A Comprehensive Overview of Backdoor Attacks in Large Language Models Within Communication Networks
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
The Large Language Models (LLMs) are poised to offer efficient and intelligent services for future mobile communication networks, owing to their exceptional capabilities in language comprehension and generation. However, the extremely high data and computational resource requirements for the performance of LLMs compel developers to resort to outsourcing training or utilizing third-party data and computing resources. These strategies may expose the model within the network to maliciously manipulated training data and processing, providing an opportunity for attackers to embed a hidden backdoor into the model, termed a backdoor attack. Backdoor attack in LLMs refers to embedding a hidden backdoor in LLMs that causes the model to perform normally on benign samples but exhibit degraded performance on poisoned ones. This issue is particularly concerning within communication networks where reliability and security are paramount. Despite the extensive research on backdoor attacks, there remains a lack of in-depth exploration specifically within the context of LLMs employed in communication networks, and a systematic review of such attacks is currently absent. In this survey, we systematically propose a taxonomy of backdoor attacks in LLMs as used in communication networks, dividing them into four major categories:input-triggered,prompt-triggered,instruction-triggered, anddemonstration-triggeredattacks. Furthermore, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of the benchmark datasets. Finally, we identify potential problems and open challenges, offering valuable insights into future research directions for enhancing the security and integrity of LLMs in communication networks.
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Cites
Sparks of Artificial General Intelligence: Early experiments with GPT-4
Bubeck, S., Chandrasekaran, V., Eldan, R., Gehrke, J., Horvitz, E., Kamar, E., Lee, P., Lee, Y. T., Li, Y., Lundberg, S., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2303.12712 · Cited by 1,526
Hidden Backdoors in Human-Centric Language Models
Li, S., Liu, H., Dong, T., Zhao, B. Z. H., Xue, M., Zhu, H., & Lu, J. (2021) · Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/3460120.3484576 · Cited by 119 · cited 4×
“, 2021 [4] Input-triggered NMT model, LSTM-BS, PPLM WMT 2014, SQuAD DP/MP S2”
BackgroundInfluentialIgnore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Models
Perez, F., & Ribeiro, I. (2022) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2211.09527 · Cited by 110 · cited 2×
“, 2022 [12] Prompt-triggered GPT-3 / / /”
Background
Cited by
A survey on large language model (LLM) security and privacy: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly
Yao, Y., Duan, J., Xu, K., Cai, Y., Sun, Z., & Zhang, Y. (2024) · High-Confidence Computing · doi:10.1016/j.hcc.2024.100211 · Cited by 1,083
“In this section, we examine the range of existing defense methods against various attacks and vulnerabilities associated with LLMs 1 .”
BackgroundUnleashing the potential of prompt engineering for large language models
Chen, B., Zhang, Z., Langrené, N., & Zhu, S. (2025) · Patterns · doi:10.1016/j.patter.2025.101260 · Cited by 490
Security and Privacy Challenges of Large Language Models: A Survey
Das, B. C., Amini, M. H., & Wu, Y. (2025) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3712001 · Cited by 445
Jaffal, N. O., Alkhanafseh, M., & Mohaisen, D. (2025) · AI · doi:10.3390/ai6090216 · Cited by 69
The Emerged Security and Privacy of LLM Agent: A Survey with Case Studies
He, F., Zhu, T., Ye, D., Liu, B., Zhou, W., & Yu, P. S. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2407.19354 · Cited by 60
Metadata
- Authors
- Yang, H., Xiang, K., Ge, M., Li, H., Lu, R., & Yu, S.
- Venue
- IEEE Network
- Published
- 2024-11
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 211-218
- ISSN
- 0890-8044 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-156X
- OpenAlex
- W4391974622
- Cited by
- 65
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 9.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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