GNSS Spoofing and Detection
Abstract
Global navigation satellite signals can be spoofed by false signals, but special receivers can provide defenses against such attacks. The development of good spoofing defenses requires an understanding of the possible attack modes of a spoofer and the properties of those modes that can be exploited for defense purposes. Sets of attack methods and defense methods are described in detail. An attack/defense matrix is developed that documents which defense techniques are effective against the various attack techniques. Recommendations are generated to improve the offerings of commercial off-the-shelf receivers from the current situation, a complete lack of spoofing defenses, to a situation in which various levels of defense are present, some that add significant security for relatively little additional cost and others that add more security at costs that start to become appreciable.
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Exploits used to enter a MITM include IP spoofing, ARP spoofing, GNSS spoofing, and DNS spoofing.
“Exploits that are used to enter a MITM include internet protocol (IP) spoofing, address resolution protocol (ARP) spoofing, global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing, and domain name system (DNS) spoofing [38].”
From Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure. (2023) · cites this paper as [38]
Cites
Unmanned Aircraft Capture and Control Via GPS Spoofing
Kerns, A. J., Shepard, D. P., Bhatti, J., & Humphreys, T. (2014) · J. Field Robotics · doi:10.1002/rob.21513 · Cited by 709 · see citing works
Self-citationAssessing the Spoofing Threat: Development of a Portable GPS Civilian Spoofer
Kintner, P. M. (2018) · Texas ScholarWorks (Texas Digital Library) · doi:10.15781/t26t0hc7q · Cited by 538 · see citing works
GPS Vulnerability to Spoofing Threats and a Review of Antispoofing Techniques
Jafarnia-Jahromi, A., Broumandan, A., Nielsen, J., et al. (2012) · International Journal of Navigation and Observation · doi:10.1155/2012/127072 · Cited by 413 · see citing works
Hostile Control of Ships via False GPS Signals: Demonstration and Detection
Bhatti, J. A., & Humphreys, T. E. (2017) · NAVIGATION Journal of the Institute of Navigation · doi:10.1002/navi.183 · Cited by 268 · see citing works
Self-citationWho's Afraid of the Spoofer? GPS/GNSS Spoofing Detection via Automatic Gain Control (AGC)
AKOS, D. M. (2012) · NAVIGATION Journal of the Institute of Navigation · doi:10.1002/navi.19 · Cited by 266 · see citing works
Detection Strategy for Cryptographic GNSS Anti-Spoofing
Humphreys, T. E. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems · doi:10.1109/taes.2013.6494400 · Cited by 261 · see citing works
Self-citationAnti-Spoofing & Authenticated Signal Architectures for Civil Navigation Systems
Scott, L. (2003) · Cited by 170 · see citing works
Real-Time GPS Spoofing Detection via Correlation of Encrypted Signals
O’Hanlon, B. W., Psiaki, M. L., Bhatti, J. A., et al. (2013) · NAVIGATION Journal of the Institute of Navigation · doi:10.1002/navi.44 · Cited by 103 · see citing works
Self-citationA Survey of Spoofing and Counter-Measures
Günther, C. G. (2014) · NAVIGATION Journal of the Institute of Navigation · doi:10.1002/navi.65 · Cited by 100 · see citing works
A blueprint for civil GPS navigation message authentication
Kerns, A. J., Wesson, K. D., & Humphreys, T. E. (2014) · doi:10.1109/plans.2014.6851385 · Cited by 97 · see citing works
Self-citationGNSS Spoofing Detection using High-Frequency Antenna Motion and Carrier-Phase Data
Psiaki, M. L., Powell, S. P., & O’Hanlon, B. W. (2013) · Cited by 87 · see citing works
Self-citationPre-Despreading Authenticity Verification for GPS L1 C/A Signals
Jafarnia-Jahromi, A., Broumandan, A., Nielsen, J., et al. (2014) · NAVIGATION Journal of the Institute of Navigation · doi:10.1002/navi.50 · Cited by 44 · see citing works
Autonomous Spoofing Detection and Mitigation in a GNSS Receiver with an Adaptive Antenna Array
Konovaltsev, A., Cuntz, M., Haettich, C., et al. (2013) · elib (German Aerospace Center) · Cited by 33 · see citing works
Manfredini, E. G., Motella, B., & Dovis, F. (2015) · PORTO Publications Open Repository TOrino (Politecnico di Torino) · Cited by 15 · see citing works
GNSS Spoofing Attack Detection using Aircraft Autopilot Response to Deceptive Trajectory
Tanıl, Ç., Khanafseh, S. M., & PERVAN, B. S. (2015) · Cited by 13 · see citing works
Field Test Validation of Single-Element Antenna with Anti-Jam and Spoof Detection
McMilin, E., Chen, Y., Lorenzo, D. S. D., et al. (2015) · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Pozzobon, O., Sarto, C., Chiara, A. D., et al. (2012) · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Robust Open Service GNSS Receivers for Military Applications
McGraw, G. A., Disselkoen, B., & Buesnel, G. (2013) · Proceedings of the 26th International Technical Meeting of The Satellite Division of the Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2013) · Cited by 1 · see citing works
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Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure.
Riggs, H., Tufail, S., Parvez, I., Tariq, M., Khan, M. A., Amir, A., Vuda, K. V., & Sarwat, A. I. (2023) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s23084060 · Cited by 124 · see citing works
“Exploits that are used to enter a MITM include internet protocol (IP) spoofing, address resolution protocol (ARP) spoofing, global navigation satellite system (GNSS) spoofing, and domain name system (DNS) spoofing [38].”
Method
- Authors
- Psiaki, M. L., & Humphreys, T. E.
- Affiliations
- Cornell University (US)
- The University of Texas at Austin (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the IEEE
- Published
- 2016-06
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1258-1270
- ISSN
- 0018-9219 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-2256
- OpenAlex
- W2332630870
- Cited by
- 736
- References
- 18
- Citations by year
- 2026: 132 · 2025: 95 · 2024: 100 · 2023: 92 · 2022: 63 · 2021: 65 · 2020: 71 · 2019: 42 · 2018: 57 · 2017: 14 · 2016: 5
- FWCI
- 47.96
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Proceedings of the IEEE (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Research Council
- Air Force Research Lab Space Vehicles Directorate
- Kirtland AFB, Albuquerque, NM
- National Science Foundation (1454474)
- Data-supported Transportation Operations and Planning Center (D-STOP)
- Tier 1 USDOT University Transportation Center
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Aerospace Engineering › GNSS positioning and interference
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Keywords
- GNSS spoofing, anti-spoofing, attack modes, defense techniques, GNSS security
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