The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Warder: Online Insider Threat Detection System Using Multi-Feature Modeling and Graph-Based Correlation
Abstract
Existing insider threat detection models and frameworks generally focus on characterizing and detecting malicious insiders, for example by fusing behavioral analysis, machine learning, psychological characters, management measures, etc. However, it remains challenging to design a practical insider threat detection scheme that can be efficiently implemented and deployed in a real-world system. For example, existing approaches focus on extracting features from user behavioral activities but they lack in-depth correlation and decision making for suspected alerts; thus, resulting in high false positives and low detection accuracy. In this work, we propose a novel online insider threat detection system, Warder, which leverages diverse feature dimensions (using neural language processing) and fuses content and behavior features to create a user's daily profile to facilitate threat detection. Besides, hypergraph-based threat scenario feature tree is designed to correlate suspicious users' activities with threat scenarios to further screen the users. In practice, Warder can also be constantly updated using newly discovered features and threat scenarios. We evaluate the performance of Warder using the public CMU CERT dataset, as well as that of approaches from the Oxford group and CMU group. Findings from the evaluation demonstrate that Warder outperforms the other two competing approaches.
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“Moreover, supervised learning methods, such as support vector machines (SVM) and random forests, leverage labeled datasets to train models capable of discriminating between normal and malicious activities [73], [74], [75].”
From A Review of Recent Advances, Challenges, and Opportunities in Malicious Insider Threat Detection Using Machine Learning Methods (2024) · cites this paper as [75]
Citations
Cites
Bridging the Gap: A Pragmatic Approach to Generating Insider Threat Data
Glasser, J., & Lindauer, B. (2013) · 2013 IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops · doi:10.1109/spw.2013.37 · Cited by 344
Automated Insider Threat Detection System Using User and Role-Based Profile Assessment
Legg, P., Buckley, O. E., Goldsmith, M. H., & Creese, S. (2015) · IEEE Systems Journal · doi:10.1109/jsyst.2015.2438442 · Cited by 186 · cited 4×
“These models generally focus on building comprehensive profile of users and then using anomaly detection [2], [3], scenario analysis [4] and graph analysis [5] to detect malicious insiders.”
InfluentialFeature Correlation Hypergraph: Exploiting High-order Potentials for Multimodal Recognition
Zhang, L., Gao, Y., Hong, C., Feng, Y., Zhu, J., & Cai, D. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics · doi:10.1109/tcyb.2013.2285219 · Cited by 143 · cited 1×
“Hyper graph [13] is a graph where an edge can connect any number of vertices.”
BackgroundBehavioral Analysis of Insider Threat: A Survey and Bootstrapped Prediction in Imbalanced Data
Azaria, A., Richardson, A., Kraus, S., & Subrahmanian, V. S. (2014) · IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems · doi:10.1109/tcss.2014.2377811 · Cited by 133 · cited 2×
“…could be overcame by the decision module, which suggests that our designed decision layer can greatly enhance the precision and recall rate of threat detection precision. c) Performance comparison: We compare Warder with two representative approaches of the Oxford group [2] and CMU group [14].”
MethodScenario-Based Insider Threat Detection From Cyber Activities
Chattopadhyay, P., Wang, L., & Tan, Y.-P. (2018) · IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems · doi:10.1109/tcss.2018.2857473 · Cited by 115 · cited 1×
“In [10], for example, the authors proposed a system which designed a time window for correlation and threat decision.”
BackgroundBF-IoT: Securing the IoT Networks via Fingerprinting-Based Device Authentication
Gu, T., & Mohapatra, P. (2018) · IEEE International Conference on Mobile Ad-Hoc and Sensor Systems (MASS) · doi:10.1109/mass.2018.00047 · Cited by 52 · cited 1×
“These models generally focus on building comprehensive profile of users and then using anomaly detection [2], [3], scenario analysis [4] and graph analysis [5] to detect malicious insiders.”
Self-citationSOFIT: Sociotechnical and Organizational Factors for Insider Threat
Greitzer, F. L., Purl, J. D., Leong, Y. M., & Becker, D. (2018) · IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) · doi:10.1109/spw.2018.00035 · Cited by 44 · cited 1×
“Although both objective and subjective factors [6] of users have been utilized to build comprehensive frameworks, these models are not easily trained and evaluated due to lack of realworld data.”
Towards Insider Threat Detection Using Psychophysiological Signals
Hashem, Y., Takabi, H., GhasemiGol, M., & Dantu, R. (2015) · ACM CCS International Workshop on Managing Insider Security Threats (MIST) · doi:10.1145/2808783.2808792 · Cited by 36 · cited 1×
“There are also some competing approaches on insider threat detection, such as those in [15], [16].”
BackgroundKandias, M., Gritzalis, D. A., Stavrou, V., & Nikoloulis, K. (2016) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2016.12.003 · Cited by 29 · cited 1×
“There are also some competing approaches on insider threat detection, such as those in [15], [16].”
BackgroundJiang, J., Chen, J., Choo, K. R., Liu, K., Liu, C., Yu, M., & Mohapatra, P. (2018) · IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM) · doi:10.1109/milcom.2018.8599790 · Cited by 24 · cited 2×
“To build a robust detection model, we carve out a new path to explore content-based features shown in [11].”
Self-citationMylrea, M., Gourisetti, S. N. G., Larimer, C., & Noonan, C. F. (2018) · IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) · doi:10.1109/spw.2018.00036 · Cited by 23 · cited 1×
“Therefore, behavioral activities of users are widely used to characterize and build profiles of users, as evidenced by existing research [7].”
BackgroundDetection of Masqueraders Based on Graph Partitioning of File System Access Events
Toffalini, F., Homoliak, I., Harilal, A., Binder, A., & Ochoa, M. (2018) · IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) · doi:10.1109/spw.2018.00037 · Cited by 17 · cited 2×
“These models generally focus on building comprehensive profile of users and then using anomaly detection [2], [3], scenario analysis [4] and graph analysis [5] to detect malicious insiders.”
Simulated User Bots: Real Time Testing of Insider Threat Detection Systems
Dutta, P. K., Ryan, G., Zieba, A., & Stolfo, S. J. (2018) · IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) · doi:10.1109/spw.2018.00038 · Cited by 13 · cited 2×
“These models generally focus on building comprehensive profile of users and then using anomaly detection [2], [3], scenario analysis [4] and graph analysis [5] to detect malicious insiders.”
BackgroundActivity Pattern Discovery from Network Captures
Lin, A. C., & Peterson, G. L. (2016) · IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops (SPW) · doi:10.1109/spw.2016.22 · Cited by 3 · cited 1×
“Such approaches generally use users’ behavioral logs, such as email, device, file [5], and logon patterns, as data source, and then use some anomaly based or machine learning based methods to detect insider threat [8].”
MethodKazdagli, M., Caramanis, C., Shakkottai, S., & Tiwari, M. (2018) · arXiv (Cornell University) · doi:10.48550/arxiv.1803.00883 · Cited by 1 · cited 1×
“In recent times, researchers have also realized the importance of a decision layer in a detection system [9].”
Background
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- schulze, 0, Insider Threat 2018 Report
Cited by
Alzaabi, F. R., & Mehmood, A. (2024) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2024.3369906 · Cited by 204
“Moreover, supervised learning methods, such as support vector machines (SVM) and random forests, leverage labeled datasets to train models capable of discriminating between normal and malicious activities [73], [74], [75].”
MethodMetamorphic Malware and Obfuscation: A Survey of Techniques, Variants, and Generation Kits
Brezinski, K., & Ferens, K. (2023) · Security and Communication Networks · doi:10.1155/2023/8227751 · Cited by 80
IoTGaze: IoT Security Enforcement via Wireless Context Analysis
Gu, T., Fang, Z., Abhishek, A., Fu, H., Hu, P., & Mohapatra, P. (2020) · IEEE Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM) · doi:10.1109/infocom41043.2020.9155459 · Cited by 64
“Graph-based detection approaches [32], [33] can also be applied to IoT to detect anomalies.”
MethodSelf-citationITDBERT: Temporal-semantic Representation for Insider Threat Detection
Huang, W., Zhu, H., Li, C., Lv, Q., Wang, Y., & Yang, H. (2021) · IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC) · doi:10.1109/iscc53001.2021.9631538 · Cited by 54
Self-citationWei, Y., Chow, K.-P., & Yiu, S.-M. (2021) · Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation · doi:10.1016/j.fsidi.2021.301126 · Cited by 32
“[13] proposed to use a graph-based correlation model to do a second step decision making, its actual implementation is through hand crafted construction of the scenario feature trees and doing a simple matching on the recognized anomalous activities in the previous step, which is not applicable in the real case with l…”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Jiang, J., Chen, J., Gu, T., Choo, K.-K. R., Liu, C., Yu, M., Huang, W., & Mohapatra, P.
- Affiliations
- Chinese Academy of Sciences (CN)
- University of California, Davis (US)
- The University of Texas at San Antonio (US)
- Venue
- MILCOM 2019 - 2019 IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2019-11
- Pages
- 1-6
- OpenAlex
- W3011330084
- Cited by
- 14
- References
- 15
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 1
- FWCI
- 1.19
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › User Authentication and Security Systems
- Keywords
- insider threat detection, false positive reduction
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