The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A secure way of exchanging the secret keys in advanced metering infrastructure
Abstract
Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) security has become a challenging issue now days because of its integration with the external networks, remote system, and internet world. Today's metering infrastructure employs computer based monitoring and control operations to enable application of one network to exchange data with other application of different network. Communication protocol, network topologies, and computerization plays crucial roles to make the metering infrastructure advanced and further make a grid smarter. On the other hand, cyber attacks already associated with such computer networks and communication protocol can easily affect the communication of AMI applications. Therefore, from trespasser point of view, in this paper, we explore the various possible types of undesirable security threats followed by desirable security attributes required for the AMI. The paper further describes and implements a signature based station-to-station protocol for exchanging the secret shared keys among the AMI applications to get rid from undesirable security threats.
Overview
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
A malicious node in a wireless mesh network can tamper with messages sensitive to flooding attacks, resulting in saturation of the AMI network; DoS attack comes from malicious node(s) sending excessive unnecessary data packets and issuing excessive requests, congesting the mesh network and increasing latency.
“A malicious node in a wireless mesh network can tamper with messages that are sensitive to flooding attacks, resulting in a saturation of the AMI network. The DoS attack will come from a malicious node or nodes in the mesh network, sending excessive unnecessary data packets throughout the network and issuing excessive requests for communication. This traffic congests the mesh network and forms the”
From Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure. (2023) · cites this paper as [33]
Citations
Cites
Cryptography and Network Security: Principles and Practice
Stallings, W. (1998) · Cited by 4,392
Security and Privacy Challenges in the Smart Grid
McDaniel, P. D., & McLaughlin, S. (2009) · IEEE Security & Privacy · doi:10.1109/msp.2009.76 · Cited by 1,177
Security Technology for Smart Grid Networks
Metke, A. R., & Ekl, R. L. (2010) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2010.2046347 · Cited by 612
Khurana, H., Hadley, M. D., Lü, N., & Frincke, D. A. (2010) · IEEE Security & Privacy · doi:10.1109/msp.2010.49 · Cited by 610
A Lightweight Message Authentication Scheme for Smart Grid Communications
Fouda, M. M., Fadlullah, Z. M., Kato, N., Lu, R., & Shen, X. (2011) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2011.2160661 · Cited by 459
A semantic model for authentication protocols
Woo, T. Y. C., & Lam, S. S. (2002) · IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/risp.1993.287633 · Cited by 303
Cyber security issues for Advanced Metering Infrasttructure (AMI)
Cleveland, F. M. (2008) · doi:10.1109/pes.2008.4596535 · Cited by 292
Fault-Tolerant and Scalable Key Management for Smart Grid
Wu, D. O., & Zhou, C. (2011) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2011.2120634 · Cited by 280
Review and evaluation of security threats on the communication networks in the smart grid
Lu, Z., Lu, X., Wang, W., & Wang, C. X. (2010) · IEEE Military Communications Conference (MILCOM) · doi:10.1109/milcom.2010.5679551 · Cited by 188
SCADASim—A Framework for Building SCADA Simulations
Queiroz, C., Mahmood, A. N., & Tari, Z. (2011) · IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid · doi:10.1109/tsg.2011.2162432 · Cited by 153
Bennett, C., & Highfill, D. (2008) · doi:10.1109/energy.2008.4781067 · Cited by 147
An AMI System for the Deregulated Electricity Markets
Sui, H., Wang, H., Lu, M.-S., et al. (2009) · IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications · doi:10.1109/tia.2009.2031848 · Cited by 82
Delgado‐Gomes, V., Martins, J. F., Lima, C. P., & Borza, P. N. (2015) · IEEE International Conference on Compatibility, Power Electronics and Power Engineering · doi:10.1109/cpe.2015.7231132 · Cited by 66
Cryptographic Key Management for SCADA Systems-Issues and Perspectives
Pi, L., & Sitbon, P. (2008) · doi:10.1109/isa.2008.77 · Cited by 51
Security Measures for Advanced Metering Infrastructure Components
Shein, R. (2010) · Asia-Pacific Power and Energy Engineering Conference (APPEEC) · doi:10.1109/appeec.2010.5448261 · Cited by 36
A Privacy-Aware Architecture for Demand Response Systems
Wicker, S. B., & Thomas, R. J. (2011) · Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS) · doi:10.1109/hicss.2011.24 · Cited by 32
Using a packet manipulation tool for security analysis of industrial network protocols
Kobayashi, T. H., Batista, A. B., Brito, A. M., et al. (2007) · IEEE Conference on Emerging Technologies & Factory Automation (ETFA) · doi:10.1109/efta.2007.4416847 · Cited by 31
Customized PKI for SCADA System
Saxena, A., Pal, O., Saquib, Z., et al. (2010) · Cited by 5
Interoperability Framework for Data Exchange between Legacy and Advanced Metering Infrastructure
Thomas, M. S., Ali, I., & Gupta, N. (2016) · Cited by 4
Self-citationDoja, M. N., Saini, D., & Gupta, N. (2009) · The International Journal of Technology Knowledge and Society · doi:10.18848/1832-3669/cgp/v05i04/56013 · Cited by 1
Self-citation
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- lenzini, 2009, Trust, security and privacy for advanced metering infrastructure, Technical Report
- 2010, Google Powermeter Web
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Impact, Vulnerabilities, and Mitigation Strategies for Cyber-Secure Critical Infrastructure.
Riggs, H., Tufail, S., Parvez, I., Tariq, M., Khan, M. A., Amir, A., Vuda, K. V., & Sarwat, A. I. (2023) · Sensors · doi:10.3390/s23084060 · Cited by 124
“This traffic congests the mesh network and forms the basis of the flooding attack, which is identified as a DoS and impacts the network by increasing the latency of the communications [32,33].”
BackgroundA key management-based two-level encryption method for AMI
Parvez, I., Islam, A., & Kaleem, F. (2014) · 2014 IEEE PES General Meeting | Conference & Exposition · doi:10.1109/pesgm.2014.6939551 · Cited by 24
Metadata
- Authors
- Thomas, M. S., Ali, I., & Gupta, N.
- Affiliations
- Jamia Millia Islamia (IN)
- Venue
- 2012 IEEE International Conference on Power System Technology (POWERCON)
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2012-10
- Pages
- 1-7
- OpenAlex
- W2537682469
- Cited by
- 13
- References
- 20
- Citations by year
- 2024: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2020: 1 · 2018: 2 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 2
- FWCI
- 3.08
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- International Conference on Power System Technology (POWERCON) (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Security in Wireless Sensor Networks
- Keywords
- advanced metering infrastructure, secret key exchange, digital signatures, cyberattacks, security threats, smart grid security, protocol security, network security
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
