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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 41 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 8 of the 51 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3

Open access

Published version of a preprint

Abstract

The presence of wireless communication grows undeniably more prevalent each year. Since the introduction of the IEEE 802.11 standard for Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN) in 1997, technologies have progressed to provide wireless accessibility to industries and consumers with growing ease and convenience. As the usage of personal devices, such as phones and watches, that connect to the Internet through Wi-Fi increases, wireless attacks on users are becoming more critical. This paper provides a novel attack model to offer an organized and comprehensive view of the possible attacks on Wi-Fi latest security standards. All existing attacks will be investigated, with emphasis on more recent attacks, such as the KRACK and PMKID Dictionary attacks. The main contribution of this paper is to analyze the technology offered in the new Wi-Fi Protected Access III (WPA3) security scheme and provide the first comprehensive security analysis and discussion to determine whether it has addressed the vulnerabilities of its predecessor. An interesting finding of this paper is that WPA3 still lacks in addressing all the issues existing in WPA2 and exploring other mitigations for future research.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This paper presents a four-phase attack flow model for Wi-Fi networks and evaluates whether WPA3 mitigates each known attack. It concludes WPA3 fixes several WPA2 vulnerabilities—deauthentication, offline dictionary attacks, handshake capture decryption, and KRACK—but still leaves evil twin, SSL stripping, DNS spoofing, and parts of rogue AP and ARP spoofing unaddressed.

Key findings

  • Table 1 reports WPA3 solves deauthentication, handshake capture dictionary attack, PMKID hash dictionary attack, handshake capture en/decryption, and KRACK; it partially addresses rogue access point and ARP spoofing; it does not solve evil twin, SSL stripping, or DNS spoofing.
  • WPA3’s SAE/dragonfly handshake and PMF/SA query make deauthentication and offline dictionary attacks infeasible: the paper states an adversary cannot derive the PMK/PTK without \(r_A\), \(r_B\), and the password element, and obtaining \(m_A\) from \(E_A\) and PE is computationally intractable.
  • Remaining feasible attacks include rogue AP key phishing when the client is not connected, evil twin MITM, ARP spoofing client session hijacking, SSL stripping, and DNS spoofing after an MITM position; ARP spoofing MITM is blocked only if client isolation is enabled.
  • The model defines four outcomes: denial of service, deception, impersonation, and stolen information.

Methods

  • Design: a conceptual attack flow model organized into states, attacks, and outcomes across four phases, applied first to WPA2-PSK and then to WPA3.
  • Analysis: case-based security evaluation with assumptions and proofs for each attack, summarized in Table 1; no empirical dataset, measurements, or experimental validation are reported.
  • Data/sample: not stated in the paper; the work is a protocol and literature analysis rather than an empirical study.

Limitations

  • Stated: WPA3 still lacks solutions for all WPA2 issues; future research is required for ARP spoofing protection and rogue AP/evil twin defenses, and SSL stripping/DNS spoofing are out of WPA3’s layer 3 scope.
  • Stated: rogue AP is only partially addressed, with client education recommended; evil twin currently has no protection.
  • Evident: the security proofs are qualitative and conceptual, with no experimental validation or quantitative performance data; conclusions depend on assumptions such as client isolation being enabled and KRACK patches being applied.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3390/electronics7110284

Cites

41 of 41 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Claims the paper makes

8 Valid · 3 Not valid · 42 Not checked · 143 Own results and interpretations

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Citations

Cites

Show all 34 references

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Kumkar, 2012, Vulnerabilities of Wireless Security protocols (WEP and WPA2), Int. J. Adv. Res. Comput. Eng. Technol., 1, 34

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Kohlios, C. P., & Hayajneh, T.
Affiliations
Fordham University (US)
Corresponding author
Hayajneh, Thaier
Venue
Electronics
Publisher
MDPI AG
Published
2018-10-30
Volume
7
Issue
11
Pages
284
ISSN
2079-9292 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2898565097
Cited by
77
References
34
Citations by year
2026: 9 · 2025: 13 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 13 · 2020: 6 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 1
FWCI
3.56
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Electronics (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Preprints.org (acceptedVersion, cc-by)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Wireless Networks and Protocols
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
Keywords
Wi-Fi security, WPA3, WPA2, wireless local area networks, IEEE 802.11, security vulnerabilities, wireless network attacks

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.3390/electronics7110284
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Kohlios, C. P., & Hayajneh, T. (2018). A Comprehensive Attack Flow Model and Security Analysis for Wi-Fi and WPA3. Electronics. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics7110284

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

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