standardized security level, when the network key is not obtained by preinstallation, the trust center will send the network key currently used by the ZigBee network to the device in an unencrypted form[65].”
From A Survey of IoT Privacy Security: Architecture, Technology, Challenges, and Trends (2024) · cites this paper as [65]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe check wasn’t confident either way, so it gives no verdict — never disputed.
In the citing paper
“Yang etal. [65] sent ping messages, ACK messages, and SYN synchronization messages to Wi-Fi devices to cause DoS attacks on devices. The researchers found that this approach could speed up the energy depletion rate of the equipment by 18.5%.”
From A Survey of IoT Privacy Security: Architecture, Technology, Challenges, and Trends (2024) · cites this paper as [65]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated major: it would touch a result — a value a result rests on, reported and recomputed p-values on opposite sides of the significance level, two passages that conflict with no sign which is right, or a cited work retracted before this paper was published.
In the paper
§ A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3 > Case 2: Client Not Connected
“The adversary will then take the plaintext entries, calculate the PMK, PTK and MIC to compare to the captured handshake and find the correct key.Therefore, preforming a rogue access point attack to obtain network keys is feasible.”
§ A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3 > 4.2.6. Handshake Capture En/Decryption
“Hence, the adversary would not be able to derive a PMK and PTK to compare to a captured MIC and find the correct password that exists within word list.Therefore, preforming handshake capture decryption is unfeasible.”
Citations
Cites
Koblitz, N. (1987) · Mathematics of Computation · doi:10.1090/s0025-5718-1987-0866109-5 · Cited by 5,634 · cited 1×
“By knowing E A and PE , it is computationally intractable to find m A [33].”
BackgroundWireless mesh networks: a survey
Akyildiz, I. F., Wang, X., & Wang, W. (2005) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2004.12.001 · Cited by 4,007
A survey on wireless mesh networks
Akyildiz, I. F., & Wang, X. (2005) · IEEE Communications Magazine · doi:10.1109/mcom.2005.1509968 · Cited by 1,680 · cited 1×
“There have been papers surveying attacks on mobile networks [11,12], sensor networks [13–16] and mesh networks [17], but a comprehensive attack survey on Wi-Fi networks is yet to be seen.”
BackgroundInternational Journal of Emerging Technology and Advanced Engineering
(2020) · International Journal of Emerging Technology and Advanced Engineering · doi:10.46338/ijet · Cited by 1,344
A Survey on Wireless Security: Technical Challenges, Recent Advances, and Future Trends
Zou, Y., Zhu, J., Wang, X., & Hanzo, L. (2016) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2016.2558521 · Cited by 1,272
A survey of security issues in wireless sensor networks
Wang, Y., Attebury, G., & Ramamurthy, B. (2006) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2006.315852 · Cited by 898
(2003) · DigitalCommons - CalPoly (California State Polytechnic University) · Cited by 625
Wireless Sensor Network Security: A Survey
Walters, J. P., Liang, Z., Shi, W., & Chaudhary, V. (2007) · Security in Distributed, Grid, Mobile, and Pervasive Computing · doi:10.1201/9780849379253-20 · Cited by 389
Key Reinstallation Attacks: Forcing Nonce Reuse in WPA2
Vanhoef, M., & Piessens, F. (2017) · Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3133956.3134027 · Cited by 380 · cited 4×
“Each attack will be described in detail and analyzed, including the new Key Re-installation Attack (KRACK) exploit released in 2017 [2] and the recent PMKID attack released in 2018 [3].”
BackgroundInfluential
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Kumkar, 2012, Vulnerabilities of Wireless Security protocols (WEP and WPA2), Int. J. Adv. Res. Comput. Eng. Technol., 1, 34
Cited by
Dragonblood: Analyzing the Dragonfly Handshake of WPA3 and EAP-pwd
Vanhoef, M., & Ronen, E. (2020) · 2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp40000.2020.00031 · Cited by 179
“Finally, Kohlios and Hayajneh provide an overview of WPA2 and the differences with WPA3 [56].”
BackgroundA Survey of IoT Privacy Security: Architecture, Technology, Challenges, and Trends
Sun, P., Shen, S., Wan, Y., Wu, Z., Fang, Z., & Gao, X.-Z. (2024) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2024.3372518 · Cited by 172
“For example, if both devices use the UART interface, the interface can be used to eavesdrop on all key exchanges, and the attacker can obtain the key for encrypted communication [65].”
BackgroundSurvey on Enterprise Internet-of-Things systems (E-IoT): A security perspective
Rondon, L. P., Babun, L., Arış, A., Akkaya, K., & Uluagac, A. S. (2021) · Ad Hoc Networks · doi:10.1016/j.adhoc.2021.102728 · Cited by 96
“[172] Christopher P Kohlios and Thaier Hayajneh.”
Multi-Channel Man-in-the-Middle attacks against protected Wi-Fi networks: A state of the art review
Thankappan, M., Rifà-Pous, H., & Garrigues, C. (2022) · Expert Systems with Applications · doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2022.118401 · Cited by 59
Llaría, Á., dos Santos, J., Terrasson, G., Boussaada, Z., Merlo, C., & Curea, O. (2021) · Energies · doi:10.3390/en14092733 · Cited by 49
Metadata
- Authors
- Kohlios, C. P., & Hayajneh, T.
- Affiliations
- Fordham University (US)
- Corresponding author
- Hayajneh, Thaier
- ORCID
- Hayajneh, Thaier
- Venue
- Electronics
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2018-10-30
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 11
- Pages
- 284
- ISSN
- 2079-9292 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2898565097
- Cited by
- 77
- References
- 34
- Citations by year
- 2026: 9 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 1
- FWCI
- 3.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- dx.doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Electronics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- Preprints.org (acceptedVersion, cc-by)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Wireless Networks and Protocols
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Keywords
- Wi-Fi security, WPA3, WPA2, wireless local area networks, IEEE 802.11, security vulnerabilities, wireless network attacks
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