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Securing commercial WiFi-based UAVs from common security attacks
Abstract
We posit that commercial Wi-Fi-based unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) are vulnerable to common and basic security attacks, capable by beginner to intermediate hackers. We do this by demonstrating that the standard ARDiscovery Connection process and the Wi-Fi access point used in the Parrot Bebop UAV are exploitable such that the UAV's ability to fly can be disrupted mid-flight by a remote attacker. We believe that these vulnerabilities are systemic in Wi-Fi-based Parrot UAVs. Our approach observed the normal operation (i.e., ARDiscovery Connection process over Wi-Fi) of the Parrot Bebop UAV. We then used a fuzzing technique to discover that the Parrot Bebop UAV is vulnerable to basic denial of service (DoS) and buffer-overflow attacks during its ARDiscovery Connection process. The exploitation of these vulnerabilities could result in catastrophic and immediate disabling of the UAV's rotors midflight. Also, we discovered that the Parrot Bebop UAV is vulnerable to a basic ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) Cache Poisoning attack, which can disconnect the primary mobile device user and in most cases cause the UAV to land or return home. Based on the literature and our own penetration testing, we assert that Wi-Fi-based commercial UAVs require a comprehensive security framework that utilizes a defense-in-depth approach. This approach would likely mitigate security risks associated with the three zero-day vulnerabilities described in this paper as well as other vulnerabilities reported in the literature. This framework will be effective for Parrot Wi-Fi-based commercial UAVs and likely others with similar platforms.
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Cited by
Fotouhi, A., Qiang, H., Ding, M., Hassan, M., Giordano, L. G., Garcia-Rodriguez, A., & Yuan, J. (2019) · IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials · doi:10.1109/comst.2019.2906228 · Cited by 1,115
Security analysis of drones systems: Attacks, limitations, and recommendations
Yaacoub, J.-P., Noura, H., Salman, O., & Chehab, A. (2020) · Internet of Things · doi:10.1016/j.iot.2020.100218 · Cited by 727
A Comprehensive Review of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Attacks and Neutralization Techniques
Chamola, V., Kotesh, P., Agarwal, A., Naren, Gupta, N., & Guizani, M. (2021) · Ad Hoc Networks · doi:10.1016/j.adhoc.2020.102324 · Cited by 367
Security and privacy in 6G networks: New areas and new challenges
Wang, M., Zhu, T., Zhang, T., Zhang, J., Yu, S., & Zhou, W. (2020) · Digital Communications and Networks · doi:10.1016/j.dcan.2020.07.003 · Cited by 363
SecAuthUAV: A Novel Authentication Scheme for UAV-Ground Station and UAV-UAV Communication
Alladi, T., Naren, Bansal, G., Chamola, V., & Guizani, M. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology · doi:10.1109/tvt.2020.3033060 · Cited by 344
A review on cybersecurity vulnerabilities for unmanned aerial vehicles
Krishna, C. G. L., & Murphy, R. R. (2017) · 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Safety, Security and Rescue Robotics (SSRR) · doi:10.1109/ssrr.2017.8088163 · Cited by 259
A survey on security and privacy issues of UAVs
Mekdad, Y., Aris, A., Babun, L., Fergougui, A. E., Conti, M., Lazzeretti, R., & Uluagac, A. S. (2023) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2023.109626 · Cited by 253
Cognition in UAV-Aided 5G and Beyond Communications: A Survey
Ullah, Z., Al-Turjman, F., & Mostarda, L. (2020) · IEEE Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking · doi:10.1109/tccn.2020.2968311 · Cited by 226
A Review of Counter-UAS Technologies for Cooperative Defensive Teams of Drones
Castrillo, V. U., Manco, A., Pascarella, D., & Gigante, G. (2022) · Drones · doi:10.3390/drones6030065 · Cited by 131
Reliable and Efficient Data Collection in UAV-based IoT Networks
Joshi, P., Kalita, A., & Gurusamy, M. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2311.05303 · Cited by 61
“One limitation of Wi-Fi is its handling of mobility and hand-off between BSs, constraining the operational range of drones to a few miles within direct access to the AP [43].”
Metadata
- Authors
- Hooper, M., Tian, Y., Zhou, R., Cao, B., Lauf, A. P., Watkins, L., Robinson, W. H., & Alexis, W.
- Venue
- MILCOM 2016 - 2016 IEEE Military Communications Conference
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2016-11
- Pages
- 1213-1218
- OpenAlex
- W2566869048
- Cited by
- 163
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 12.28
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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